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Foreword 1
The authors of There’s Another Side to Euthanasia are commendable. Their 
powerful book proves that 18 years after the Belgian law on euthanasia was passed, 
and in the midst of a rather broad consensus about the subject among the media and 
public opinion, the need to challenge popular beliefs remains. Giving fieldworkers 
the opportunity to express their doubts while describing their experience gives 
weight to the arguments. They forget about the false conflict between advocates of 
an ethic of autonomy and promoters of one of vulnerability, and similarly, avoid the 
inflated antagonism between people who can be “compassionate” with someone 
else’s suffering and the “unbending” defenders of the ban on killing. Providing facts 
and genuine experience which prompt their reflection, the authors offer their 
unassuming testimony before asserting their convictions. Thus, unbiased by 
ideological preconceptions, the style flows with neither pathos nor arrogance. 
People who choose to perform euthanasia are not stigmatized. On the contrary, their 
tactfulness is conveyed for instance when a colleague’s refusal to take part in 
euthanasia is respected and the medical team makes sure they are not present at the 
lethal injection. Although not stigmatized, people in favour of euthanasia may feel 
challenged by these bold testimonies which run against the tide of popular thinking 
to follow people’s inner voice of conscience.
Undoubtedly, people who choose to perform euthanasia examine their conscience 
too when appraising their course of action, and we may not doubt their authenticity. 
Neither do we have any reason to doubt the integrity of those who exercise their 
right to conscientious objection by refusing to take their patients’ lives: one cannot 
accuse someone who ratifies the Hippocratic Oath of holding outdated moral or 
religious standards. Yet, we notice that conscientious objection is under pressure 
when an author writes: “The present-day message of liberal societies is to discredit 
conscientious objection in the name of tolerance. In other words, a ‘tolerant’ health 
professional is expected to carry out everything that is demanded of them without 
any personal thinking. Doesn't tolerance run the risk of becoming tyrannical if it 
prevents a carer from working with their conscience, and renders illegitimate any 
personal deliberation on the meaning of what is right and good?” Furthermore, 
during an inspection, Community inspectors have ordered a hospital, whose charter 
stipulated euthanasia was not to be performed on their premises, to update the 
document and lay down a euthanasia protocol. If conscientious objection is reduced 
in this way to a merely individual dimension, it is watered down to simple tolerance 
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for a personal weakness or a worrying inability to abide by the common decency. 
Too often, the conscience issue boils down to a subjective feeling, a personal 
opinion, or even “a perverted sense of duty”, and one easily forgets that, in order to 
be legitimate, conscience needs to be “enlightened”. It needs mentioning that the 
authors of the testimonies in this book manage to provide a number of perspectives 
which are easily overlooked when euthanasia is performed, such as: Why is 
euthanasia wrongly referred to as a “natural death”? Why is the doctor's identity 
concealed in the case of euthanasia “whilst it is explicitly documented in any other 
significant medical act?”
The main argument of the promoters of euthanasia is well known: when a 
patient’s request has been accepted, their unappeasable suffering must be relieved. 
Refusing to alleviate their pain would be tantamount to lacking compassion and 
restricting their freedom. But such reasoning, often with heartfelt articulation but 
also in good faith, contains a major flaw: it denies the complexity of the underlying 
issues. On the one hand, “unappeasable suffering” has so many different facets that 
it is not easy to define precisely. Moreover, a wide range of methods to relieve 
suffering are now available, including palliative sedation. On the other hand, can 
someone’s freedom to acknowledge that they see no alternative way to escape 
unbearable suffering be regarded as a real freedom? These two issues are worth 
pondering.
What is compassion? Stemming from pity, compassion can lead to damaging 
attitudes when, overwhelmed by emotion, it misses adjustment and refinement by 
an enlightened conscience. “This (adjustment) means that the carer does not 
completely identify with the other’s suffering nor acts exclusively from the patient’s 
perspective; but that they can consider the other's predicament in earnest.” Speaking 
about “deceptive and therefore dangerous pity”, an author calls to mind the warning 
by Stefan Zweig in his beautiful novel Beware of Pity or the one by Antoine de 
Saint-Exupéry: “all too often have I seen pity go astray” while another author writes 
“compassion means being alongside another person in their ordeal”.
Authentic compassion does not involve suppressing one’s own emotions which 
tend to surface when one’s mind is quietened. “Such was the experience of a 
qualified doctor, who once told me he had performed euthanasia several times in the 
care institution where he works. His eyes filled with tears as he confessed that some 
nights he wakes up in a sweat, seeing the faces of the very people he has euthanised 
in front of him.”
What a truncated understanding of the patient’s self-determination overlooks is 
that there can be no freedom outside the relationship that binds the patient and 
doctor. Freedom that relies on the presence of another person is totally different 
from the individual freedom a person exercises, for instance, when taking their own 
life. In the latter, they are separate from society, face to face only with themselves. 
But when a patient summons the medical profession into a deadly pact, they change 
the “therapeutic alliance” into a “legally binding agreement”. One can therefore 
consider this a “perverted fusional relationship”. “We are no longer dealing with 
free and responsible autonomy, but with the desperate act of two people trapped by 
helplessness.” Surprisingly, although autonomy is generally thought to have been 
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conquered by the patient, the recounted testimonies suggest that “with the 
normalisation of euthanasia, a new form of paternalism has entered the Belgian 
medical world. Indeed, in the end, it is the doctor who decides whether or not 
euthanasia will be granted.”
An advantage of these testimonies lies in how they illustrate that what is 
sometimes referred to as current excesses of euthanasia (psychiatric cases, existential 
suffering, euthanasia for children, advance decisions of euthanasia, etc.) are in fact 
a direct consequence of a law that has breached a dam. When a crack opens up in a 
sea wall, waves cannot but widen it even though, at the start, people naïvely thought 
they could seal it off.
A warning by Robert Badinter, former French Minister of Justice in the 
government of President François Mitterrand, comes to mind. Against the public 
opinion of his time, Badinter had been the architect of the abolition of the death 
penalty in 1981. And later, overcoming all political divide, this man from the left 
fully endorsed Jean Leonetti, a moderate right-winger and kingpin of the 2005 
French law (on End of Life). For Robert Badinter, law does not only have a repressive 
value but, above all, an expressive one which conveys a society’s ethical values. And 
he says, on these, one law commands all the others, the law that forbids the 
intentional killing of another person, even out of seeming compassion. I would like 
to add that forbidding does not equal preventing, but points towards an 
anthropologically structured benchmark. Indeed, transgressing the law does not 
necessarily mean denying it, but when transgressing becomes embedded in the law 
under the alleged purpose of supervising it, it is no longer a transgression. And here 
is what I have learnt from Aristotle and Paul Ricœur: Transgression falls under the 
authority of the courts, not of the law.
The testimonies reported in this book are forward-thinking and prophetic: they 
are the words of “Resistance fighters” and watchers who do not believe that 
euthanasia can be a medical or a caring act, neither can it be a neutral option. As I 
said before, euthanasia does not complement palliative care, it ends it; it is not the 
pinnacle of care and support for the patient, it discontinues it; it does not relieve the 





A main argument of the advocates of legalizing euthanasia is that the decision to be 
euthanized in jurisdictions allowing this is a purely personal decision of the 
individual concerned and does not affect anyone else. This claim is often expressed 
by the most vocal, educated and powerful people in a society as, “If you object to 
euthanasia you don’t have to use it, but you have no right to prevent me from doing 
so and my accessing euthanasia does not affect you. It’s no one else’s business.” 
This book challenges that claim by documenting first-hand evidence, mainly from 
healthcare professionals, about how euthanasia has affected them and the institutions 
in which they work.
 The Failure to Present “the Full Story”
As the title of this book, Searching for the Full Story, indicates, the full story that 
needs to be told and taken into account in deciding whether to legalize euthanasia is 
not being told. There are two sides to the euthanasia debate, but, in post-modern 
Western democracies in decision making about legalization, one side, that in favour 
of legalization, receives far more airtime and attention in the public square and 
media than the side opposing legalization. There are many converging reasons why 
this imbalance is occurring, including the ease with which the competing cases can 
be made.
The case for legalizing euthanasia is easy to make in contemporary post-modern 
Western democracies, especially those in which moral relativism and utilitarianism 
are the main philosophies informing the dominant worldview of a given society. 
Moral relativism takes a stance that nothing is absolutely or inherently wrong, rather 
what is right or wrong all depends on the circumstances and the individual person’s 
preferences. Utilitarianism in the context of euthanasia proposes that euthanasia is 
a means that has an outcome or end of reducing suffering and, therefore, can be 
justified and is ethical.
In these societies, overwhelming primacy is given to the value of respect for 
individual autonomy—this approach is often called “radical autonomy”. In 
prioritizing the conflict in values that euthanasia presents between respect for 
individual autonomy and respect for life, the former prevails. Moreover, the 
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discussion and analysis of the impact of legalizing euthanasia is limited to only the 
present time—this restriction can be called “presentism”.
The pro-euthanasia case is promoted and buttressed by stories of “bad” natural 
deaths—those where great suffering is experienced—and “good” euthanasia 
deaths—those where suffering is promptly and completely eradicated through the 
intentional extinguishing of life itself by using euthanasia.
The media, which overall has a bias towards legalizing euthanasia, are especially 
prone to presenting euthanasia as a topic for discussion in the public square in the 
manner described above, that is, with a focus on an individual suffering person and 
only taking into account the immediate impact in the present of providing that 
person with euthanasia.
The case against euthanasia is much more difficult to promote, not because it is 
weak—it is not—but because it is much more complex.
This case requires looking not just to the present but also to our “collective 
human memory”—that is, history—for lessons from the past and to our “collective 
human imagination” to try to anticipate the full and wider consequences of legalizing 
euthanasia.
While the individual person and their wishes and respect for their right to 
autonomy are always important considerations, they are not alone sufficient 
considerations, if we are to make wise decisions as a society whether or not to 
legalize euthanasia. That requires taking into account the immediate and long-term 
wider ramifications of legalizing euthanasia and authorizing physicians, and in 
some cases nurses, to end the life of another person through administering lethal 
medications with a primary intention to cause death. These ramifications include the 
effects on healthcare professionals and the healthcare professions; on the institutions 
in which they practice, such as hospitals and aged care homes; on society and the 
shared values on which it is based and which create the glue that bonds us as a com-
munity; and even on our global reality. There is a dearth of literature in this regard. 
Searching for the Full Story: Experiences and Insights of Belgian Doctors and 
Nurses makes an important contribution to starting to fill these lacunae.
Feminist scholars have developed a concept of “relational autonomy”, which 
recognizes and takes into account that even though I might have a legal right to 
decide for myself what should happen to me, for example in relation to euthanasia, 
what I decide affects others besides myself. The personal accounts of the authors of 
their encounters with euthanasia, in each of the chapters of “Searching for the Full 
Story”, powerfully demonstrate the truth of this insight.
Of particular concern in relation to the wider impact of legalizing euthanasia is 
the possibility of it being “thrust on” or “seeping into” the lives of fragile and 
vulnerable people—those who are poor, uneducated or least vocal, and those who 
are elderly or living with a disability. The COVID-19 pandemic has provided hor-
rific examples of neglect in many of our countries—even criminal neglect—in the 
everyday care and treatment of such people, which should be a warning that we 
cannot afford to trivialize or underestimate the dangers of the abuse of legalized 
euthanasia in relation to them.
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 Range of Disciplines and Experiential Knowledge
Two of the notable features of the book include, first, that each of the chapters is 
written by a different professional from a range of disciplines relevant to deciding 
about legalizing euthanasia and assessing its impact on individuals, families, 
communities and societies. The majority are practising healthcare professionals—
oncologists, a psychiatrist, other physicians including a general practitioner, 
nurses—specializing in the care of terminally ill and dying patients and, importantly, 
a philosopher-ethicist with expertise in this domain.
A second notable feature is that these authors communicate experiential 
knowledge, a very important human way of knowing that often cannot be reduced 
to a mathematical formula or weighed or measured and for that reason may be 
ignored or rejected as irrelevant in decision making. That is a very serious 
mistake.
 Issues Raised by Legalized Euthanasia
Here are just some of the issues, selected at random, to which the book alerts 
the reader.
We found heartbreaking the story in Eric Vermeer’s chapter, “The Slippery Slope 
Syndrome,” of the nurse whose husband asked her to arrange euthanasia for him, 
but not to tell him the identity of the doctor who would provide it or on which date. 
Her grief, as recounted by Vermeer, after her husband was euthanized is palpable:
Finally, together with the doctor, we agreed on a date but since I had promised to say 
nothing to him, I was not able to say to him, “I love you,” or “Thank you”…The day of his 
euthanasia both of us died… he physically and I mentally.
She melted into tears and I [Vermeer] had no other words but silence.
We note, to avoid confusion, that this story is not an example of a slippery slope, 
but of profound human grief.
 Expansion and Normalization Through Giving Priority 
to Autonomy
Vermeer’s chapter shows the very rapid change to normalization of euthanasia as a 
way to die once it is legalized. As more and more jurisdictions introduce it, this 
normalization process will accelerate. Any restrictions on access to euthanasia are 
challenged as breaches of rights to personal autonomy, the right to decide what 
should happen to your own body and life, and such challenges are consistent with 
the primary justification for allowing euthanasia, namely, giving respect for personal 
autonomy priority over all other values and considerations.
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Canada legalized euthanasia (called MAiD—medical aid in dying) in June 
2016. In a recent Quebec case the judge ruled that the requirement in the law, that 
the person’s death to be “reasonably foreseeable” in order for them to qualify for 
euthanasia, was unconstitutional.1 In February 2020, the Canadian Government 
introduced a bill, which includes a provision deleting this requirement from the 
Criminal Code provisions governing access to MAiD.  There have even been 
reports that the Canadian euthanasia law will be challenged on the grounds that 
placing any conditions, such as requiring a physician’s authorization, on mentally 
competent adults having access to euthanasia is unconstitutional on the grounds 
that they breach these persons’ constitutional Charter rights to life, liberty and 
security of the person.
Philosopher Willem Lemmens in his important chapter “When Conscience 
Wavers” challenges the view that euthanasia has been normalized in Belgium on the 
grounds that, first, it unavoidably involves transgressions of long-established prin-
ciples of medical ethics and that such breaches can never be normalized. Second, he 
rightly observes that, whatever the law might be, there will always be some physi-
cians who cannot, in good conscience, accept euthanasia as ethical or appropriate 
medical treatment. Lemmens also demonstrates the inherently problematic charac-
ter of the legalization of euthanasia by identifying the risks and harms it creates to 
important shared societal values and what goes wrong in its practice.
 Suicide and Social Contagion
Research shows that suicide can be contagious. This phenomenon is sometimes 
called “social contagion”. For example, when a young person commits suicide 
there can be a cluster of copycat cases. We know that a single case of suicide can 
affect over 100 people, some with grief and others with contagion. Moreover, in 
Australia, for instance, suicide is the number one cause of death in persons under 
35 years of age and the government is committing large financial resources to 
provide what they hope will be remedial measures. Suicide rates have risen in at 
least most, and possibly all, jurisdictions that have legalized physician-assisted 
suicide or euthanasia.
There does seem to be social contagion in post-modern Western democracies 
with respect to legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia, themselves. We could call 
it an epidemic or even pandemic of legalizing euthanasia. The acceptance of eutha-
nasia by many societies is not an accidental or isolated phenomenon; it is an out-
come of a major “cultural change”, as psychiatrist An Haekens notes in Chap. 4, 
“Euthanasia for Incurable Mental Suffering”.
Haekens’ discussion of empathy is so important it bears repeating, especially 
because at the heart of the euthanasia debate is disagreement between the two sides 
1 Truchon c. Procureur général du Canada, 2019 QCCS 3792
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of the euthanasia debate regarding what is the most compassionate approach to 
those who are dying:
The notion of empathy merits some further reflection. Edith Stein [1] established a distinc-
tion among different levels of empathy. She distinguishes being immediately shaken by an 
emotion, “emotional contagion,” and corrective empathy, the evaluation of one’s own 
capacities for empathy. True empathy is only possible when this corrective movement of 
conscience has been applied to emotional contagion. This means that the caregiver will not 
totally identify with the other person’s suffering and will not be supposed to have to act 
from the patient’s point of view, but that he will be able to look truthfully at the other’s situ-
ation. Only then will he be morally justified to take care of the other person. It is important 
to be aware of these different levels of empathy, particularly in the context of a request for 
euthanasia on account of mental suffering.
 Euthanasia is Incompatible with Palliative Care
Many authors discuss palliative care, the benefits it offers and how euthanasia and 
palliative care are philosophically and in practice totally incompatible. Options at 
the end-of-life are presented by those in favour of euthanasia as a choice between 
suffering, including the suffering engendered by over-treatment, and euthanasia, 
rather than presenting palliative care as a true alternative to both suffering and 
euthanasia. This non-disclosure raises the issue of whether an informed consent to 
euthanasia has been obtained if the full range of palliative care options and the 
gamut of risks and benefits of both approaches to suffering have not been disclosed 
to the patient.
 Loving Accompaniment Until Natural Death
What the analysis, insights and stories found in this book make clear is that death 
has its own time and a “good” death requires loving accompaniment of the dying 
person from a wide range of people, including family and friends and professional 
caregivers. Some important experiences cannot be time compressed if they are to 
maintain their integrity and authenticity. Dying is one of these.
Euthanasia eliminates future possibilities for finding meaning, giving to others 
and receiving selfless gifts of love from them that the period of natural dying can 
offer. Euthanasia is a harmful effort to compress this period of natural dying and, 
although presented as being meant to benefit only the dying person, support for 
euthanasia can result from others wanting to shorten the period of their “watching 
and waiting” for the person’s death, which can be an experience of suffering for 
them. This approach was succinctly summed up as follows by a prominent Australian 
politician who is in favour of legalizing euthanasia: “When you are past your ‘use 
by’ or ‘best before’ date, you should be checked out as quickly, cheaply and effi-
ciently as possible.” However, human beings are not products and a family, 
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community or society is not a supermarket selling life from which a person can be 
evicted. Commodities can be valued and substituted for something of equal value, 
but human value is beyond price and, therefore, cannot be managed “cheaply and 
efficiently” as a commodity.
 The “Mystery of Death”
An antidote to this approach is to regain our perception and respect for the “mystery 
of death” to which Julie Blanchard refers in Chap. 8, “Resisting”:
In Belgium, where euthanasia is decriminalized, as in France, where it is not, it has hap-
pened to me that it was the family that requested it for a loved one. The main problem for 
those concerned is time, the time it takes for the illness to bring life to its end, as well as the 
time for the death throes. As Patrick Baudry says very rightly: “The death throes is not 
merely a bundle of physiological mechanisms leading to death. It is a psychological and 
spiritual process that in large part escapes us. To speak of it only by its symptoms would be 
to make it a final illness. But we are precisely summoned by the presence of a mystery” [2].
Many people in secularized Western democracies are deeply fearful of mysteries, 
probably, in part, because they cannot feel that they are in control of them. To deal 
with this fear and the intense anxiety it evokes they use what social psychologists 
call a “terror reduction mechanism” or “terror management device”. They convert 
the mystery to a problem and seek a technological solution to the problem. So the 
mystery of death becomes the problem of death and a lethal injection—euthanasia—
is the technological solution that solves the problem of death.
 Conclusion
We are only starting to understand the complexity of the issues legalized euthanasia 
raises, the uncertainties it involves and the breadth of its potential consequences. 
The authors of the chapters in Searching for the Full Story: Experiences and Insights 
of Belgian Doctors and Nurses make important contributions in this regard and 
show us that we have much, much more to learn. Legalizing euthanasia is not, as 
pro- euthanasia advocates argue, just a small incremental step on an ethical path we 
have already taken. It is a radical rejection of the most fundamental value on which 
we base our societies, that of respect for human life. Respect for human life must be 
upheld at two levels: in society in general and for every human life without diminu-
tion of worth based on disease or any other factor. Euthanasia contravenes both 
levels of respect and ruptures the story we tell each other and buy into to create the 
glue that bonds us as a society—the story of our collective humanness and what that 
entails. We believe that history will judge the euthanasia debate as having been the 
single most important societal values debate of the twenty-first century. Knowledge 
is essential if we are to make wise decisions about whether or not to allow 
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euthanasia, and Searching for the Full Story: Experiences and Insights of Belgian 
Doctors and Nurses contributes very important information and insights to our fund 
of knowledge in this regard.
References
 1. Edith S. On the problem of empathy, trans. Stein W. Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications; 1989.
 2. Patrick B, Henri-Pierre J. Le deuil impossible, Eshel; 2001.
Sydney, NSW, Australia Margaret Somerville




 1  The Slippery Slope Syndrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1
Eric Vermeer
 2  The Doctor Turned into an Instrument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
Catherine Dopchie
 3  When Conscience Wavers. Some Reflections on the  
Normalization of Euthanasia in Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
Willem Lemmens
 4  Euthanasia for Unbearable Psychological Suffering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
An Haekens
 5  People Facing the Question of Euthanasia: Patients,  
Family and Friends, Healthcare Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
Rivka Karplus
 6  Surrendering to or Inducing Death: Artificial Feeding as Paradigm  .  61
Marie Frings
 7  The Meaning of Suffering or the Meaning of Life Despite Suffering  .  75
Benoit Beuselinck
 8  Resisting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
Julie Blanchard
 9  Behind the Scenes of Euthanasia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
François Trufin
 Postface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
 Brief List of Health-Care Terms for the Non-specialist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
xix
About the Authors
Eric Vermeer is a nurse specializing in palliative care and psychiatry, Eric Vermeer 
has worked for 20 years at the bedside of patients at the end of life. He is a psycho-
therapist and teacher and the president of the ethics committee of a neuropsychiatric 
center (Namur, Belgium).
Catherine Dopchie, MD is a physician-oncologist specializing in palliative care 
(Tournai, Belgium).
Willem Lemmens, PhD is full professor for modern philosophy and ethics at the 
University of Antwerp (Belgium). He has been member of the Belgian Advisory 
Committee on Bioethics from 2004 till 2018.
An Haekens, MD is a psychiatrist and psychotherapist. She is chief of the medical 
staff of the Alexianen psychiatric clinic in Tienen (Belgium).
Rivka Karplus, MD is an Israeli doctor, living and practicing in Jerusalem. She is 
a specialist in internal medicine and infectious diseases who has worked in hematol-
ogy, internal medicine, infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS medicine. Currently, she 
works in general practice and as an infectious disease consultant in outpatient clin-
ics. Her interest for ethical questions stems from the concrete reality of her work 
and of multicultural encounters.
Marie  Frings, MD is a General Practitioner, specialized in palliative care and 
clinical ethics (Brussels, Belgium).
Benoit  Beuselinck, MD, PhD UCLouvain, specialised in medical oncology at 
KULeuven and at Paris-Descartes. He is staff member of the medical oncology 
department of the Leuven University Hospitals and professor of medicine at 
KULeuven.
Julie Blanchard, MD is a general practitioner in palliative care (CHC Hospital 
Liège, Belgium).
xx
François Trufin is a hospital emergency nurse. He is secretary of the palliative 
care platform of the Belgian German-speaking Community and Vice-President of 
the Belgian Chamber of German-speaking Nurses.
Jacques Ricot A qualified teacher, Jacques Ricot holds a Postgraduate Certificate 
in Education and a PhD in philosophy. He is Associate Researcher at the Philosophy 
Department of Nantes University. He has written several books: Penser la fin de vie 
(Presses de l'EHEPS, 2017), Le suicide est-il un droit de l'homme? (M-editer, 2015), 
Du bon usage de la compassion, PUF, 2013.
Margaret  Somerville, AM, FRSC, DCL Professor of Bioethics, School of 
Medicine, The University of Notre Dame Australia, Sydney, Australia
E.  Wesley  Ely, MD, MPH Professor of Medicine, Critical Illness, Brain 
Dysfunction, and Survivorship (CIBS) Center, Vanderbilt University Medical 
Center and the Veteran’s Affairs Tennessee Valley Geriatric Research Education 
Clinical Center (GRECC), Nashville, TN, USA.
About the Editor
Timothy Devos, MD, PhD is an internist-hematologist at the University Hospital 
of Leuven (UZ Leuven) and the referring physician for palliative care of the hema-
tology team. He is Professor of Medicine at KU Leuven.
About the Authors
1© The Author(s) 2021
T. Devos (ed.), Euthanasia: Searching for the Full Story, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56795-8_1
E. Vermeer (*) 
Nurse, Ethicist, Psychotherapist, Trainer and President of an Ethics Committee of an 
Neuropsychiatric Center, Namur, Belgium
1The Slippery Slope Syndrome
Eric Vermeer
For more than 20 years I have practiced nursing, first in oncology services, then in 
palliative care. As a teacher and psychotherapist for the past 10 years, I have had the 
opportunity to continue working with nursing students in palliative care and psychi-
atric services, as well as to supervise nursing teams. An ethicist by training, I belong 
to an ethics committee in a neuropsychiatric hospital. Wearing these different hats 
gives me the great privilege of encountering patients at the end of life or who suffer 
from mental illnesses as well as nurses and students who face difficult situations, 
and to review in the ethics committee clinical situations involving great suffering.
The question of euthanasia comes up very regularly and occasions numerous 
discussions that are both emotional and engaging.
I am well acquainted with a generalist who, when still young, 
espoused the cause of euthanasia in the 1980s, distributing, 
already at that early date, cards to carry on one’s person 
declaring that the holder wished to be euthanized. Nevertheless, 
she waited until the law was adopted to begin practicing 
euthanasia. Once she did, she was sick for three days after each 
instance. In order to overcome this painful contradiction, she 
consulted psychologists who persuaded her that the cause of 
her suffering was loneliness, since euthanasia was not at all 
widespread in her region. Instead of pondering over this 
poignant reaction of life within her, she has not ceased to 
persuade doctors to practice euthanasia …
Hugo R. (close friend)
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1.1  The Decriminalization of Euthanasia
Since 2002, Belgian law has permitted euthanasia to be decriminalized under cer-
tain conditions. Notably, this law was intended to combat clandestine euthanasia, 
but one is led to conclude that this has absolutely not been the result. According to 
a thorough study in The British Medical Journal1 [1], it can be reasonably estimated 
that half of the euthanasia procedures are still being carried out without being 
reported. This is not surprising for those who know that someone’s death is always 
accompanied by strong emotions and that decisions are often made on the spur of 
the moment.
Five years ago, a doctor went so far as to say, in the Senate, that for a long time 
he had not declared any euthanasia cases and that he did not call in a second col-
league to validate the request for euthanasia, as the law nonetheless stipulates.2
The topic has not ceased to be fed by the media who, by playing on emotions, 
impose on us the idea that in order to die with dignity, one has to be euthanized.
This discussion is taking place in a country marked, as are other countries in 
Europe, by an increase in serious incurable diseases of much longer duration than in 
the past. Every year in Belgium, more than 40,000 new cases of cancer are diag-
nosed, with the prognosis of real healing (remission for more than 5 years) of around 
60%; however, in spite of advances in medicine, more than 15,000 Belgians die of 
cancer every year. To this must be added the upsurge of other diseases labeled as 
multifactorial (Alzheimer’s disease, cardiovascular diseases, cerebral vascular 
strokes, neuromuscular diseases such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and schizo-
phrenia)—all of them burdensome pathologies that cause a great deal of physical 
and mental suffering.
1 The British Medical Journal conducted a study, using a cross-sectional analysis of euthanasia 
cases that had been reported to the Federal Registration Commission in Flanders, via an anony-
mous questionnaire sent through an attorney to general practitioners who had treated a quarter of 
the patients who died between June 1 and November 30, 2007 (a total of 6927 deaths). This study 
revealed that only half of the euthanasia cases were officially declared. The questionnaire asked the 
doctors which of these four treatments had been applied to the patient concerned:
1—withdrawing or not administering a treatment, in spite of its possible effect on shortening 
the life of the patient.
2—intensifying analgesic treatment, in spite of its possible effect on shortening the life of the 
patient.
3—withdrawing or not administering a treatment, with the explicit intent to hasten death.
4—administering, providing, or prescribing medical drug doses with the explicit intent to has-
ten death.
Only the cases where the doctor had chosen the fourth treatment were considered euthanasia. 
Only half of these cases were officially reported to the Commission.
2 “A professor of the University of Ghent, Dr. Marc Cosyns, pleaded on Wednesday before the joint 
Senate Commissions on Social Affairs and Justice in favor of eliminating the laws on euthanasia 
and palliative care and integrating them into the law on patients’ rights. Incidentally, this same 
doctor stated that he had not reported any acts of euthanasia since 2011, an obligation that is how-
ever stipulated by the law.” (“Intégrer l’euthanasie dans les droits des patients et l’éliminer des 
lois,” RTBF Info—20 Marc 2013, www.rtbf.be/info).
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It was thus necessary to initiate discussion about the end of life. But it had to be 
done sincerely, that is, by involving all who play a part in healthcare and without 
any preconceived ideas. But that is not what happened. In 2002, Belgium decrimi-
nalized euthanasia and at the same time promoted palliative care,3 as though to 
signify that they were one and the same reality. Yet, if there is a message to put 
across first and foremost, it is that it is necessary to differentiate clearly between 
euthanasia, which is the planned process of dying, from palliative care. The latter 
aims, as is well known, at developing the specific management of physical, psycho-
logical, familial, and spiritual symptoms.
However, the definition, in Europe as in Canada, is clear and unambiguous: 
“Palliative care neither hastens nor postpones death.” It follows that every form of 
extraordinary measure that postpones death and every act of euthanasia that hastens 
death is foreign to the philosophy of palliative care.
1.2  Ignorance About Palliative Care
In 2002, the Netherlands began to offer Belgian doctors in Flanders training modules 
on euthanasia that met with clear success, to the detriment of various forms of train-
ing in palliative care, pain management, and analgesia.4 Accordingly, many doctors, 
for lack of training in palliative care, quickly came to the conclusion that euthanasia 
was the only solution when conditions of physical or mental pain appear to resist 
traditional treatments.
Healthcare professionals agree in saying that today around 95% of all pain can 
be alleviated, although 60–65% of patients still die in pain.
The continuing education of doctors needs to be called into question. Would it 
not be more pertinent to invest in training on the treatment of pain rather than on the 
way to euthanize a patient in pain?
To think of euthanasia as the only way to relieve intractable pain is hardly the 
answer sick people expect. I have often had occasion to ask this question of patients 
requesting euthanasia: “Do you wish to die or do you wish to stop suffering?” In 
most cases, patients ask for a better quality of life rather than an “end to life.”
Obviously, no one questions the full measure of a patient’s suffering, nor the way 
they go through it… I do not even question their request for euthanasia, when there 
is no relief. On the contrary, I react in view of the way the doctor receives this 
request… I often hear, from doctors favoring euthanasia, that euthanasia plainly 
signals the admission of medical failure. Because the doctor feels powerless (or 
incompetent?) faced with a patient’s pain or suffering, euthanasia appears the only 
answer to give.
This being so, it is just as obvious that there remain extremely difficult situations: 
a small minority of patients (around 5%) can render the medical team powerless 
3 The same year also saw the adoption of the law on patients’ rights.
4 Pain management: the treatment of pain. Analgesia: the reduction of pain. See also the Brief 
Healthcare List of Terms at the end of the book.
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when the pain is so complex and multifactorial. We then have the possibility of 
having recourse to sedation, in its many degrees.
In the same way that the resolve to sow confusion between palliative care and 
euthanasia is real, there is also an attempt to amalgamate euthanasia and sedation, 
whereas they are two totally different realities, on several levels.
In the first place, while euthanasia should never be proposed to a patient, seda-
tion is an option to offer a sick person who is experiencing suffering that is unbear-
able and hard to manage.
The intent of euthanasia is to induce death, whereas the intent of sedation is to 
treat one or several symptoms.
The process of euthanasia is to guarantee death by injection of a lethal product, 
whereas the process of sedation is to administer medical substances that must be 
adjusted to the needs of the patient through a regular and rigorous evaluation of this 
process.
The result of euthanasia is death, whereas the result of sedation is a better quality 
of life.
Those who assert that sedation is euthanasia in disguise commit a gross error.
But let us return to the lack of medical training and let the patients speak; they 
are the ones who in the end know the truth.
Philippe has been suffering from a myeloma5 for three years and comes to the emergency 
services with unbearable back pain… His reaction seems to be irrevocable: “I’m in too 
much pain… I want to be euthanized… one wouldn’t make even a dog live like this…. For 
the sake of my dignity, I request euthanasia….” The anesthetist on duty comes quickly and 
gives him an epidural injection of an analgesic product that works within minutes. An hour 
later, I see Philippe again in his room and, after telling me his story, he concludes: 
“Fortunately, they didn’t listen to me… but you know, when you’re in pain, you’re capable 
of asking anything…” Philippe lived another three years, with his two adolescent sons, and 
he told me how this time had been necessary for his children’s grieving process.
The competence of the anesthetist neutralized Philippe’s request for euthanasia. 
This is how a doctor, with little or no training in how to use the new analgesic 
molecular drugs, can commit an irreparable act.
1.3  The Trivialization of Euthanasia
The examples of lived experience oblige us to look at reality, just as it is.
Mrs. B. suffers from a kidney cancer that has metastasized to the bones and lungs. She regu-
larly complains to the attending physician of her difficult marital situation with a violent, 
alcoholic husband. She also suffers from no longer seeing her two daughters, aged 25 and 
27, who never come to visit her. After several meetings during which the doctor seems 
5 Kahler’s disease, also known as multiple myeloma, is an ailment of the bone marrow induced by 
the uncontrolled proliferation of a specific type of white blood cell, the plasmocytes. Under normal 




 distraught in face of the patient’s great suffering, one day he takes it upon himself to speak 
to her in these terms: “Taking into account your terminal cancer and your family situation, 
don’t you think that euthanasia would seem the least bad solution?” The patient broke 
down in tears and the doctor realized his blunder.
Miss V. comes to the psychiatric emergency services after a third attempt at suicide. She 
has been suffering chronic depression for two years, following the breakdown of her mar-
riage. The nurse asks her: “Do you know that you can request euthanasia?” The patient 
appears surprised and asks for information. While waiting for the patient to be transferred 
to a psychiatric unit, the nurse gives her the contact information for the ADMD6…
Mr. B. is afflicted with pancreatic cancer with no hope of a cure. On several occasions, 
the doctor has suggested euthanasia, in a gentle but insistent manner. Mr. B. is tired and 
asks his family to be present around the clock since he no longer has the strength to engage 
in this kind of discussion with the doctor…
Mrs. V. has been in a rest and care home for several years and has just had a cerebral 
vascular stroke.7 She remains conscious but has lost the ability to speak. As is well known, 
improvement in these situations is often possible, especially two or three days after the 
stroke. At a team meeting, the healthcare assistant who looks after her quite openly asks 
whole team: “Can’t we suggest euthanasia to this lady? She has already declined consider-
ably since her stroke.… The majority of the team opposed this strongly, but this example 
shows how easily the subject is brought up with an icy thoughtlessness and, above all, 
outside the legal limits set by the conditions of legal decriminalization.
This is not a question of unique and exceptional cases. It is a reality that many do 
not want to face. Students, who tell me what they experience in training, sometimes 
have their wings clipped:
“Is it normal for a doctor to propose euthanasia?”
“If it’s a matter of proposing euthanasia to a depressed and suicidal patient, I’m chang-
ing jobs right away…”.
I am, of course, obliged to answer that doctors and nurses who propose euthana-
sia are doing so completely illegally. Under the guise of compassion, for certain 
healthcare personnel, euthanasia is becoming more and more a way, often an uncon-
scious way, of removing oneself from the suffering and distress of a sick person.
1.4  A Perverted Sense of Duty
I do not wish to put doctors on trial, far from it. I hear from doctors who really suffer 
in the face of the insistent demands and the pressure of certain families. That too is 
a reality.
6 Association pour le droit de mourir dans la dignité = Association for the Right to Die with Dignity, 
part of a global network promoting euthanasia, whose motto is “Choosing your own death: A free-
dom! A right!”
7 A vascular cerebral stroke occurs when the flow of blood encounters an obstacle (a blood clot or 
ruptured blood vessel) that blocks its passage to the different parts of the brain thus depriving the 
latter of their vital input of oxygen, causing their dysfunction and then death within a few minutes 
(www.franceavc.com).
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But do we take the time to propose palliative care, as the law requires? Do we 
take pains to go a bit further into the history of the person and to explore his real 
request?
When I give training in palliative care to doctors, I am impressed to hear some of 
them tell me: “When a patient asks me for euthanasia, I refer him right away to 
ADMD... It’s my duty…” My reaction always is to ask in what context the request 
was made and in what way it was received. The answer is very often basic and pri-
mary: “The law permits euthanasia, I don’t see why I would refuse it to him... You 
have to be tolerant…”.
Once again, let us ask the question: What is tolerance? From that angle, do we 
still have the right to react with our own conscience? Tolerance is fundamental, to 
be sure, but it implies reciprocal respect and invites dialog. It must not, in any case, 
supplant ethical inquiry.
Sometimes, simply daring to raise the question about a patient’s real request is 
sufficient to make healthcare staff feel judged and condemned by their peers.
Whoever seeks to remain alert and unified by the values that underlie their prac-
tice sometimes hear themselves say: “Who do you take yourself for? Where is your 
tolerance?” Must healthcare staff be content to perform acts, without consulting 
their conscience, or do they still have the right to react and to feel that their position 
is at odds with one situation or another?
The difference between personal conscience, which belongs to private life, and 
the law, which orders relations within society, is well established in our society. 
However, the problem is that the relationship between the doctor and the patient 
belongs to life in society governed by law, to be sure, but also to personal relation-
ships governed by ethics. The risk in this for the practitioner is for him to persuade 
himself that it is normal to silence his conscience in order to conform to the law.
Worse still: even the conscience clause, which allows the healthcare worker to 
remain free with regard to what the law authorizes and to not engage in acts that 
their conscience objects to, is jeopardized.
Brigitte, a nurse, invoking the conscience clause, refused to put in place an IV whose sole 
aim was to inject a lethal product. She was subjected to pressure by the medical staff and 
had to justify herself before her supervisor. She ended up leaving the hospital to go work 
elsewhere.
Stéphanie, a nurse, works in intensive care and challenges the head nurse about a medi-
cal order that does not seem to her very coherent. In fact, the doctor was asking her to inject 
a high dose of morphine via an IV. Stéphanie was very aware that this injection could be 
fatal for the patient. The head nurse retorted: “If you are not able to give 50 mg of morphine 
via an IV, you don’t belong in this unit…” She held her ground… She went to see the doctor, 
who then reduced the dose of morphine, but the head nurse continued to hold it against her…
The current message of liberal societies is to discredit conscientious objection in 
the name of tolerance. In other words, if a healthcare worker calls herself tolerant, 
she is obliged to carry out all that is asked of her, without any further thought. Does 
not tolerance risk becoming tyrannical, once it prevents a healthcare worker from 
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working in keeping with her conscience, by rendering illegitimate any personal 
reflection on the meaning of wellbeing and goodness?
Democratic discussion and ethical inquiry appear to be endangered in the area of 
health care. Some will say that I exaggerate; but, to be convinced, it is sufficient to 
look at the pressures, indeed the reprisals, that healthcare staff undergo when, fol-
lowing their conscience, they react with their heart.
1.5  Suffering and Silence
It is most important to always come back to the patient, to the reality of their 
suffering and their request. The request for euthanasia is often due to many factors and 
encompasses physical pain, moral suffering, and the familial context. It is important 
to listen carefully to what the patient tells us, and also to know when to remain silent…
In spite of all our goodwill, there is always a gap between the patient who suffers 
and the healthcare staff who try to reach out to him. It is difficult to acknowledge 
this, but it is something that we must accept. It is difficult when we experience this 
gap since it forces us to confront our limits, our poverty, and our vulnerability.
When I was a young nurse and I worked with leukemia patients, I had the privi-
lege of caring for Christophe. He was often very rebellious and 1 day I thought it 
good to say to him: “You know, Christophe, I understand you…” He answered me: 
“What do you understand? We are both of us 20 years old… You will live and I 
will die.”
Christophe taught me that I needed to approach another’s suffering on tiptoe in 
word and deed, in great humility. We shall never truly understand what the patient 
is living through in his distress, and this is where listening and silence sometimes 
become the only language. Then we can hear another underlying suffering that 
hides beneath the request for euthanasia.
Mrs. N. was suffering from lung cancer and requested euthanasia. Her wish was heard and 
taken seriously, but it encouraged me to go further into her history. After a long exchange, 
she told me: “I weigh 33 kg and I am a burden to society [sic]. Moreover, my two daughters 
are waiting for me to die so that they can inherit the house…” I asked myself what this 
patient was really asking for. Was it: “Put me to death”? Or else: “Show me that I still have 
worth in your eyes, despite my feeling useless and my family distress?” As a team, we opted 
for the second choice and took the time to accompany this patient, without suppressing her 
request, which evaporated on its own. She left the palliative care unit after three months and 
was reconciled with her two daughters.
As healthcare workers, we must always ask ourselves what the patient is really 
asking for.
Mrs. V. suffers from a metastasized breast cancer and is greatly depressed. Early one 
morning, as I am bringing her breakfast, she tells me: “I would like to die.” And, in the 
same breath, she adds: “You did put my vitamin B in my orange juice?”
I then asked myself the question: Why is this vitamin B so important, when this woman 
wishes to die? This very interesting paradox made me understand that when a person tells 
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me: “I want to die,” she is not necessarily telling me: “Put me to death.” I was able to 
deepen my relation with Mrs. V. and she told me: “Don’t we sometimes have the right to say 
we are fed up, that life is hard?” She ended by saying that she was not asking for euthana-
sia, but that she needed to have her distress heard.
This is why reformulation8 is important when there is a request for euthanasia.
Mrs. W. is in a rest home and suffers from loneliness. When her daughter comes to visit, she 
tells her: “I would like to die since I am no longer useful for anything…” The daughter 
retorts, tit for tat: “But mom, you are still there to love us!...” Mrs. W. was dumbfounded. 
She remained silent for a long while, then, with a smile on her lips, said: “Yes, that is true, 
I am still there to love you, and it’s the most beautiful thing I know how to do…”.
For lack of training or information, out of concern for a perverted and misunder-
stood tolerance, out of a desire to answer the request in precipitous fashion, eutha-
nasia has become normal for certain people, banal for others, and even moral for a 
third group.
1.6  The Economic Context
Along with the human suffering experienced on every level, the political message 
tells us, time and time again, that cuts need to be made and that healthcare is costly.
Once again, we need to open our eyes and acknowledge that we live in a society 
that leaves less and less place for aging, frailty, illness, and death… To be convinced 
of this, it is sufficient to read the report of Canadian researchers at the University of 
Calgary [2], who reckon that Canada could make large cuts in the healthcare budget 
thanks to the decriminalization of “medically-assistant dying.” Basing themselves 
on the data and profiles of euthanized Belgian and Dutch citizens, these researchers 
have estimated that more than 10,000 Canadians could have themselves euthanized 
every year, which would represent a savings of more than 130 million dollars.
Even if they refrain from promoting euthanasia, we have every right to ask our-
selves what the goal of their research is.
In Belgium, Dr. Marc Moens, former president of the Belgian Association of 
Medical Unions (ABSyM-BVAS), also asks himself: “In August 2016, in the wake 
of budgetary problems in the area of care for the elderly, a debate began over a 
policy of euthanasia that is motivated by socio-economic considerations… 
Euthanasia is already considered a right that can be laid claim to and that can be 
abused, but mostly it is becoming a duty for the doctor who receives the request.” [3].
Closely connected to this politico-socio-economic context, “almighty” medi-
cine, which wants to leave nothing to chance and prides itself on mastering every-
thing, considers letting go to be a failure. Thus, faced with a patient at the end of 
life, the doctor is tempted to see only these two alternatives: extraordinary measures 
8 Reformulation is one of the keys of palliative care. It consists in ascertaining that what the patient 




or euthanasia. In both cases, the doctor remains “master of the situation” and leaves 
no place for an acknowledgment of the limits of man and medicine.
Thus, the slippery slope syndrome is very real. In the domain of end of life, 
euthanasia is effectively and illegally proposed by healthcare staff, even if the legis-
lature pretends to ignore it. In matters of mental and moral suffering, the slide is 
even more flagrant.
1.7  Euthanasia in the Psychiatric Context
In late 2001, the commission that worked on the bill of law on euthanasia had 
asserted without any ambiguity that “the psychiatric suffering of the patient alone 
could never lead to euthanasia. The groups in the majority recognized that patients 
afflicted with dementia or psychiatric disorders did not fall within the bounds of the 
projected law’s application” (Descheemaeker Report submitted in the name of the 
Justice Commission) [4].
Today, the seventh report on the registration of euthanasia cases states that 108 
people were euthanized for psychiatric causes such as depression, early dementia, 
borderline personality disorder, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, obsessive- 
compulsive disorder, anorexia, etc.
This practice raises an enormous number of questions, given that the evaluation 
of “unbearable and unappeasable” mental suffering is extremely subjective. How 
can the irreversibility of moral or mental suffering be validated?
Thus, a 48-year-old psychiatric inmate was euthanized in prison in September 2012. “The 
question everyone is asking is whether the inmate would have made his decision if he had 
received proper psychiatric treatment,” Dr. Moens stated [5].
The case of Laura is still more telling. Laura, 24 years old, suffers from chronic depres-
sion and requests euthanasia. Three doctors confirm that her mental suffering cannot be 
reversed. One month later, the period required by law for euthanizing a patient who is not 
terminally ill, Laura clearly asserts to the doctor who comes to euthanize her that she no 
longer wishes to die.
It is evident that the person who suffers mentally has no perspective on the future 
and cannot imagine that she will be better in a few weeks. Laura’s case reveals, once 
again, that no one can validate mental suffering as irreversible.
The conditions of decriminalization state that the patient must be “capable and 
conscious.” How are the real capacity and consciousness of a person suffering from 
a psychiatric pathology to be verified? The first symptom of a patient deemed psy-
chotic is the loss of the sense of reality. Can we then endorse her request, knowing 
that her perception of reality is altered? We know that in psychiatry the dominant 
element of people suffering from psychiatric disorders is the loss of their vital 
impulse. Thus, the primary goal of psychiatry is to develop effective strategies to 
put a person back on her feet and give her back the will to live. Is not there a risk of 
imploding the core principle of psychiatry by accepting euthanasia on account of 
mental suffering?
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A young bipolar female has made a second attempt at suicide. The doctor on duty talks to 
her about the possibility of having herself euthanized. The patient becomes angry, for she 
does not want to die: “Don’t you see that I am just a piece of crap? My adoptive parents 
have rejected me and I am alone in the world!” The doctor had not understood that these 
attempts at suicide were calls for help …
The loss of hope, a feeling of incomprehension, and loneliness are the principal 
motives for requesting euthanasia in psychiatry, according to documents of the 
Federal Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Euthanasia [6].
Medication is not the only means to help patients overcome mental suffering, 
even though they are extremely important and necessary. When we work at the nar-
cissistic revaluation of people, a path to living can be cleared… Obviously, human 
and financial means need to be made available, but psychiatric care professionals 
also need to be convinced.
Gilberte suffers from Huntington’s disease and requests euthanasia. The doctor consults a 
colleague, as the law requires, and a month later the patient is transferred to a hospital that 
performs euthanasia. At the moment of the act, Gilberte has a crisis of anguish and cate-
gorically refuses to be touched. She ends up returning to her unit after telling the doctor: 
“It was my children who convinced me I no longer had any quality of life.”
How do we look upon vulnerability and who are we to evaluate another person’s 
quality of life?
In the mind of common mortals, the dominant opinion, broadly conveyed by the 
media, identifies euthanasia with dying with dignity. It is true that each of us has, 
according to our history and filtered through our subjectivity, our own conception of 
dignity. But does not society incite us to orient our concept within the restrictive 
framework of autonomy and self-determination, thereby signifying that dignity is 
lost with physical decline?
Do not we need to rediscover the ontological concept of dignity as extolled by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? A human being intrinsically has dig-
nity, whatever the contingencies of his life, handicap, suffering, or dependence. As 
a human being has dignity due to being human, he never loses his dignity; it is 
irreducible. This objective dignity certainly does not prevent a suffering human 
being from experiencing a real feeling of indignity; but in that case, is not it a job 
for us, the healthcare professionals, to try to transform this feeling?
Mrs. R. comes to a palliative care unit after long months of hospitalization in an oncology 
unit. The oncologist’s report is unambiguous: this patient is at the end of life and will die 
within the coming days. We take the time to accommodate her; we offer her a bath, which 
she willingly accepts. We ask her what her favorite music is and she tells us she likes the 
accordion. We find a CD that plays while she is bathed and we sense that Mrs. R. is relax-
ing. We suggest make-up and nail polish and, when she comes out of the bath, her daughter 
exclaims: “My, how beautiful you look, mom!” And she replies: “It’s not the make-up that’s 
made me beautiful, but the kind regard of the nurses…” Mrs. R., who was supposed to die 
quickly according to the oncologist’s prognosis, left the palliative care unit after six months 
in the hospital, to return home, surrounded by her loved ones.
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1.8  After Euthanasia
We speak very little about the people who go on living after being directly affected 
by the euthanasia of a loved one.
One day a nurse came over as very aggressive at a lecture I was giving on eutha-
nasia. I took the time to listen to her and I learned that she had just experienced the 
euthanasia of her husband. In the final stage of terminal cancer, he had asked her to 
choose the date of his planned death, without her telling him. The patient was at 
home on an IV, and the doctor came by every day. This nurse was in great distress. 
This is what she told me: “My husband was euthanized and I am not even certain 
that he met the conditions of decriminalization… He was indeed suffering, but the 
medication relieved his pain … For days and days, I asked myself what was the 
right day to make him die, but I could not even speak to him about it… Finally, 
together with the doctor, we agreed on a date, but since I had promised to say 
nothing to him, I was not able to say to him, “I love you,” or “Thank you”…The day 
of his euthanasia both of us died… he physically and I mentally.”
She melted into tears and I had no words to offer but only silence.
It seems more and more obvious that the grieving process is much more difficult 
when death has been given intentionally. The more natural death is, the more natural 
the grieving process is as well… I think that we will speak again, in the future, of 
the survivor syndrome for the loved ones who survive the euthanasia of a relative. 
How many feelings of guilt are laid bare in support groups for people in mourning?
1.9  The Euthanasia of Minors
What is to be said about the euthanasia of minors? In any case, it causes a good deal 
of ink to flow, even in, and especially in, the medical profession. In Mumbai, in 
India, in February 2014, the International Congress for Paediatric Palliative Care 
brought together more than 250 experts from 35 countries. The question of the 
euthanasia of children obviously came up and these pediatricians as a body decided 
to send a message to the Belgian government, inviting it to “reconsider its recent 
decision with the utmost urgency.” This was their message: “We believe that all 
children (neonates, children, and young people) have the right to the best quality of 
life. When they have life-limiting conditions they have the right to high quality pal-
liative care to meet their needs.… We believe that euthanasia is not part of children’s 
palliative care and is not an alternative to palliative care...” [7].
The question of euthanasia for minors is extremely tendentious since the child 
does not know what euthanasia means. Thus, euthanasia has to be explained to the 
child, so as to make it possible for him to request it. But is not informing him about 
the possibility of putting an end to his life already a way to proposing it to him? 
How will the child understand what medicine is proposing to him? Very likely it 
will be this: “To eliminate this revolting pain, we would be able to eliminate you…”.
In this specific context, euthanasia has a very violent crudeness. I had the oppor-
tunity to work in an outpatient hospital where children were treated for various 
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illnesses, including cancer. I was always edified by the way these children lived 
their illness. There was suffering, to be sure, but also a kind of joy, and furthermore 
I never heard talk of euthanasia.9
The law tells us that children must be “capable of discernment.” What does this 
eminently subjective expression mean? At what age is one capable of discernment? 
5 years? 8 years? 10 years? 12 years? But do not we all know people 50 years of age 
who are still not capable of discernment?
There is a risk in unconsciously inducing the request, as much in the children as 
in the parents. Thus, in a pediatric oncology unit, a child was saying that he wanted 
to be like a bird and his mother asked herself whether her boy was not in the process 
of requesting euthanasia [sic]. Obviously this interpretation was not taken seriously, 
but it nonetheless crossed the mother’s mind! That is what is insidious. Euthanasia 
has been so trivialized that it is now understood to be implied when there is no 
request for it.
1.10  The Euthanasia of Remorse
The trivialization of euthanasia manifests itself in matters of identity and the socio- 
familial context.
We have all heard of Nancy, a girl who had only a “garret over the garage” for a room. Her 
parents reproached her for not being a boy. Her mother regularly told her: “If only you had 
been a boy…” Here is what this mother told a reporter from ‘Het Laatste Nieuws’ [8]: 
“When I saw Nancy for the first time, my dream was shattered… She was so ugly… I had 
given birth to a monster, a phantom…” While the three boys in the family could relax after 
school, Nancy had to do the housework. “I have three sons, a husband, and a job. It’s logi-
cal that a girl ought to help with the cleaning, isn’t it?” she stated.
Much later, Nancy wanted to become Nathan. First she underwent hormonal treatment, 
then a removal of the breasts and a phalloplasty. Nancy, now become Nathan, said: “When 
I looked at myself in the mirror, I was disgusted. My new chest did not correspond to my 
expectations and my new penis had the look of a reject. I did not want to be a boy in a man’s 
body, and even less a monster…”.
Nathan requested euthanasia. In conformity with the law, three doctors deemed that 
Nathan’s suffering was unbearable and irreversible.
Before his death, Nathan wrote a letter to his mother, who replied to the reporter: “I will 
certainly read it, but it will be filled with lies… For me, this chapter is closed. His death 
means nothing to me. I do not feel any pain, any doubts, any remorse.”
The request for euthanasia must always be heard and received with infinite 
respect. It is a cry that needs to be expressed, and it is because we offer room for the 
expression of this suffering that the suffering can take on another face.
How many patients have told me that they wanted to be euthanized, sometimes 
at the very moment their illness was diagnosed! Then, along the way, a little like the 
9 The documentary film by Anne-Dauphine Julliand, Et les mistrals gagnants (2017), shows the 
extraordinary resilience and appetite for life of seriously ill children.
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stages of grieving, they no longer asked for death but looked for a certain quality of 
life, and that involved a multitude of factors.
Our society extols the right to die with dignity, but the question is biased. It is not 
the right to die that is in play, but the right to “make die.” The law always regulates 
acts in which the will is involved; it has nothing to say about a natural state of 
affairs.
Is palliative care not the most beautiful and the most sublime way to experience 
dignity? Palliative care is not a way to make people die, but a way to help them live 
to the very end.
A doctor told me lately that it was monstrous not to euthanize people who were 
tired of living. This will probably be a future stage in the conditions for 
decriminalization: allowing the euthanasia of a person who is “tired of living.” Who, 
finally, is monstrous? The person who is disfigured by illness and tormented by suf-
fering? Or the one who proposes death in any circumstance?
I leave it to Jean Rostand, the eminent biologist and historian of the sciences, to 
conclude this reflection: “When it becomes habitual to eliminate monsters, the 
smallest defects will be seen as monstrosities. From suppressing what is horrible to 
suppressing what is undesirable there is but a small step… This cleansed, purified 
society—this society without refuse, without blemish, where the normal and the 
strong benefit from all the resources that until now the abnormal and the weak have 
consumed—this society would reconnect with Sparta and delight the disciples of 
Nietzsche. I am not sure that it would still deserve to be called a human society.” [9].
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2The Doctor Turned into an Instrument
Catherine Dopchie
Being a doctor is my vocation; it is my calling to be an active member of society, to 
have my place in the world. It is not an end in itself, but a way to exist and to flourish 
personally and in solidarity with others. I am deeply convinced that I have a mission 
to combat illness with skill, to support the sick and their loved ones with all my 
heart, and to experience the compassion that alone makes it possible for us all to live 
together.
Given all this, since the therapeutic relationship is a human relationship, I am 
convinced that the doctor must be completely committed, with the three dimensions 
that constitute his being. He engages his body by the expression on his face, the way 
he speaks, and the movement of his hands; but he engages also with his heart, by his 
ability to experience emotion, his sensibility, and his intelligence; and lastly, he 
engages with his mind through his will and his liberty. In all this, he is called to open 
himself to the other person, all the while respecting her as different. In answering 
this call, he labors so that the life that dwells equally in both of them may flow 
within them, between them, and beyond them, and so may weave the bond of 
humanity that binds all of us. That way, the doctor can reach out to a sick person in 
a human way, in the entirety of her suffering. He can help the sick person to get 
moving again, to evolve, so as to heal whatever in her body or mind needs healing, 
but he can also help her get beyond her losses and reorient her expectations. 
It takes nine months for a person to be viable and fully formed 
yet it takes only 60 seconds to die!
Dr. Jeanne B. (doctor in palliative care).
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Independently of the treatments we give, sometimes without our knowing it, simply 
because we open the door to the life within us, good things pour forth from this 
inner life whose goodness we cultivate. If a person agrees to detach herself from the 
superficial, if she refocuses on what ultimately counts, she nurtures what is peren-
nial, what transcends the relationship and gives a taste of eternity. A lasting human 
society is built.
Isabelle is 62 years old, with sparkling blue eyes and a smile from ear to ear. For her hus-
band, her children, their spouses, and her grandchildren, she is the conductor of a family 
symphony who cannot help but touch those who meet her. Mistress of her life, sure of her 
choices and resolves, she knows how to guide her little world gently and firmly. In two 
weeks, jaundice fell upon her like a storm from a summer sky. Unfortunately, its cause is a 
particularly aggressive cancer of the pancreas that has already spread to the liver. The 
prognosis is extremely somber. The liver is functioning very poorly, allowing at best a very 
low dose of chemotherapy, which may be sometimes difficult to tolerate and whose effec-
tiveness seems uncertain. Is it wise to undertake it? Isabelle takes in the news by shedding 
a few tears that are quickly wiped away and by letting her “better half” hold her hand 
without saying a word. In one evening, she’s made up her mind that there is to be no ques-
tion of dying: her son is getting married in three months—she’s got to get better and be in 
shape for the wedding. In this chaos, scientific truth shall not have the last word. Isabelle’s 
resolve is wholehearted; the only thing she can do is to silence this damn cancer that wants 
to interfere with her plans. Everything will go well. With teeth clenched under a revived 
smile, Isabelle suffers, alone and in silence, the anguish of a dying person that is imposed 
on her. Mirroring her resolve, without a word said, each of her loved ones obeys the mute 
order and puts up a good front. The love that flowed so well freezes. Like a colorless, odor-
less poison, death insidiously settles among them. I suffer to see them like that. Confident in 
her strength, I suggest to Isabelle that she does not repress the reality of serious illness, that 
she give it a place in her life and in that of her loved ones. Happily, Isabelle lets herself be 
guided and agrees to open the door to another way of being. Instead of being the one who 
shows the way, she learns to listen to the advice given to her. Instead of confining herself to 
the role of the strong woman who controls everything and imposes a smooth and joyful 
ambiance, she is willing to both relinquish control and fight on. Accepting her vulnerability 
implies acknowledging her finiteness. But finiteness is scary. It implies saying good-bye, 
leaving those one wants to protect. This requires time and inner struggle. Progressively 
taming reality can allow ties to be firmed up more, to show confidence in loved ones, to 
leave messages, and to find peace. In these situations, the doctor is inspired by the hope that 
the sick person may experience a transformation of her life, may accept it and make it her 
own, to regain the wholeness that opens her to inner healing. Isabelle dares to freely speak 
the truth. She learns to cry with her loved ones and to let them cry, without for all that 
becoming discouraged. She becomes willing to not control everything, all the while remain-
ing herself. Bestirring herself to prepare both her son’s wedding and her own burial, she 
makes more room for those she loves and who love her to support her, to surround her, and 
to care for her.
She learns how to receive in addition to how to give, to welcome whatever happens 
instead of denying it. This is stimulating and salutary for her and her loved ones. Thanks to 
this new equilibrium, like a reed that bends but does not break, she expresses even more 
vividly her personality that is so full of life and will leave her imprint in the hearts of her 
loved ones to remain there forever, devoting the end of her life to snubbing the death that 
wanted to crush her. Drawing on this new wealth she discovers in herself, Isabelle finds the 
necessary force to snatch enough time in remission to let her be truly in shape for her son’s 
wedding. Then she dies quickly but in the joy of a shared victory.
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The lessons she taught confirmed the reality of “a life fully lived right to the 
end,” not only for her loved ones but also for the healthcare professionals, and for 
me in particular. The tiny spark I gave lit a fiery blaze that shone far and wide. 
Through alert listening and loving presence, I experienced how, if one simply gives 
of oneself in this therapeutic alliance, there is a chance of touching the mystery 
present in each one of us. Mutual self-giving can be painful, or at least destabilizing 
since such giving often has the feel of powerlessness. One is tempted to flee rather 
than to live. That is what I would risk doing if I believed that I could not rely on 
anything. I would then flee to protect myself and remain effective. I would succumb 
to the temptation of wanting to manage the problem one way or another. But then I 
would cease to see the sick person. I would see only her illness and her suffering, 
which repel me. Yes, everything depends on how I see the sick person and how she 
sees me. Her truth, which escapes her, just as my own escapes me, can only be 
approached in the communion of our two frailties. This requires confidence and 
perseverance. Ordinarily, we seek independence, for we think we are free only by 
being independent. We seek effectiveness, strength, and autonomy, devoted as we 
are to individualism. As death approaches or when illness brings it to mind, we 
become aware that this way of seeing things alienates us from our nature and weak-
ens us rather than strengthens us.
Unlike Isabelle, Corinne struggled for five years, with long remissions and relapses. But 
just like Isabelle, she has a fiery temperament, she is decisive, independent, and combative. 
She clings to her autonomy in deciding and acting. Losing her hair, or part of her lung or 
liver, is nothing as long as she can attend to her business and live without depending on 
others. Her oncologist, who works in the same hospital as I do, has just told her he can only 
offer to keep her comfortable. She does not want to go home. She wants to stay a while at 
the clinic. My colleague requests her transfer to palliative care, with no particular plan. 
She acts a bit distant toward me, but is polite and smiling. She keeps to technical ques-
tions—symptoms, explanations, and medication—and does not pick up on any hint I offer 
for a deeper dialog. I am at her side for a few days only. Very quickly she understands that 
the fatigue that is starting to hinder her mobility and makes even getting dressed an effort 
is here to stay. She understands that the appetite she has lost will not return. Without the 
palliative care team’s knowledge, she makes sure that her referring oncologist will keep his 
promise to euthanize her. She informs her loved ones; it has to be done quickly. The refer-
ring oncologist, who knows that the palliative care team does not practice euthanasia, 
remains silent about this plan and asks his patient and her loved ones to do the same. They 
avoid the idea of possible support and concentrate on imagining what they view as inevi-
table. For them, there is only useless suffering. The patient is in a hurry. I am absent that 
day; my oncologist colleague is replacing me and is a little overloaded. Without saying a 
word to the palliative care team he has just left, he asks a nurse on the oncology team to free 
a room and get the patient so she can be euthanized. Without stating any reason, the nurse 
in oncology telephones the palliative care unit to say she is coming to get the patient. The 
healthcare staff in palliative care find these odd doings disturbing. For her part, the patient 
appears calm. She has got what she decided on, what suits her; the rest means nothing to 
her. Upon my return, I am pained to see my team treated like furniture. In this assignment, 
I feel amputated. Nonetheless, I met this patient’s expectations within the framework she 
defined: I thwarted whatever physical symptoms there were and I did not force upon her a 
relationship she did not want. She knew that I did not perform euthanasia and freely chose 
not to speak to me about her difficulties. Yes, at that moment in any case, the only possibility 
she could see to maintain what she considered her autonomy was to stick to this image of 
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herself that she had forged and shown to everyone else, that of the patient in charge. As for 
myself, it was my duty to take in and let resonate in me the mute cry of her suffering, her 
revolt, her denial, her anger, and her discouragement, even if nothing was said or shared. 
In the Belgian medical context of the decriminalization of euthanasia, I had no choice but 
to accept this interpersonal void and let her choose an induced death.
This way of applying the law on euthanasia is widespread. To me it is abusive. 
Originally, the law removed the fundamental prohibition of killing, but only in cer-
tain circumstances deemed extraordinary. The legislature confirmed that killing—
even out of compassion, even at the express request of the patient—remained a 
grave act that the doctor could perform only in an exceptional circumstance. This 
law sought to protect the doctor against possible indictment. But its application was 
quickly extended. Thus, in what way did Corinne, in fearing the progressive loss of 
her autonomy, display suffering that was making her lose her dignity? Or that of 
those who supported her?
In giving citizens the so-called right to choose when their life is no longer worth living, 
society turns the doctor into an instrument.
Euthanasia has become a life plan, and the doctor is asked to grant the citizen 
what she asks of him. Instead of considering euthanasia a transgression, an evil that 
is tolerated under strict conditions, current ethical thinking seeks to impose a new 
paradigm of care, under which the doctor must consider it a lesser evil, indeed a 
simple therapeutic option, in planning care in advance. As for myself, it is only by 
means of my right to conscientious objection that I can attempt, at the bedside of a 
sick person, to shed light on the situation from another perspective. This is possible 
only if the patient leaves me free to do so, because euthanasia has made it difficult 
to talk about and maintain this perspective. To make myself more available to the 
person who truly requests euthanasia, I must overcome my own fears and ground 
myself in my values in order to risk the encounter, to dare to venture into unknown 
territory, where I will be defenseless, at a loss for an answer, where I will have to 
give yet more of myself, relying on what lies deepest in me, on the spark of life that 
sustains me. None of us has created himself, and so I know that this spark also 
dwells in Corinne, as in every human being. I know, not from theory but from expe-
rience, that the spark of life remains alive and can help us. It beckons us to give 
ourselves up to it with confidence and to let drop the image of what until then we 
had thought ourselves to be, like an empty shell. Is not that what it means to live? 
To dare to place real confidence in our untapped resources, without looking to hang 
onto the image we have constructed of ourselves over time. The doctor knows he 
must remain by the side of the suffering person, to help him realize he can find him-
self anew instead of losing himself, that he can again be himself, even if he is differ-
ent, even if he is afraid he will not be recognized. The person whose suffering seems 
unbearable and unappeasable sees herself trapped where she thinks she can no lon-
ger live. Her suffering reaches out to me in the deepest place of my own frailty, 
where I too experience my powerlessness as an impasse. The person who is at the 
end of her rope is a call to me, a summons. The only way, for both of us, to get out 
of the impasse where suffering wants to trap us, is to recenter ourselves, not on our 
achievements, not on the quest for a solution, but on our common humanity, our 
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complicity as allies, by making our relationship strong and loyal, by being willing 
to live through the difficulties together. The person who is suffering will feel she has 
been reached out to only if the person who cares for her lets himself be touched 
where he too is fragile and vulnerable, where he accepts that he too can live through 
this suffering. Supporting the person is more important than solving a problem, 
without for all that forgetting that “expertise is the foremost solidarity.”
Accepting this fragile situation provides an opportunity for us to approach the intimate and 
mysterious place where the life force flows in us like a free gift.
If I consent to be powerless, in a spirit of silence, struggle, confidence, and patience, 
I can let well up in me a life-giving spring that makes me a better person and allows 
me to show another person that I have faith in her. It is often from the powerlessness I 
take on that in my heart there arises the compassion that can reach the suffering person 
and give her new strength. A shared peace, a gift of life for both of us.
This is what Corinne refused. By turning in on herself, she demanded a contrac-
tual commitment rather than a therapeutic alliance. All that is left is the confronta-
tion between the right to request euthanasia and the right to accept or refuse to carry 
it out. Since Belgian society imposes this confrontation on me, the exercise of these 
rights must at least respect the vulnerability inherent in human nature. The person 
who suffers and experiences the feeling of no longer being able to live must be 
acknowledged in her suffering. Yet are not certain sick people, in a situation of 
extreme frailty, often exploited for the benefit of a macabre ideology? It in fact is not 
rare that the press depicts them as horrors to be eliminated since they call into ques-
tion the concept of an ideal life without suffering, our society’s utopia, which con-
tradicts our life in the flesh. If, like Corinne, the patient sticks to her point of view, 
to the point of repelling any dialog, there remains only loneliness, on one side and 
on the other. The therapeutic relationship can only be cut off. And humanity 
swept aside.
But is this what to expect of a doctor? To step back when he has left only what is 
essential, his humanity, to place at the service of the person who is suffering?
Should one infer that our country has imposed on us an act that denatures our profession?
In any event, insofar as I am involved, given how I view my medical commitment 
to the therapeutic relationship, I do not feel respected. It is as though I were but a 
machine equipped with some good software, producing an act that issues from the 
meeting of an intellect and a will. Besides, the law does not even require that the 
doctor know the person he is to euthanize; he must only verify that the person 
belongs to the “euthanizable without prosecution” group. This law is deluded about 
its foundation: it purports to be the exercise of a right to autonomy, whereas it is 
only a conditioned reflex in the face of a double impasse: the impasse of the patient 
drowning in her suffering as though she no longer has it in her to exist, and the 
impasse of the doctor locked into the omnipotent efficacy that the other person 
demands of him.
It is not a question of a responsible and free autonomy but rather of a desperate act of two 
people trapped in powerlessness.
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The resolve to promote autonomy as an absolute good results in a perverse fusion 
where the roles of master and slave are interchanged.
The sick person, reduced to her suffering, thinks she knows what is good for her 
and wants to impose her vision. The doctor exists only in his capacity to respond to 
the patient’s expectations. He loses his own identity and commits an act of mistaken 
mastery to fulfill the other’s aggrieved wish. The way they have defined themselves, 
one cannot continue to exist without the other; they are accomplices forever.
Attempting to take control of the situation by an act that interrupts life is for me 
false compassion since it denies the fact that the person always remains a force for 
the good to be protected, whatever her situation—a person with whom, together, we 
jointly form humanity. Of course, inducing death effectively turns the one who suf-
fers away from a difficult road, but this irreversible act gives the last word to suffer-
ing. It prevents the person who suffers from discovering in herself the living force 
that both renews the one who finds it and strengthens the one who witnesses it. 
Giving the doctor the power of death over the utterly defenseless person who requests 
it of him pushes him into a position where he becomes the idol, the one who can do 
everything. This way of thinking forces the doctor to abandon the therapeutic goal of 
caring for humans as they really are, to veer toward a promise to improve the human 
condition, which has been conceived as a subjective ideal, detached from reality, 
freed from any dependence, from any shared point of reference.
This unbridled quest for total mastery, which denies the finiteness inherent in 
man and denies man as a transcendent being, is appalling since it cannot do other 
than sacrifice a weakened person in favor of an idealized and abstract image. 
Suffering in one’s own identity is a painful wound that impairs a person’s health. 
The doctor has no solution to offer; he can only accompany the person along her 
way, in solidarity with her in this suffering that can touch any person. This is the 
glory of his vocation of caregiving.
If Corinne does not agree to take the journey of seeking what remains of herself 
after her losses and what truly defines her as a unique and irreplaceable human 
being, if she refuses to take the risk of waging this fight and if Belgian society gives 
her the right to find a doctor who cancels this fight before it can start, it is to be 
feared that the humanity of both patient and doctor will be erased.
The doctor becomes the instrument that satisfies a resolve, the executor of a con-
tract. Through his skill and the power society bestows on him, he masters the natural 
life from which the patient wants to be freed…, whereas, for me, the doctor is there, 
with his expertise of course, but also with his whole person, to place himself at the 
service of the suffering person, in the most balanced interpersonal relationship pos-
sible, recognizing each one’s limits.
To demand that medicine master all suffering is to reduce it to solving problems, instead of 
taking an interest in the person who is suffering.
Suffering certainly must be fought with skill and perseverance, but it does not 
encompass the whole of a human being. The patient cannot be reduced to her suf-
fering; she is more than that. The doctor cannot be reduced to his expertise or his 
function; he is more than that.
Requesting death and giving it when suffering persists is neither a courageous act 
nor an act of love, but a flight and a desertion. Courage and love do not lead to these 
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impasses: the fear of suffering together, turning in on oneself, and turning the other 
into an instrument. In these difficult cases particularly, but also generally, I plead for 
recovering and permanently entrenching a humble and human medicine, almost in 
spite of its effectiveness, a medicine centered on human beings and not on their 
problems.
From experience, I know that this attitude can give birth to a new inner freedom. 
For the sick person who is no longer alone, who is acknowledged as a companion 
for the journey, as someone important, capable of acting and of giving herself in 
spite of her extreme frailness, it is a matter of seeing the unexpected surface, of 
discovering unknown resources within oneself, of tending toward inner healing and 
wholeness of being. For the healthcare professional, it is a matter of being received 
by the person who needs him, without having anything else to give but the main 
thing, which is himself. For loved ones also, it is a matter of growing in humanity 
by remaining present for the person who is suffering: her suffering upsets them, but 
they acquiesce in suffering with her.
Only the painful confrontation of this reality makes it possible to affirm the existence of the 
“kalon kakon,” that is, the beauty of love concealed in the ugliness of suffering.
Whether we want it or not, all that we experience rebounds in one way or another 
on those who surround us. To want to escape, by means of a radical technical solu-
tion, from the formidable experience of suffering and dying leaves us more and 
more defenseless, more and more vulnerable, whether we are the one cared for or 
the healthcare professional, the loved one, or simply a member of society. This 
growing inability to live with suffering will make people say, more and more, as we 
are already hearing, that only an induced death, at the chosen time, is a dignified, 
peaceful death suffused with humanity, and that only the doctor who agrees to 
induce the death of his patient who has requested it has any heart. Whereas eutha-
nasia is in fact surrendering to fear, to prevailing despair, to the attitude of “what 
good is it anyway?” that clips our wings.
Lili writes to me: “Before experiencing the accompaniment you offered my 
mom, I was rather in favor of euthanasia. Now, not any more. Without making a 
crusade out of it, I know that I would not want it for myself. I have learned, from the 
final moments lived with my mother, to tame death. It is a wonderful gift, for I no 
longer fear death now. That is for me the key: if our society had not set death aside 
by making it a supreme taboo, euthanasia would not exist. And you are not heart-
less, on the contrary!”
The growing incapacity to live with suffering affects not only our humanity but 
also our professional expertise and our ethical bearings. Many healthcare profes-
sionals today have not acquired or are losing their expertise in dealing with great 
suffering instead of improving it. Their threshold of tolerance has fallen greatly.
Euthanasia kills not only the patient but also the therapeutic imagination.
Palliative care, as established by Dr. Saunders, has fallen out of favor, whereas it 
should be better taught and developed. Instead of taking this route toward progress, 
certain healthcare professionals, notably members of the Commission for the 
Control and Evaluation of Euthanasia, ask that directors of public health services 
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henceforth promote the form for the advance declaration of euthanasia, believing 
that there are far too few people enrolled. Yet we know well that it is difficult to 
make decisions when the patient is unconscious,1 and even more so in the current 
context where the pressure for euthanasia from suffering loved ones can be great. 
The Commission’s request can only lead to escalation, to the point where euthanasia 
will become a panacea, applied in any difficult situation. Is that the medicine people 
want for tomorrow?
2.1  The Therapeutic Alliance
In being born male or female, human beings must acknowledge that they are they 
are not by themselves alone sufficient to express humanity. This complementarity is 
also to be found in the doctor–patient relationship. For human beings to be, to live, 
to grow, and to build humanity, they must accept complementarity and dependence. 
Being a doctor means forging a therapeutic alliance. This has nothing to do with a 
therapeutic contract that seeks only to place sophisticated technology, applied by a 
qualified professional, at the disposition of an anonymous client who gives or does 
not give her consent. In the alliance, there is a promise of loyalty to always provide 
care in an impartial way. I have witnessed the way in which many men and women, 
in situations of great distress, have found in themselves resources they were not 
aware of and that flourished by their accepting difficult circumstances.
Marie-Thérèse is 84 years old. I find her very agreeable. Yet she upsets me in our first meet-
ings. She suffers from a metastasized ovarian cancer and we speak about a treatment plan. 
In a very crude, flippant way she tells me how she is for eliminating the elderly in retirement 
homes and the handicapped at birth, all those useless people who can do nothing with their 
lives. If she becomes helpless, she is sure she will request euthanasia. She knows that I am 
a conscientious objector to this act, but just the same, she wants me to take her as a patient 
for chemotherapy. We get along well. At the end of life, bedridden and completely depen-
dent, to gain time, she fights all the forces arrayed against her, telling her daughter: “It’s 
my old age.” Reasoning as a woman in good health, she had reduced her body to its organic 
aspect, but she had no doubt forgotten the fact that a person exists in relation to others, 
through her body—this frail body that is herself, and not mere matter that belongs to her. 
Tirelessly attended by her loving daughter, she came to give renewed value to the body that 
was abandoning her, to maintain her relationships, and to live through them to the end.
Marie-Thérèse and her daughter, and so many other examples I have seen, show 
a reality that forbids us to despair of human beings. Human beings can evolve end-
lessly while always remaining themselves, and can do so much better with an alter 
ego that accompanies and supports them, and they can invent new norms for them-
selves that integrate their difficulties. Their acknowledged vulnerability becomes a 
life force that helps them detach themselves from the idea that they had of them-
selves and that imprisoned them.
1 The advance declaration on euthanasia is a form by which a person “requests, in the event he/she 
is no longer able to express his/her will, that a doctor perform euthanasia provided all the condi-
tions laid down in the law of 28 May 2002 on euthanasia are satisfied” (www.health.belgium.be).
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Jacques is only around 50 years old. A kind of sullenness and listlessness, a fatalistic care-
lessness along with a certain resourcefulness in social dependency, drew him into a down-
ward spiral of debt from which there seems to be no return. Fortunately, he is taken into the 
care of the district’s social assistance team and a medical institution that supports him in 
his new hardship, metastatic lung cancer. Unfortunately, the illness has got the upper hand: 
chemotherapy is no longer effective. In pain and diminished by an inability to function that 
is getting worse, he needs to be taken into the care of a palliative care team. Little by little, 
the core of his person comes to the fore; he shows himself to be particularly plucky with the 
physiotherapist who is teaching him to walk again; he works hard, like an athlete who 
wants to win the gold medal. He involves himself, to the point of literally being out of 
breath, in relating to his new “friends,” the healthcare staff, the volunteers, or his fellow 
unfortunates. From this loyal support, he draws the strength he had lost when he was in 
good health but abandoned by everyone.
Living this medical relationship, where the doctor and patient agree to have a real 
responsibility for one another, does not deprive them of autonomy, but on the con-
trary opens a way to an authentic freedom that is cohesive and human. From this 
abiding fraternal relationship is born the confidence that makes a therapeutic alli-
ance lived out in everyday life possible. That is the humanist medical paradigm that 
respects the human being, simply because he/she is human, independently of every-
thing else. Suffering and death than lose their false supremacy. Human life is truly 
respected to the very end, unconditionally. Human society can rely on and remain 
firm on this sure foundation.
Yes, euthanasia remains a temptation which is right and good to resist.
We can transform death by living it as an act of love, by welcoming our spiritual-
ity that comes to the aid of our wounded flesh. It is no doubt this transformation that 
makes those who care for the seriously ill say they receive more than they give. In 
the therapeutic alliance, the patient and doctor weave a bond between themselves by 
both trusting, in the same manner, in the life force that was given them and that 
unites them, what I undergo by the violence of suffering is transformed by love. By 
honoring the life received in us, our flesh is reborn from its ashes. This life force can 
transform everything from within much better than a solution imposed from without.
Annita is seriously handicapped due to anoxia2 at birth. Monitoring her is complicated 
since she hardly speaks. One has to know her well to interpret her symptoms. So the diag-
nosis comes too late: paralysis of the lower limbs linked to compression of the bone marrow 
by metastasis. Recovery is not possible, only a treatment that relieves her pain and prolongs 
her life. Several visits to reevaluate her treatment have made her well-known in the pallia-
tive care department, where she is happy. Through interdisciplinary collaboration and 
ongoing discussion, the team seeks what is good for Annita, while respecting her wishes 
and her frailty. At the very end of life, greatly weakened, turned in on herself due to incor-
rect positions3 slowly acquired despite the efforts of healthcare professionals, from the 
intense gaze of fraternal communion she draws the strength to die calmly, with a dignity 
that compels wonder and makes those who tend to her stronger.
2 Anoxia is a deficiency of oxygen the blood distributes to the tissues.
3 The abnormal position taken by a limb or several joints, due to a persistent anomaly of the under-
lying skeleton or to a long-lasting neurological affliction.
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I hope that in reading this you will have understood that its content does not 
come from theoretical reflection. I am a doctor and it is as such that I express myself. 
My thinking is rooted in what I experience as a professional in the field.
The doctor is there to “sometimes heal, often relieve, always console.” Yes, to 
always console, since it is as a human being that the doctor is close to the person that 
illness isolates, worries, makes suffer, and plunges into doubt. In all these lived 
experiences of deaths great or small, where life asks only to triumph, but where the 
light has dimmed, where its fire has turned cold, the doctor and the sick person are 
two similar links in the same chain. When the body is tired, too weak to be lifted up, 
the doctor is there to tell his fellow traveler that she is unique and thus irreplaceable 
and that her dignity is immutable.
With all my heart, I wish the doctor–patient relationship to be a therapeutic alli-
ance and not a contract. Even if I want to be completely dedicated to the person who 
turns to me, I do not accept being turned into an instrument, trapped in an idolatry 
that would make me a seemingly almighty savior. Through our presence before one 
another, patient and doctor, we can make life flow between us and unite us in one 
and the same humanity.
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3.1  The Embarrassment of the Law
The euthanasia law has been established in Belgium since 2002. The law states that 
a physician does not commit a crime in intentionally ending the patients’ life when 
he meets a number of strict conditions. In certain circles, the euthanasia law is still 
hailed as a major success story, making Belgium an ethical beacon for the whole 
world. It is often said that euthanasia has been “accepted” by most of the population 
and that the so-called opposition, which may have existed initially, has melted away. 
Euthanasia stands as a figure for the “good death” (eu-thanatos), which more and 
more people choose every year. In the period 2016–2017, for example, 4337 eutha-
nasia cases were officially registered, 2028 in 2016 and 2309 in 2017 [1]. Officially, 
about 1 Belgian in 20 has currently his or her life ended through euthanasia.1 It is 
therefore appropriate to speak of a certain normalization of euthanasia as an integral 
1 It remains remarkable that in the French speaking part of Belgium there are significantly less 
euthanasia cases officially declared than in the Dutch speaking Flanders: for 2016 436 cases vs. 
1592, in 2017 517 vs. 1792 (roughly 40% of the population in Belgium is French speaking).
One day when I no doubt needed to have some kind of feedback, 
I asked a sick person I was accompanying: “What do you 
expect of me?” He looked at me, then replied: “I expect you to 
stand firm.” The roles were reversed down to the very words 
that were spoken.
Tanguy C. (volunteer in palliative care)
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part of the end-of-life care in Belgium. Apparently, the legislative initiative has 
achieved its goal.
Yet there are also dissonant voices. For example, there is great concern among 
psychiatrists about euthanasia in cases of mere psychological suffering. Here 
according to many experts, in recent years there have been avoidable deaths, patients 
who were obviously not terminally ill and who could have been treated [2–4]. 
Sometimes these are young women with complex psychiatric problems and a strong 
persistent wish to die, who are in a socially precarious situation and clash with the 
limits of inadequately developed care. Their death often causes a shock to the fam-
ily and the immediate social environment. In one case, this recently led to a criminal 
prosecution that came before the courts of assize (the criminal court in the Belgian 
juridical system that treats the most severe crimes), a case which affected society as 
a whole and enjoyed massive press interest. The doctors involved were in the end 
acquitted, but the trial revealed severe concerns about the way euthanasia was in this 
case offered and executed. In fact, during the trial, it became clear that the law on 
euthanasia was not respected on several fundamental points and that the control 
commission played an active role in the initial attempts to silence the concerns and 
questions of the bereaved family. Despite all these worrisome elements, the doctors 
went free, after a debate behind closed doors of 8 h by the lay jury. Apparently, in 
the end, the idea that the autonomous wish of the patient was respected and that the 
physicians had only good intentions overruled the fact that the euthanasia law was 
interpreted by them in a very lenient way.
Since the trial, a significant group of doctors have argued for a thorough evalua-
tion of the law.2 Within psychiatric care there has been concern for some time: sev-
eral stories of problematic euthanasia cases are known, even though some doctors 
simply deny this. How to deal with that? Even if all these cases would appear to be 
legally justified, is a law that creates traumas among relatives and causes such dis-
cussions in society not intrinsically problematic? And what about the legal certainty 
of the doctors involved? The law is formulated in such a way that any violation 
results in a murder charge. Was that the intention of the legislator? Observers note 
that the acquittal of the doctors sends this signal: do not turn a doctor who tries to 
help into a murderer. Even though he or she may fail to offer euthanasia on some 
points in an optimal way, there can be never be spoken of murder in case of eutha-
nasia, because the doctors acted with good intentions or, as one says, “in good 
faith.” This was the official line of argument of the lawyers defending the physicians 
at the trial on the euthanasia of Tine Nys.
However, as more critical voices remark, these observations raise the thought 
that the current law looks like a rag of paper, with a purely symbolic function: it 
cannot really be violated, since it is based on trust in the doctor who commits eutha-
nasia and the belief that nobody asks for euthanasia in a lighthearted way or haphaz-
ardly. As long as the doctor follows the correct procedures and faithfully reports 
every euthanasia case to the monitoring committee, he is fine.
2 According to a poll of the Artsenkrant/Le journal du Medecin 70% of the physicians in Flanders 
and 61.5% in French speaking Belgium insist on an evaluation of the law (Knack, 31 January 2020).
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What is the function of the law? Apparently, the law recalls the need for careful 
handling of something as extremely important and complex as euthanasia, but at the 
same time, it wants to give doctors legal certainty. In the aftermath of the trial men-
tioned, the chairman of the audit committee that was created by the law in 2002 
unequivocally says that the role of the committee is to act as a buffer between physi-
cians and public prosecutor. This implies that the only possible violations of the law 
are limited to procedural negligence and carelessness that can be detected by a 
purely administrative control committee. What action must be taken on infringe-
ments, and what exactly those violations could consist of, remains unclear. This 
may explain why few physicians or law experts are currently willing to sit on this 
committee. One doctor already resigned in 2018 because it was clear to him after 
two sessions that manifest violations of the euthanasia law are being ignored by the 
committee and swept under the carpet. A letter from this doctor to the parliament, to 
whom the audit committee is accountable, simply remained unanswered.
In what follows I do not want to delve deeper into the controversies and discus-
sions that continue to take place around the euthanasia law in Belgium, nor do I 
want to comment on problematic cases that keep popping up. Rather, from a philo-
sophical point of view, I want to try to understand why euthanasia, as a symbol of a 
“good death,” but also as a lived reality at the end-of-life, inevitably continues to 
have something unruly and confronts us with fundamental medical and moral ques-
tions and problems, next to personal tragedies and trauma’s among families of 
patients that receive euthanasia. These experiences within the realm of end-of-life 
care lead to ongoing discussions at the level of civil society, whereby critical voices, 
asking for a serious and independent evaluation of the euthanasia social experiment, 
are countered by pro-euthanasia lobbyists who plea for a further extension of the 
law to people with dementia and a better access for patients with psychiatric afflic-
tions and disorders. These last pleas are fostered by the normalization of euthanasia. 
However, critics see this as a proof of the slippery slope dynamics that inevitably 
emerges wherever euthanasia is legally permitted.
Why is the normalization of euthanasia welcomed by some and rather feared by 
others? Moreover, why should according to the pro-euthanasia experts euthanasia 
become an integrated part of normal therapeutic practice in the clinic, while others 
are vehemently opposed to this idea and plea for a more cautious attitude towards 
the further normalization of the active ending of human life in end-of-life-care? 
Finally, there is the tricky issue that the mere possibility of euthanasia would exert 
pressure on both the physician and the patient, but also on the whole society as such. 
Does that pressure indeed exist or does the law, based on self-determination, allows 
everyone the freedom to choose for euthanasia or not, free from any social pressure?
3.2  Euthanasia: Medical Act or Transgression?
The Belgian law describes the act of euthanasia clearly and elegantly. Euthanasia is, 
we read, “the intentional termination of life by a person other than the person con-
cerned, at his request ...” It is important that this act is performed by a doctor and 
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that specific restrictive conditions are met. In fact, the euthanasia law decriminalizes 
an act that is subject to a radical prohibition in every legal order: the intentional kill-
ing of another, the most severe crime a human being can commit. The law therefore 
clearly states that the doctor does not commit a crime if he complies strictly with the 
conditions of the law. Moreover, an important clause in the law states that no treat-
ing physician can be obliged to “apply euthanasia,” although he must explain any 
refusal and pass on the medical file to a doctor designated by the patient or the 
confidant (Law on Euthanasia, Chapter VI, Article 14). Apparently, the Belgian law 
thus respects explicitly the freedom of conscience of the physician, a crucial prin-
ciple of classical medical deontology.
It is clear the original concept of euthanasia has been considerably curtailed by 
the legislative initiative: in its original meaning, euthanasia refers to a “good death,” 
and was classically understood to mean the most optimal way in which a person can 
say goodbye to life, implying among other things a death free from unbearable suf-
fering and pain. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this concept evolved: by 
euthanasia one increasingly understood a medically induced death, initially from 
the idea that some “unworthy” forms of life may be terminated by a physician based 
on his medical judgment and skills.3 In fact, euthanasia in this sense could be offered 
for a wider range of cases than just unbearable suffering and pain, as the Nazi pro-
gram Aktion T4 testifies in a gruesome manner, where euthanasia was welcomed as 
the “good death” for some 200,000 persons with a handicap or a psychiatric afflic-
tion [5]. This has also led to the bad connotation that the concept of euthanasia still 
has in some countries, especially in Germany.
It must be emphasized: crucial in Belgian legislation (such as in the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg) is the clause that the life-ending act is performed by a doctor at 
the explicit request of the patient. That euthanasia must be the result of an autono-
mous expression of will, untainted by pressure or occasional emotional distress, is 
regarded as the moral core of the euthanasia law: thus, the ultimate right to self- 
determination, and therefore to a dignified, self-chosen death, is honored. 
Nevertheless, after 18 years and a few thousand euthanasia cases, the alleged trans-
parency of the law seems in practice hardly realized. How come?
There are two ways of looking at euthanasia as it is practiced today in Belgium 
and the Netherlands (and recently also in Canada, where euthanasia is rather called 
Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID)): on the one hand, it can be seen as a strictly 
medical act, contextualized by a procedural framework, which has become inte-
grated into the normal therapeutic realm of end-of-life care and is thus “normal-
ized.” In contrast, euthanasia can be understood as an act that presupposes certain 
medical expertise and takes place in the context of the clinic or medical care but 
falls radically outside the normal therapeutic practice. I think there are good rea-
sons for understanding euthanasia in the second sense. Let me clarify this.
Euthanasia always emerges as an action figure when the curative, healing objec-
tive of medicine falls short of a limit. It concerns a weighty, always existentially 
3 For more on the history of euthanasia cf. the excellent study by Ian Dowbiggin, A Concise History 
of Euthanasia. Life, Death, God, and Medecine, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007.
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charged act, in principle performed when a patient is incurably ill and death is 
imminent, in which a dying process is concluded by a direct intervention. The closer 
the act is to the moment of a foreseeable death, the more it still seems to fall within 
the therapeutic space of normal end-of-life care. However, in Belgium euthanasia is 
also legally possible for nonterminal patients. Euthanasia is then offered to answer 
the suffering caused by an incurable and untreatable illness or affliction, which is 
experienced by the patient as a source of unbearable suffering, even at a moment in 
time where death is not at all imminent or even to be expected. This is especially the 
case with euthanasia demands for merely psychiatric diseases. Here, the physician 
leaves the normal therapeutic realm and takes a decision to stop all care and perform 
a life-ending act based on motives and considerations that are never purely medical. 
Obviously, if euthanasia is not granted, the patient has all chance to continue his 
life, while a persistent death wish or suicide threat might still exist. As most psy-
chiatrists admit, at this point the social and existential dimension of euthanasia 
demands must be highlighted: psychiatric patients that ask for euthanasia do so 
often under the influence of a detrimental social situation and existential isolation. 
Significantly, the law in Belgium insists that a physician who considers to positively 
follow a euthanasia demand should try to consult family members and friends, but 
only on the condition that the patient gives his or her permission to do so. The law 
here reveals a possible tension between the colloque singulier of doctor and patient 
and the inevitable social dimension of dying.
3.3  Euthanasia as Transgression
Given all these facets I would call euthanasia a special, transgressive act, which one 
cannot reduce to a purely therapeutic option, possibly replaceable by another, tech-
nically speaking equivalent medical act. The word transgression can make the eye-
brows frown. But in several respects, medicine is a practice that involves 
transgressions. I would like to make a distinction here between transgressions that 
fall within the normal therapeutic-clinical practice, and transgressions with an exis-
tential and therefore deeply moral meaning.
In a way, transgressions belong to the essence of medicine and are a daily prac-
tice within the clinic or clinical care: the cutting of the surgeon, but also the physical 
examination and screening of the body with complicated equipment is inevitably 
part of good medical practice. This means that the doctor in the clinic or at the bed-
side comes in specific contact with the most intimate of the human person: his or her 
body. It is no coincidence that implicitly felt, or sometimes more explicitly formu-
lated rules apply here, which frame the transgressive nature of medical practice and 
ensure that patients are treated respectfully. Unmistakably, this also means that the 
doctor who abuses his transgressive power is expected to perform a morally repre-
hensible act.
Medically justified transgressions in the clinic and at the sickbed are inextricably 
intertwined with transgressions with an existential-moral meaning. Here too one 
can speak of morally acceptable transgressions, which are situated on the borderline 
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of strictly therapeutic and more person-related attitudes and relations between phy-
sician and patient. For example, a physician can in the course of a long-term treat-
ment share in a certain way the privacy and intimate personal history of the patient. 
Empathy is in medicine very important, and always presupposes a person-to-person 
relationship of a certain sort between physician and patient. In psychiatry, this is the 
case par excellence, but not only there: in other forms of prolonged medical care the 
relation between physician and patient has inevitably this more personal dimension. 
This affects in a fundamental way the medical, moral, and existential impact of 
euthanasia.
This should not surprise us. Euthanasia concerns one of the two liminal moments 
by which every human life is structured and affected: birth and death. It is no coin-
cidence that in every culture these moments, of crossing the border between exis-
tence and nonexistence as a corporal human being, beget a sacred meaning. Even in 
our liberal and highly secularized culture, we remain sensitive to this sacred charac-
ter of life and death. It is no coincidence that the atheistic liberal political philoso-
pher Ronald Dworkin [6] says that when it comes to abortion and euthanasia, the 
“sanctity of life” is at stake. He calls the moral questions about abortion and eutha-
nasia inevitably religiously charged.4 From this perspective, in all cultures, we find 
strict rules and taboos that regulate our behavior and attitudes towards birth and 
death. In fact, the purpose of these rules and taboos is double: on the one hand, they 
serve to protect the community from transgressions that threaten the sacredness of 
life and death, on the other hand, they structure and symbolize the way members of 
a specific community are supposed to behave towards newborn or dying 
human beings.
From the perspective of the physician, euthanasia should thus be considered a 
transgression in several respects. Giving a lethal injection to a patient, which results 
in his or her immediate death, implies an inversion of the attitude a doctor has 
towards his or her patient in normal therapeutic treatment. Here, the iatrogenic 
power of the physician reveals itself in a dramatic way.5 Indeed, the “technical” act 
of a lethal injection is in the case of euthanasia inevitably loaded with a strong 
symbolic-existential meaning. This implies that ending a life by euthanasia never 
can become a normal medical act: if something goes “wrong” at the offering of a 
lethal injection, it is almost impossible to conceive of this as a merely medical- 
technical issue. Complaints of bereaved families after a botched euthanasia on one 
of their beloved ones, as in the Tine Nys case, bear testimony to this. Remarkably, 
some Belgian doctors seem to take their own “technical” mistakes rather lightly and 
4 “We stand on the edge of a new age of religion, though a very different one from the long religious 
era that history began to leave behind in the eighteenth century.” I think Dworkin’s conception of 
an atheistic religious spirit, which sacralizes individual freedom and self-determination is deeply 
problematic, but it remains significant that he stresses the need to address issues of life and death 
from a religiously inspired perspective. Cf. also: Dworkin, Religion without God, Harvard 
University Press, 2013.
5 About the possibility of iatrogenic harm caused by physician, cf. Cavanaugh T. A., Hippocrates’ 




openly avow to consider the offering of a lethal injection a merely neutral med-
ical act.
In fact, when intentionally causing the death of a patient the physician steps out-
side the normal therapeutic space and his role of healer, who is focused on preserv-
ing life and the bodily integrity of his or her patient. When offering euthanasia, the 
doctor enters the personal existential realm of the patient: he fulfills a deeply 
expressed wish, without doubt in most cases in good conscience, but also a wish that 
comes out of tragic and apparently irresolvable dilemma: the patient wants his or 
her suffering to end and sees no other solution than death. The doctor is therefore 
addressed also himself as a person and not merely as a physician. He must fulfill a 
most intimate wish of the patient, which is always emotionally charged and expects 
from the physician to step outside his therapeutic role. The physician is here 
addressed as a human being, in his or her own moral integrity. Obviously, the 
patient and his or her family expect and hope that the doctor is acting in good con-
science when he offers euthanasia and is not merely an executive technician. If this 
latter is the case, it might make one wonder whether the physician is not causing a 
deep moral harm, that is hard to discern, let alone to sanction, but that in a way 
contaminates his whole profession. “It’s no small deal, ending a life,” a doctor once 
told me, “It crawls under your skin, it lingers even when it goes well and in a 
serene way.”
Offering or performing a euthanasia act is therefore in the end a deeply morally 
charged existential transgression. It affects the physician inevitably as a human 
being and gives him or her a power which is from a juridical point of view immense. 
As the Belgian law on euthanasia indicates, the doctor commits a crime if the pre-
requisites foreseen by the law are not respected: if so, euthanasia comes down to 
killing another human being, the gravest sort of transgression that one can commit. 
No matter how you turn it, the depenalization of euthanasia allows a doctor to break 
a commandment on which in principle the entire legal order is built. Of course, the 
aim of the act is in principle humane and shows a deep concern for a crucial goal of 
medicine as such: the relief of distress and pain. The well-acting doctor is moved 
here by compassion, he might even see it as his duty to offer euthanasia to a specific 
patient. However, this does not detract from the charged, weighty nature of the act: 
euthanasia implies the radical inversion of normal medical therapy.
Because of this transgressive nature, I believe that euthanasia can never be con-
ceived of as a purely procedural act, which follows the logic of supply and demand. 
Yet, paradoxically, due to its depenalization in the law of 2002 there is a temptation 
to see euthanasia in this way. In discussions in the civil society in Belgium that view 
often resonates: “I do what I want with my life, if I ask to die autonomously, no one 
has business with it, only the doctor I ask. And doctors only have to agree ‘yes’ or 
‘no’, nobody should further interfere with my demand.” This viewpoint implicitly 
presupposes a very instrumental relationship between doctor and patient: the offer-
ing of euthanasia is seen as a service of a merely contractual nature. But is the real-
ity not more complex? Often doctors in Belgium will confirm this, but it must also 
be observed that many among them seem to experience a sort of habituation towards 
the very act of euthanasia. They just follow the public opinion that euthanasia is in 
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fact a sort of right that should be granted by the medical world. But does this nor-
malization not come at a huge price? A doctor who provides euthanasia a dozen 
times a year or more often, can he still be sensitive to the transgressive nature of 
euthanasia? One could say: we, as a society have no business with that, we should 
not be concerned about how a doctor feels about his involvement in the active end-
ing of a human life, nor should we try to estimate the state of his conscience. But is 
a society conceivable where we become indifferent to the rules and principles that 
regulate one of the most transgressive acts a citizen can commit? The freedom of 
conscience of every citizen is of course personal and inalienable, but the rules by 
which conscience is oriented are collective and should be open to discussion and 
evaluation.
Pro-euthanasia physicians eagerly defend that in the Belgian medical world 
euthanasia is always granted and performed with the utmost care and respect for the 
patient. Moreover, physicians that offer euthanasia always do so in good conscience, 
so it is said. When one consults physicians and medical experts in Belgium and ask 
for their experiences with euthanasia in the clinic, they appear to be confident that 
there is no risk of what Albert Bandura calls “moral disengagement.” [7] But at the 
same time doctors who are willing in principle to offer euthanasia acknowledge that 
they sometimes struggle with the role they have to fulfill in actively ending a human 
life. Some awareness of the transgressive nature of euthanasia remains present. 
Personal differences in attitude and capacity, but also in moral conviction, stand out 
here: “I can offer euthanasia to conscious patients who are suffering somatically and 
who are at the end, but do not ask me to euthanize a demented person.” Or: “eutha-
nasia on psychiatric patients, one cannot ask this from me. I am unable to do that.” 
“I can only euthanize a patient that I have followed for a long time, and with whom 
I feel personally connected.” We discern the same sensitivity among doctors when 
they express in specific cases their conscious objection or remain in principle very 
reluctant or unwilling to commit euthanasia. These attitudes of reluctance and prin-
cipled opposition should be respected because they exemplify the awareness of the 
transgressive nature of euthanasia.
3.4  Between Law and Conscience: Euthanasia 
and Moral Integrity
I return to the three questions with which I began this reflection.
 1. How should we understand the divergent responses to the so-called normaliza-
tion of euthanasia? To some in Belgium, it goes without saying that a “right to 
euthanasia” exists, and could even be derived from human rights, or the right to 
self-determination. The disappearance of the taboo around euthanasia is from 
this perspective a good thing because it seems to make the dying process man-
ageable and death less-threatening. Moreover, it derives from the most intimate 
wishes of the individual patient and respects his or her right to self-determination 
by lifting the irrational and paternalistic taboo on death.
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However, as I have argued, euthanasia can in my view never be regarded as a 
purely instrumental transaction in which only the autonomy of the patient and 
the willingness of the doctor (possibly supported by compassion) are at stake. 
Euthanasia always has an existential, moral, and even spiritual meaning, from 
which it is impossible to make abstraction and which affects the collective mind 
of a whole society and the end-of-life care in general. The fear of normalization 
among some is a fear that this weighty dimension of euthanasia and its public 
meaning will no longer be seen. Our collective morality, where self- determination 
is so central, threatens to expand euthanasia even further beyond the clinic’s 
boundaries: euthanasia becomes a sort of emblem of clean, self-desired death, 
even for people who are not terminally ill. Remarkably, the law, which in fact 
should remind us of the great impact of euthanasia, seems to have an eroding 
effect here. Our moral culture is being thoroughly changed, but there is also 
much confusion and uncertainty: the transparency the law was promised to offer, 
remains a far dream.
 2. As a transgressive act, so I would defend, euthanasia inevitably falls outside the 
realm of normal therapeutic action. Yet there is still a debate between those who 
think that there is a right to euthanasia, and those who dispute this. Until now, the 
Belgian law recognizes and protects the doctor’s freedom of conscience not to 
commit euthanasia. Claiming that euthanasia should and can therefore become a 
“normal” therapy ignores this. If euthanasia is just an extension of good medical 
practice, there would be no reason not to recognize it as a patient right. But that 
would also mean that a doctor may not refuse euthanasia if in his or her eyes it 
appears to be the “best option” from a medical point of view.
But if euthanasia is a right the patient can claim, why should it not become 
an integral part of the medical training? I received the testimony from a young 
physician whose mentor thought it would be good she would by way of training 
get involved in a euthanasia case. Happily, this young physician was able to 
refuse to do so but her attitude becomes less and less accepted by some pro- 
euthanasia voices. In Canada, bioethicist Udo Schüklenk contends that in a dem-
ocratic state the doctors’ conscience clause must be restricted. “Conscientious 
objection” should never compromise the patient’s rights to have access to certain 
medical treatments [8]. If euthanasia or MAID is thus considered as a normal 
medical therapy to which the patient has a right, this would cause an ethical 
landslide: the freedom of conscience of the physician would be restricted and 
controlled by the state. Fundamental transgressive acts such as euthanasia and 
abortion would thus become a public good, available for all. Doctors would turn 
into a sort of public medical servants.
 3. Given the fact that euthanasia is a transgression that affects personal conscience 
as well as the collective mind of a society, it becomes understandable why it puts, 
if legalized, such a pressure on individual doctors, their patients, and the whole 
medical profession. The proponents of euthanasia in Belgium usually ignore this 
by stressing that no one is “forced” by the law to ask for euthanasia, one just has 
the option to do so. The euthanasia law is therefore praised for being very liberal: 
it leaves maximum space for personal choice, so one contends.
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Yet, reality is more complex. Doctors testify they experience conflicts of con-
science that lead to disagreement, for example, in a group practice. Sometimes 
patients seem to be under pressure from the family to ask for euthanasia, however 
subtle. Or they put pressure on the doctors themselves, often in a state of depression 
and emotional instability and despair. This proves once again that dying inevitably 
has a social dimension, but also, and more fundamentally, that it puts a heavy bur-
den on a physician’s conscience. He or she is pulled from the strictly therapeutic 
sphere in the direction of a heavily existentially charged decision and act. Just 
because the claim to his or her conscience is so great, there is a tendency to hide, as 
it were, behind the purely procedural requirements of the law. This further promotes 
the normalization of euthanasia, whereby the active ending of a human life is 
increasingly considered a purely technical therapeutic intervention.
The normalization of euthanasia is further nourished by the media and influ-
enced by public opinion through lectures, leaflets, moving stories, etc. The message 
of these public stories is always the same: thanks to the euthanasia law dying has 
become human, bearable, and serene, and unworthy and inhuman suffering can be 
avoided. Euthanasia is a gift to the patient and helps the medical profession to deal 
with the end-of-life in a dignified manner. Euthanasia is presented as a completely 
neutral act that is independent of any ideology and just meets the patient’s right to 
self-determination. At the same time, any criticism of the way in which euthanasia 
is applied in practice, or the identification of potential problems or abuses of the law, 
are rejected or minimized with great persistence. Critics of the euthanasia practice 
in Belgium are presented as conservative, ideologically biased by religion, and lack-
ing empathy and humanity: their attitude is said to exemplify an obsolete and con-
descending paternalism.
Such a response shows that the euthanasia law and practice itself is not value- 
free and is based on an ideology of self-determination and radical autonomy. 
Moreover, it does not square with the facts: there are also in Belgium staunch non-
religious and atheist physicians who share the worries and critique of many col-
leagues concerning the current euthanasia practice, on legal, medical, and 
deontological grounds.6 However, in the mainstream media and increasingly also in 
the medical world, the normalization of euthanasia goes hand in hand with its 
sacralization as a symbol of emancipation: euthanasia has become a new way of 
dealing with human finitude and the mystery of suffering and death. The sacraliza-
tion of euthanasia in the name of self-determination thus simultaneously makes 
every reference to the more ancient Hippocratic tradition into a taboo: it can no 
longer be said or remembered that euthanasia, all things considered, will remain a 
transgression that is alien to the nature of medicine and the highly ethical calling of 
the medical profession. Even the doctor who tries to go along with standardization 
(“I do euthanasia occasionally, but please not too much”) might inevitably at some 
point find himself in a state where he experiences a dilemma or the wavering of 
6 There are good arguments to be given against the legalization of euthanasia or assisted suicide 
from an atheist and liberal point of view. Cf. for this Yuill Kevin, Assisted Suicide. The Liberal, 
Humanist Case Against Legalization, Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
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conscience. The farther the request for euthanasia—and if granted, the life-ending 
act—lies from the moment of natural death, the more likely there might arise a 
struggle of conscience, but also palavers and dissensus between all involved: 
patients, but also caretakers, physicians, family members. This fatal and never 
avoidable dynamic is most poignantly exposed in the case of euthanasia for psychi-
atric patients.
3.5  Conclusion
I conclude with three observations.
First of all, the depenalization of euthanasia puts pressure not only on the medi-
cal world but also on society at large. This inevitably might trigger a conflict of 
conscience for the physician and the entire medical team involved in end-of-life 
care. But the family and wider social environment might also be affected by this 
process of normalization and experience pressure to choose for euthanasia or to 
propose it as the most appropriate way to die.
Secondly, the attempt to make active life-ending actions more transparent and 
unambiguous through the euthanasia law, and to release the doctor from the pres-
sure of legal sanctions, has led to a new kind of uncertainty, now at the level of the 
freedom of conscience of the physician. Where the Hippocratic oath used to be a 
benchmark and a guideline, the doctor now has to look for self-invented or very 
volatile benchmarks for his or her conscience.7 It is no coincidence that recently in 
Belgium attempts are being made by groups of doctors—for example, the psychia-
trists—to formulate additional rules to somewhat frame the transgressive act of 
euthanasia and guarantee morally responsible decisions in response to an euthanasia 
request [9]. At the same time, this creates the temptation, pressured by the culture of 
normalization, to reduce euthanasia to a procedural act, the result of a merely con-
tractual agreement between doctor and patient. In this way, euthanasia is made mor-
ally speaking completely neutral. As a euthanasia prone doctor once declared to a 
colleague: “who am I not to respect the will of the patient? I am not God!”
Thirdly, I think that there are two ways in which the euthanasia law, and the 
practice it has created, strengthens problematic coping attitudes on the side of phy-
sicians who welcome the normalization of euthanasia and try to bring their own 
euthanasia practice in consonance with their conscience. While unconsciously rec-
ognizing the vexing and transgressive nature of euthanasia, they at the same time 
seem to silence possible conflicts of conscience in two ways. Either they hide com-
pletely behind the law and let the procedures, provided for by the law, take the place 
of conscience: “the papers are filled in correctly, everything is fine.” Another 
7 Arguments in favor of the sustenance of the classical Hippocratic tradition with regard to eutha-
nasia or MAID are given in: Sprung Charles L., Somerville Margaret A., Radbruch Lukas, Steiner 
Collet Nathalie, Duttge Gunnar, Piva Jefferson, Antonelli Massimo, Sulmasy Daniel P., Lemmens 
Willem, Ely Wesley, “Physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia: emerging issues from a global 
perspective” in Journal of palliative care, 2018, pp. 197–203.
3 When Conscience Wavers. Some Reflections on the Normalization of Euthanasi…
36
attitude consists in pretending that one, as a physician, in fact, is motivated by a 
pure goodwill, not contaminated by doubts or afterthoughts: one coincides as it 
were with one’s own conscience and cherishes the illusion that it is impossible to act 
wrongly. The latter attitude became apparent after the euthanasia trial in Ghent, 
where the accused psychiatrist, after her acquittal, stated in the press plainly: 
“Maybe I could have ‘saved’ Tine if she had come to me 10 years earlier.” In other 
words, the advice pro-euthanasia, and therefore the death of her patient 10 years 
“too late,” is implicitly acknowledged as being somehow a contingent tragic event. 
Unaware of the highly problematic character of her avowal, the psychiatrist openly 
testifies of her self-indulgence and alleged purity of conscience: she uses her acquit-
tal to openly plea, on television and in newspapers, for an extension of the access to 
euthanasia for psychiatric patients.
Both the attitude of hiding behind the procedural form of the law and the attitude 
of self-glorification and alleged purity of conscience ignore in a fundamental way 
the transgressive nature of euthanasia. Moreover, both attitudes, I contend, derive 
from the depenalization of euthanasia and the practice inaugurated by this legal 
regulation. Therefore, it would be highly undesirable to reach as a society a point 
where doctors are no longer appealed in their conscience—and either reduce eutha-
nasia to a purely procedural semi-therapeutic act or sacralize it as a highly moral 
intervention. If this point of normalization is ever reached, the freedom of con-
science of the doctor evaporates. Perhaps this is the most important lesson to be 
learned in Belgium after almost 20 years of social experiment on euthanasia: as a 
transgressive act, euthanasia should always remain controversial and possibly 
embarrass the doctor’s conscience and by extension the entire society. This embar-
rassment cannot and should not be eliminated by any law or procedural decision. 
But if this is right, it also cannot be expected that the normalization of euthanasia 
will ever succeed. The active ending of a human life, even on demand of the patient, 
will always fall outside the realm of normal medical practice and remain thus the 
object of possible controversies, clashes of conscience, and deeply felt traumatic 
experiences, that affect a whole society.
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4Euthanasia for Unbearable Psychological Suffering
An Haekens
In recent years one observes in the field of psychiatry a growing proportion of 
persons requesting euthanasia on account of unbearable psychological suffer-
ing. The law concerning euthanasia passed the 17-year mark in 2019 and it is 
evident today that the number of euthanasias carried out on persons not suffer-
ing from a terminal affliction is increasing. In the first (biannual) report of the 
Federal Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Euthanasia (FCCEE), 
no mention was made of euthanasia for psychiatric reasons. The report for 
2004–20051 however describes six cases of persons afflicted with psychiatric 
disorders who were euthanized. The most recent reports number 57 (2018) and 
49 (2019) cases. The illnesses cited were depression, bipolar disorders, early 
stages of dementia, autism, schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorders, 
posttraumatic stress disorders, borderline type personality disorders, and other 
personality disorders.
In 2019, polypathology (“the co-occurrence of multiple chronic or acute dis-
eases and medical conditions within one person2”) was the second most frequent 
diagnosis justifying euthanasia, 17.3% of the total number of registered euthanasias 
1 http://organesdeconcertation.sante.belgique.be/sites/default/files/documents/federale_controle_
en_evaluatiecommissie_euthanasie-fr./14088500_fr.pdf
2 Definition for the first time used in the report: https://overlegorganen.gezondheid.belgie.be/sites/
default/files/documents/8_euthanasie-verslag_2016-2017-nl.pdf, p. 39.
40
(by way of comparison, in the period of 2012–2013, the proportion was 5.0%). In 
the report of the FCCEE for 2016–2017 we read that, even in cases of terminal 
affliction, 82.8% of causes for “unbearable suffering” are of a psychic nature, in this 
case, dependence on care, loss of autonomy, loneliness, despair, feelings of unwor-
thiness, desolation, diminished social contacts, etc.3
This evolution reveals a shift that is taking place at the heart of our society. The 
Dutch psychiatrist Boudewijn Chabot, a pro-euthanasia militant of the first hour, 
speaks of “a worrisome cultural change regarding self-chosen dying with the doc-
tor’s agreement.”4 It must be noted that self-determination at the end of life is a 
diktat that has imposed itself in recent years and that “control of the practice of 
euthanasia has been lost, because the legal requirements—which doctors still mas-
ter reasonably in cases of somatic illnesses—have been declared applicable with-
out any restriction for vulnerable patients suffering from incurable cerebral 
illnesses.”5 Moreover, he observes a link between the growing number of requests 
for euthanasia and “the financial stripping of care” that undermines the quality of 
life of persons suffering from a long-term mental illness. More and more critics 
arise, in our country as well, to voice their reservations regarding the practice of 
euthanasia.
Starting from a particular case we will first sketch the problem of euthanasia, to 
then expose, on the basis of legal criteria, the various thorny points of this practice, 
not only on the form but also on the substance of the practice.
Mrs. Jeanine
I recently received a telephone call from a colleague in family medicine. He was 
greatly concerned. A patient he had been treating for a long time and who lived in a resi-
dential care center was insistently requesting euthanasia. This situation was disturbing 
him, since it was not certain that the lady fulfilled the conditions to qualify for euthanasia. 
Since she would not take no for an answer he had decided to solicit the second opinion of 
a colleague. That doctor had concluded that in fact the lady did not fulfill the legal condi-
tions for euthanasia. “Case closed.” But since the lady was not giving in, and in the face 
of persistent obstinacy, the family doctor let himself be convinced to consider anew the 
question of an euthanasia. He called a third doctor for a third opinion. That doctor came 
to the same conclusion: euthanasia on account of physical suffering was not legally pos-
sible in her case. On the other hand, he suggested the possibility of euthanasia on account 
of unbearable psychological suffering, in light of the patient’s suffering caused by her 
physical decline (poor eyesight, reduced mobility). But to do that required the supplemen-
tary opinion of a psychiatrist. That is why the attending doctor was calling me. I found the 
case doubtful. Yet I sensed how it troubled my colleague and I agreed to visit the lady. She 
welcomed me cordially and told me why she wanted to die: she was tired of living and 
expected me to give the green light to her dying. She was imploring my help! I was very 
touched by her appeal. But was it for me to decide whether or not this woman has the right 
to die? And was it really a matter of unbearable psychological suffering? I realized very 







 (existential) suffering. In other words, she was absolutely not “beyond treatment.” It 
seemed to me there still were numerous possibilities to make her rediscover meaning to her 
life, in spite of her limitations. The family doctor reacted to my negative opinion with 
relief. On the contrary, the people surrounding the patient had strong and negative reac-
tions, giving me the feeling that I had “no compassion whatever,” that I was heartless, and 
that I resolutely lacked empathy. How was I able to refuse this lady in distress the right to 
die? “Yet that is the purpose of the law, no …?”
4.1  What Does the Law Say?6
The law concerning euthanasia stipulates that at the time of his request the patient 
must be conscious and competent to make a decision. He must be in a medical situ-
ation where there is no prospect of improvement. The patient must display constant 
and unbearable physical and/or psychological suffering that cannot be appeased and 
that arises from an accidental or pathological affliction that is serious and incurable. 
His request must be expressed in a voluntary, reflected, and repeated way, and can-
not arise from external pressure.
4.2  A Lack of Prospect of Improvement 
of the Medical Situation
In the context of euthanasia by reason of unbearable psychological suffering, the 
criterion that requires “a lack of prospect of improvement of the medical situation” 
is already problematic. The description is in fact subject to numerous interpreta-
tions. For some, the criterion means “medically incurable,” and thus subject to eval-
uation by the attending doctor: is treatment still possible? For others, the criterion 
refers to “unbearable suffering” whose evaluation is based on the subjective percep-
tion of the patient.
In its recommendations on the requirements for the care to adopt with respect to 
euthanasia in psychiatry, the Flemish Association of Psychiatry has indicated that 
there is an urgent need for further specification of the legal criteria for euthanasia for 
psychological suffering. In those recommendations “no prospect of improvement of 
the medical situation” is defined as follows: “the affliction is not only serious and 
incurable but the suffering is also continuous and unbearable and can no longer be 
relieved. The definition of a lack of prospect of the medical situation does not refer 
to a patient’s subjective experience but to the absence of possibilities for treatment 




7 http://vvponline.be/uploads/docs/bib/euthanasie_finaal_vvp_1_dec.pdf (available in Dutch only). 
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4.3  Incurable Disorder
The law requires an incurable affliction, and thus a situation where no treatment is 
possible. In a psychiatric context, it is particularly difficult to determine that an ill-
ness is incurable. In fact, it is impossible for a psychiatrist to say to his patient, 
“your disorder is incurable,” or “I have enough indications to show the course your 
illness will take,” or again, “science teaches me that your condition will never 
improve.” In psychiatry, it is very difficult to predict the evolution of pathologies 
and impossible to objectify their incurability. With physical suffering it is altogether 
different: not that exact prognoses can always be made, but in general, and certainly 
in the case of cancer, there is enough scientific evidence to ascertain that all treat-
ments have been exhausted or to see what still can be considered. There are a num-
ber of psychiatric disorders whose evolution remains unknown. On the other hand, 
there is no connection between the gravity of a patient’s condition and his chances 
for improvement. Certain people who are in very poor condition for a long time and 
who have frequent relapses, in spite of many treatments, can get better later. The 
crux of the matter therefore seems to be that when estimating the incurability of 
someone’s suffering, the subjective factor cannot be eliminated. Even psychiatrists 
very favorable to euthanasia in case of mental suffering acknowledge that the notion 
of “incurable illness” can never be fully objectified in psychiatry…. no more than it 
is possible anyway to describe the suffering unbearable and hopeless on more or 
less objective grounds.8
Healthcare also implies that treatments are available and accessible. This is not 
necessarily the case in mental health. “The mental health care sector suffers from 
budgetary thresholds (underfunding, waiting lists), social thresholds (stigmatiza-
tion, professional recognition), and thresholds having to do with care (for example 
‘comfort care’ is still insufficiently developed) that can result in patients suffering 
psychiatric afflictions not receiving adequate treatment.”9 [1].
Confronting questions of euthanasia by reason of unbearable psychological suf-
fering is a new and sometimes confusing phenomenon for psychiatrists. In fact, they 
have always striven to prevent their patients’ suicides, which is anyway what society 
expects of them. Patients who suffer intensively and who feel hopeless have always 
talked about their taedium vitae (aversion for life) and spoken these words: “For me, 
it is not worth the effort.” It cannot be overemphasized how much mental suffering 
can be burdensome for the people afflicted by it and for those around them. Since 
forever the task of psychiatrists and other caregivers in the psychiatric care sector 
has been to give the patient the possibility of expressing his wish to die in order to 
talk about it with him, to carry the suffering of these patients with them, to endure 
it together, and to help search for “meaning.” It involves staying by the patient’s side 
when he cannot go on. It is the job of psychiatrists to deal with one’s own sense of 
powerlessness. All this derives from the following conviction: “It is always 
8 http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20171103_03168722
9 https://www.zorgneticuro.be/sites/default/files/general/Ethisch%20advies%2020%20levensein-
dezorg%20psyschisch%20lijden.pdf (available in Dutch only).
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possible. We are not giving up on you.” Psychiatrists today are more and more often 
faced with a wish to die that manifests itself under another form: “I want euthana-
sia.” Society currently expects a psychiatrist, in addition to the continued efforts to 
prevent as many suicides as possible, to answer his patient’s request for euthanasia, 
and to decide whether his life is still worth living or not. And this with people who 
are not suffering from terminal illness and who have, in principle, many more years 
to live.
Concerning euthanasia, in psychiatry, important discussions are nonetheless tak-
ing place regarding the handling of the refusal of treatment. What is to be done with 
a person who is suffering unbearably, for whom treatment is still possible, but who 
refuses treatment and requests euthanasia? Certain proponents of euthanasia argue 
that a patient who suffers unbearably, can be treated but who does not feel he has the 
strength to begin a new treatment, can have access to euthanasia. The question then 
arises whether the “lack of prospect of improvement of the medical situation” does 
not come down to the criterion of “the willingness to begin a new treatment” and 
whether such an application of the law is not an abusive use of it.
The core of the problem resides in the fact that it is impossible to eliminate the 
“incurability” of an illness. Even psychiatrists very favorable to euthanasia in case 
of mental suffering acknowledge that the notion of “incurable illness” can never be 
fully objectified in psychiatry…. no more than it is possible anyway to describe 
“unbearable and hopeless suffering” on more or less objective bases.10
4.4  Persistent and Unbearable Psychological Suffering
The criterion of “persistent and unbearable psychological suffering” is not defined 
by law either. Suffering is by its essence subjective and assessing the suffering of the 
person concerned can only be subjective, which in turn gives rise to diverse inter-
pretations. It is not easy to define the different forms of suffering. Nonetheless, a 
distinction needs to be made among inherent suffering, contextual suffering, and 
meta-suffering.
By inherent suffering, we understand any suffering caused by the pathology 
itself: the wish to die is in this case a symptom of a psychiatric illness, for example, 
of depression that leads to despair. Healing from depression will bring the healing 
of the wish to die. Patients can also suffer from psychotic symptoms, or from inap-
propriate behaviors linked to an addiction, or from personality disorders.
Next to inherent suffering comes contextual suffering. Patients stricken with 
serious mental afflictions suffer from the consequences of the disease: the side 
effects of medication, repeated relapses and hospital admissions, increasing isola-
tion, loneliness, loss of employment, stigmatization, or social regression….
Finally, there is meta-suffering, which is suffering from one’s suffering: experi-
encing the feeling of hopelessness and injustice of having to live with a serious and 
long-lasting mental illness. Very often it is about existential suffering. We must 
10 www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20171103_03168722
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dare to admit that we cannot always provide an appropriate answer to this (existen-
tial) suffering. Even in mental healthcare, we have made ourselves guilty of thera-
peutic persistence. It is of paramount importance that caregivers be resolute, 
reliable, and determined to help the patient and that they stubbornly not abandon 
the patient. This must not lead to therapeutic persistence: for example, continuous 
treatment pressure, repeated hospitalizations always proposing more of the 
same [2].
“Recovery psychiatry” (“Hersteldenken”) has already without any doubt contrib-
uted to providing solutions to this problem [3]. This approach focuses more on 
improving the well-being of the patient than on treating the illness. “Recovery 
appears as a way to live a satisfying life, filled with hope, to contribute to society in 
a significant way, despite the limitations imposed by illness. Recovery is the origin 
of a new significance and meaning given to life, all the while overcoming the disas-
trous effects of a psychiatric illness.”11
In the same way, in psychiatry, palliative care and the care called “crustative” 
or “oyster” care (care for seriously afflicted psychiatric patients, around whom 
the healthcare team forms as it were a solid shell or “oyster”, within which these 
persons feel secure)12 are paths that need to be further developed, and that can 
contribute to better care for patients who experience intense psychological 
suffering.
Moreover, the existential dimension has been neglected for a long time in 
mental health care [4]. Although caregivers are being involved in the dialogue 
around the meaning of life, since psychiatric disorders by definition attack the 
meaning of life, they are not familiar with this existential dimension and are 
not acquainted with the specific language of the topics related to the meaning 
of life. Many caregivers feel awkward when they have to deal with them explic-
itly. However, in recent years we have seen a turnaround. The growing interest 
in these themes shows an awareness of their importance. There is nonetheless 
a long road ahead.
In addition, our society shows little inclination to invest more in healthcare for 
“chronic psychiatric patients”: little interest, little scientific research, little fund-
ing…. The progressive socialization of mental healthcare, a positive movement, 
risks leaving aside this category of vulnerable people: they cannot always call on a 
network of support within society itself and they carry their stigmatization of “psy-
chiatric patient” as a burden. The result is that it is only with great difficulty that 
they find “their place” in our neoliberal society.
In public debates, the opponents of euthanasia in cases of mental suffering are 
reproached for lacking respect and empathy for their patients. But what does empa-
thy mean in this specific context? A patient’s request to put an end to his life (to put 
an end to his suffering) can sometimes be understandable to the point that a care-
giver is tempted to acquiesce quickly, to comply with it. But do we not give the 
11 http://www.ispraisrael.org.il
12 http://mailsystem.palliatief.be/accounts/15/attachments/NF_12_2016/crustatieve_zorg_geeft_
kwaliteit_van_leven.pdf (available in Dutch only). 
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patient the message that he no longer has any worth? That we are abandoning him 
in all his vulnerability and despair? That we cannot take it any longer? Is that really 
empathy? It would be rather a misleading form and therefore dangerous form of 
empathy.
4.5  What Is Empathy?
The notion of empathy merits some further reflection. Edith Stein [5] established a 
distinction among different levels of empathy. She makes a difference between 
being immediately shaken by emotion, “emotional contagion,” and “corrective 
empathy”, the evaluation of one’s own capacities for empathy. Authentic empathy is 
only possible when this corrective movement of conscience has been applied. This 
means that the caregiver will not totally identify with the other person’s suffering 
and will not be supposed to have to act from the patient’s point of view, but that he 
will be able to look truthfully at the other’s situation. Only then will he be morally 
justified to take care of the other person. It is important to be aware of these different 
levels of empathy, particularly in the context of a request for euthanasia on account 
of mental suffering.
4.6  Decision-Making Capacity
In examining more closely the criterion “the capacity to make a decision” it has to 
be noted that this criterion has not been specified in the Belgian law concerning 
euthanasia. Yet, evaluating a person’s mental capacity remains a very complicated 
matter. To this day, there is no consensus on how to evaluate a subject’s capacity to 
make certain specific choices. This difficulty in assessing is still more acute in per-
sons suffering from a psychiatric disorder.
A depression, an anxiety disorder, or a psychotic disorder can alter a person’s 
capacity to make a thoughtful decision, which however does not mean that because 
of his or her psychiatric affliction the person becomes automatically incompetent 
for all decisions [6].
4.7  Conclusion
Obviously, the legal criteria do not provide sufficient guidance to doctors who 
wish to evaluate a request for euthanasia in a thoughtful way. The law opens the 
door to numerous interpretations, as practice confirms. We note that the law is 
in effect interpreted in very different ways, and in certain cases in a very 
elastic way.
The law allows any psychiatrist to evaluate very complex psychiatric afflictions, 
whereas he obviously cannot be an expert in all forms of afflictions, such as autism, 
eating disorders, mood and personality disorders.
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In practice, we also observe that certain patients shop around for medical assess-
ments: everyone can consult as many doctors as he wishes, until he has garnered 
enough positive assessments. Scott Kim [7] adds that, from a foreign perspective, it 
is striking that in Belgium the procedures leading to euthanasia are clearly less strict 
than for other medical interventions that are however less radical. Moreover, there 
is no feedback loop in this domain: it is not possible to draw any lesson from one’s 
errors, since the patients can no longer speak, being deceased.
The problem, in any event, does not arise solely from the law, but equally from 
the system of control and evaluation, which in our country functions little or not at 
all. After 17 years and about 18,000 files submitted to the Federal Commission for 
Control and Evaluation, only one case was sent to the prosecutor. Nor has any inter-
pretation of the data been made or case descriptions published. Lastly, no close 
evaluation of the commission’s operation has ever taken place.
What should we conclude from this? Without wanting to minimize the immea-
surable suffering of many patients afflicted with a psychiatric disorder, the current 
evolution, where requests for euthanasia by reason of psychological suffering are 
more and more frequent, is a matter of concern. From the viewpoint of the caregiver, 
it is sometimes “tempting” to quickly acquiesce to this request. Indeed, it is not easy 
to deal with one’s own feelings of powerlessness in the face of so much suffering in 
the other person, and it is difficult not to give in to despair.
Requests for euthanasia seem to flourish in the current context of society. We can 
in fact perceive a general change in culture. “Each must be able to decide for him-
self when he has had enough” seems to have become the new standard of normality. 
Such a shift is definitely taking place amount the elderly, as shown in the current 
debates on “life fatigue” and “completed life”.
The social context has a determining effect on patients with a psychiatric disor-
der. Given that our society is evolving toward a society where every vulnerable life 
is considered unworthy of human dignity (old age, dependence on care, dementia, 
mental illness, Down’s syndrome….), it becomes extremely difficult to give mean-
ing to one’s own life once one is suffering a serious psychiatric disorder. The obser-
vation that psychological suffering increasingly plays a role in the practice of 
euthanasia and that this psychological suffering is a consequence of dependency on 
care, loss of autonomy, loneliness, loss of dignity, or loss of the ability to maintain 
social contacts, confirms this evolution.
Is not the primary mission of our society to first invest in quality care, in innova-
tive and accessible treatments, in developing “recovery psychiatry,” in organizing 
palliative care and “oyster” care for the most vulnerable patients with a psychiatric 
disorder? And above all to give them a place in our society?
4.8  The Long and the Short of Mrs. Jeanine’s Story
A few months after my visit with Mrs. Jeanine as “third expert” quite by chance I learned 
that her partner, with whom she had had a long “LAT” relation (Living Apart Together) had 
passed away. This man had kept many secrets to himself and had always expressed the wish 
to die after his companion. When he felt, and then knew that his last days were upon him 
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and that he would no doubt be the first to die, he pressured his companion to request eutha-
nasia so that their agreement regarding their dying might be upheld. After all, he had many 
secrets on a relational level, and he did not want those secrets to be revealed if he died first….
References
 1. Vandenberghe J. Euthanasie bij ondraaglijk lijden als gevolg van een ongeneeslijke psychia-
trische aandoening. In: Delepeleire J, editor. Euthanasie en menselijke kwetsbaarheid. Leuven: 
KU Leuven Metaforum; 2013. p. 39–51.
 2. Haekens A, Hermans J.  Geen Eind aan mijn pijn? Over uitzichtloos psychisch lijden. 
Antwerpen/Apeldoorn: Garant; 2008. p. 11.
 3. Callebert A. Herstel als antwoord op euthanasie? Acco; 2018.
 4. VanPraag HM.  Zinverlies, een verwaarloosd onderwerp in de psychiatrie. Tijdschrift voor 
Psychiatrie. 2010;52(10):7050714; available (in Dutch only) via webpage: http://www.tijd-
schriftvoorpsychiatrie.nl/en/issues/432/articles/8293.
 5. Stein E. On the problem of empathy. Stein W (Trans.) Washington: ICS Publications; 1989.
 6. Haekens A. Beslissingsbekwaamheid in de gerontopsychiatrische context. Leuven: University 
Press; 1998.
 7. Kim S, DeVries R, Peteet J. Euthanasia and assisted suicide of patients with psychiatric disor-
ders in the Netherlands 2011 to 2014. JAMA Psychiat. 2016;73:362–8.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
4 Euthanasia for Unbearable Psychological Suffering
49© The Author(s) 2021
T. Devos (ed.), Euthanasia: Searching for the Full Story, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56795-8_5
R. Karplus (*) 
Maccabi Healthcare Services, Leumit Healthcare Services, Jerusalem, Israel
5People Facing the Question of Euthanasia: Patients, Family 
and Friends, Healthcare Workers
Rivka Karplus
Since the Oregon Death with Dignity Act was adopted in 1997, followed by the 
decriminalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands in 2001, and in Belgium in 2002, 
an increasing number of people are requesting euthanasia.
How does a person reach the point of asking for euthanasia1? What are the 
factors involved, for the patient him/herself, for family and friends, or for the 
medical team? The attitude of the surrounding society evidently plays a role via 
its perception of suffering and illness, as well as the value it sees or denies in 
fragilized human life. But rather than limiting ourselves to these general consid-
erations, it seems better to start our discussion by seeking to understand the situ-
ation of the person him/herself, since it is his/her life and death which are at 
stake. A doctor may know a disease thoroughly, and even be a specialist involved 
in clinical research, but will still be unable to predict exactly how the disease of 
a specific individual will evolve. Even if the statistics show that a certain treat-
ment gives a 70% chance of survival, the person receiving the treatment will 
never be 70% alive and 30% dead; he/she will always be one or the other. And 
given that suffering is an essential criterion for allowing euthanasia in those 
countries where it is legal, it seems important that we first try to understand the 
reality of that suffering.
1 In order to avoid excess wordiness, the present text frequently uses the more general term of 
“euthanasia” to also include the practice called “assisted suicide” or “assisted dying.” Despite the 
distinctions which can be made between the two categories, in both we are dealing with the death 
of a person as a direct consequence of a series of deliberate actions including an active intervention 
of medical personnel, either directly by prescribing, preparing or injecting lethal product(s), or by 
prescribing or supplying them for the person to take.
This article addresses and develops certain points addressed in a more general article published in 
French: Karplus Rivka, Euthanasie: réflexions d’un médecin. NRT, 2014, n 136, pp. 596–605.
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5.1  Personal Suffering
This question must be approached with the greatest of respect for the person suf-
fering, and with a deep humility on the part of those trying to understand, who do 
not themselves experience the same suffering. Nevertheless, if we wish to analyze 
the situations which can bring a person to request death, we need to understand 
the nature of their suffering, as they experience it. However inadequate categories 
may be to describe the complexity of human reactions, we can still describe suf-
fering as physical, psychological, relational, spiritual, or existential. Frequently 
these different aspects overlap or intermingle, particularly in the case of a serious 
illness.
5.2  Physical Suffering
Physical suffering may present in various guises: pain, disagreeable sensations such 
as nausea, weakness, respiratory insufficiency, hunger, or thirst. It may also consist 
in the loss of physical or cognitive function. Certain situations may be perceived as 
particularly humiliating, such as urinary or fecal incontinence.
The perception of physical suffering can vary according to the circumstances: 
the same pain may seem unbearable alone in one’s room at 2 am and be relatively 
easy to bear the next day during the time spent with a friend. The perceived duration 
of pain, both current and remembered, is frequently longer than its objective dura-
tion [1, 2]. Other elements can aggravate physical suffering; for example, the help-
less feeling of someone waiting to be given pain medication, or the anguish caused 
by bone pain which is likely to indicate new metastases.
Any attempt to treat physical suffering, especially that which is perceived as 
unbearable by the sufferer, must take this complex reality into account. We need to 
be wary of imposing our own, “objective,” exterior perception of the degree or dura-
tion of another’s physical suffering.
5.3  Psychological Suffering
There is a redoubled suffering in the feeling that one’s very humanity is somehow 
wounded or diminished by a disease which limits the ability to act, fosters depen-
dence on others, or causes physical deterioration. Once again, there is frequently a 
difference between that which is felt by the patient him/herself, and that which is 
visible to others.
An artist whose hands can no longer function due to polymyalgia rheumatica 
(PMR) may feel that his incapacity to draw has taken away his means of expression 
and the gift which gave his life meaning.2 A person suffering from fecal 
2 Most of the examples are based on my experience as a doctor (in hematology, internal medicine, 
and infectious diseases), frequently with modification of identifying details.
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incontinence may feel imprisoned in his/her own house, by fear of humiliating 
“leaks” if he/she dares go out. The very relationship to the body can change: rather 
than being the means of life, of encounter with the surrounding world and with oth-
ers, it becomes primarily the site of suffering.
The loss of physical beauty (and even disfigurement, such as that following a 
radical operation for throat cancer) can threaten the person’s sense of identity: “Am 
I still myself?” The question: “Can others still love me like this?” often implies an 
underlying doubt: “Can I love myself like this?”
The relationship to time also changes, since it is demarcated by the alternance 
between the symptoms of suffering and the temporary relief given by medication. It 
is also often composed of waiting for treatment or visits since the patient has very 
little control of the events in his/her life. Time can end up being perceived as a 
gradual progression of disease, filled with fear of what lies ahead.
5.4  Emotional and Relational Suffering
Whatever the depth of a human relationship may be, it cannot escape being affected 
by suffering, especially in the case of a serious illness. This does not necessarily 
mean that the impact on the relationship will be negative; sometimes illness and its 
consequences can be an occasion for encounters more focused on essential aspects. 
But relationships can also be a source of suffering for the patient: the inability to live 
them “as before” underlines the omnipresence of the illness in his/her life.
For a couple, intimate aspects of medical care, pain, physical changes can all 
challenge the body’s role in expressing love and sexuality. There are also logistical 
problems: if a person is hospitalized, the framework limits intimacy…especially 
when the medical staff may enter the room at any moment3! The sick person may 
feel he/she is limited to asking and receiving (visits or assistance), rather than retain-
ing any sort of initiative. This dependence can have varying effects on a relation-
ship: one person may require a constant presence to face the anguish caused by his/
her illness, another might refuse visits out of fear of being a burden for family or 
friends.
Lastly, there is the influence of our society where the value of human beings is 
too often judged in terms of success or “productivity.” A sick person may ask him/
herself if such life is “worth” the cost of treatment or the limits the illness places on 
family and friends. Such questions can lead to an extreme where the patient asks 
him/herself if it is not “selfish” to spend so much money for treatment, rather than 
dying and leaving it to family members. The ill person becomes unable to conceive 
that his/her presence is of far more value to family members than the material legacy.
3 It is important to note that there are creative initiatives which create spaces for intimacy, even in 
the hospital setting: the cameras sometimes used to monitor patients in intensive care units can be 
turned off when a partner, close friend or family are present. In other departments, it is often pos-
sible to simply ask the team to refrain from entering the patient’s room for a specific time span.
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5.5  Existential and Spiritual Suffering
Death is an inevitable part of our existence. We all know this, even if our perception 
of death itself may vary among societies or by religious belief. A person suffering 
from a fatal illness is confronted with his/her mortality as an immediate reality, 
approaching inexorably but with an unknown date of arrival. The loss of indepen-
dence may lead the patient to try to “take back control” by determining the moment 
and circumstances of his/her own death [3]. An article [4] on assisted suicides in 
Oregon during the first years after its legalization shows that close to half of the 
persons concerned justified their request by at least one of the following reasons: 
“Ready to die,” “Wanted to control circumstances of death,” and “Saw continued 
existence as pointless.”
Accumulated suffering can lead to a feeling of existential anguish. Even those 
who believe in a good and loving God may find it hard to accept the seeming incom-
patibility between their faith and the daily reality of their suffering, or the internal 
contradiction between their desire to bear patiently all that “comes from God” and 
the questions or feelings of rebellion awakened by their illness.
5.6  How Can One Respond to a Request for Euthanasia?
Given the cumulative aspects of suffering we just discussed, it is far from surprising 
that some people see their situation as unbearable and express the wish to die rather 
than continue to live in such circumstances. While every person does not necessarily 
experience all the abovementioned aspects of suffering, each bears a painful burden 
which diminishes the very experience of living. The wish to die rather than live “like 
this” can be understood as a fundamentally human reaction, a rebellion against suf-
fering in death, and thus an affirmation of life as it should be. For this reason, we 
need to be wary of assuming that all those who ask for euthanasia truly wish to die.
Several articles have been published in recent years about the outcome of requests 
for euthanasia or assisted suicide since their decriminalization in various countries. 
The abovementioned article [4] describes the results of a questionnaire sent to 
Oregon physicians on their experience of assisted suicide since the year when it 
became legal. Of 165 people who requested assisted suicide, 17 (10%) died by that 
means; 42 (25%) changed their mind; the others were either considered ineligible 
by the established criteria or died a natural death before completing the process.4 
The authors noted that people changed their minds more frequently when the doctor 
prescribed one or more interventions, among them palliative care, antidepressant 
medication, social workers, or chaplain services.
In the Netherlands, 8.3% of those who died in 2015 had requested euthanasia, 
and 4.6% did in fact die by euthanasia or assisted suicide [5]. The national statis-
tics show a progressive increase in the annual cases of death by euthanasia since 
4 The article mentions a number of other circumstances, of which some people had more than one.
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1990. A 2005 article [6] based on questionnaires distributed to Dutch physicians 
reports the following results: 44% of euthanasia requests were followed by death 
by euthanasia, in 25% of cases the person died before receiving the lethal drug, 
and 13% of those requesting changed their mind. The Belgian data [7] are similar 
to those from the Netherlands: an article [8] based on questionnaires sent to more 
than 3000 Belgian physicians in 2009 determined that 48% of euthanasia requests 
were eventually carried out and that 10% of those requesting changed their minds. 
These articles do not indicate whether there was a difference in the interventions 
offered to persons who actually died by euthanasia and those proposed to the per-
sons who changed their minds. Another Dutch article [9] compared the symp-
toms, as described by their physicians, for cancer patients who died by euthanasia 
versus those who died without having requested euthanasia. It showed that more 
of the first group suffered from severe symptoms, and that for certain of these 
symptoms (nausea and dyspnea) they received less treatment, although pain was 
treated for all.
What can we conclude from all these statistics? First of all, the frequency of 
euthanasia requests is steadily increasing in those countries where it is legal under 
certain conditions [10]. These requests are the expression of genuine suffering: life 
has become unbearable for these people, who express that in requesting euthanasia. 
It would however be incorrect to conclude that all those who request euthanasia 
truly wish to die. Let us first state what seems evident: a person who expresses the 
wish to die by euthanasia (with the exception of a truly suicidal wish) is not saying 
that he/she prefers death to life, but rather that death seems preferable to life under 
the actual circumstances, which implies that he/she might well choose differently if 
those circumstances were to change. The data from Oregon, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium show clearly that not all who request euthanasia go on to the final act. In 
addition, the first article would seem to show that various interventions can help the 
patient to desire to go on living.
This said, we cannot conclude that all those who withdrew their request for 
euthanasia “changed their mind” due to the proposed interventions. It would be 
more accurate to say that there is an entire spectrum of reasons why someone could 
request euthanasia: the desire to die when faced with what is perceived as an unbear-
able situation, the will to choose the moment of his/her death when facing the 
unpredictable duration of a terminal illness, the need to know that the option will be 
there at a future moment where the suffering could become unbearable, or simply 
the need to express just how serious that suffering is.5
5 See (among other articles): Li M, Watt S, Escaf M, Gardam M, Heesters A, O’Leary G, Rodin 
G. “Medical Assistance in Dying—Implementing a Hospital-Based Program in Canada,” N Engl J 
Med, 2017, n° 376, pp. 2082–2088. This Canadian article describes the fact that many patients 
“change their mind” about euthanasia after their request has been approved. One possible interpre-
tation, suggested by the authors, is that the fact of having received approval for euthanasia gives 
them a renewed sense of control of their situation—and hence they no longer feel the need to end 
their lives.
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How can we respond to a request for euthanasia? The first step is to truly hear 
the suffering being expressed: no one can judge another’s suffering, and hence 
none of us have the right to belittle it or to give a simplistic answer. The person 
who requests euthanasia is telling us the depth of his/her suffering and proclaim-
ing just how incompatible the suffering seems with what life is meant to be. To 
truly listen means to be willing to hear simultaneously the suffering, the despair, 
and an affirmation of life expressed in the very wish for death. Often, the simple 
fact of being listened to, in respect for the uniqueness of the person’s experi-
ence—and thus for his/her inalienable human dignity—can already alleviate the 
suffering caused by feeling “less human” due to the incapacity or disfiguration 
caused by disease.
Once it is established that the response involves listening and accepting the 
person in his/her present situation, it becomes possible to work together with the 
person to see what can be done to help reduce suffering. Euthanasia does not 
improve life—it ends it by giving death. But in helping the sick person to define 
the areas of his/her suffering ways are opened to work together in looking for 
means to improve the situation. Pain can be greatly attenuated, often virtually 
eliminated by palliative care. It is possible to choose the most appropriate medica-
tions together with the patient, to identify and treat any adverse effects, and to 
provide him/her with means to adjust the dose according to the situation. For 
example, a person might choose to be fully awake to receive visits, and drowsier 
the rest of the day.
For the other forms of suffering, the logic is the same as that for pain: to prioritize 
listening, to attempt to understand, to relieve suffering as much as possible—always 
with the greatest of respect for the person concerned and his/her wishes. It is impor-
tant to work together with the sick person in order to preserve or restore autonomy 
as much as possible, and to diminish the physical and esthetic impact on his/her 
sense of bodily integrity. The means will be different for each individual. A parent 
may choose to save his/her strength to be with the children when they come home 
from school, and spend the rest of the day in treatment or in bed. Another, nearing 
the end, may wish to go to a family reunion, visit a favorite place, or simply go out 
for the evening. A trip to the sea or to the countryside can reawaken an awareness of 
the world’s beauty for someone who has spent months in a hospital room.6 Personal 
care such as a massage, a hairdo, or new clothes may sometimes help the patient to 
“feel him/herself again.”
When depression is involved, it is important to have a psychological or psychiat-
ric professional accompany the person. If he/she desires it, a hospital chaplain or 
other religious accompaniment may also help the person to use faith resources to 
6 Among other initiatives, personal or by organizations, the “Wish Ambulances” in many countries 
are worthy of note. Their goal is to enable those gravely or terminally ill to take a trip in an ambu-
lance to accomplish a personal wish. In Israel, they are often used to go to holy sites or to partici-
pate in family events, but also for child-oriented fun activities or for nature trips. Two of the sites: 




deal with his/her reactions or existential questions. Sometimes the mere fact that a 
“representant” of the religion considers it normal to ask God questions on suffering, 
or even to feel anger at Him, can be a source of relief and enable dialog. To accom-
pany someone in illness is often to open doors for a person who has become inca-
pable of imagining a better situation—but while making it clear that these are only 
suggestions, not “stock answers” for a particular situation. Creativity is important to 
look for little things which may make a difference, or help to surmount a diffi-
cult moment.
When impending death seems to be the cause of distress, it is important to under-
stand what this means for the person entering the terminal phase of his/her illness, 
and to look together for ways to respond. For those who fear the physical suffering 
of the final moments, sometimes after a painful experience with a family member, 
it is important to speak frankly of the probable symptoms as death approaches, and 
what can be done to alleviate them. Often the sick person needs to know that he/she 
will not remain alone, that family, friends, or the medical team will be present until 
the end.
5.7  The Reaction of Family and Friends to a Request 
for Euthanasia
The family and close friends of a suffering person also suffer, inevitably. There is 
the pain of seeing a loved one suffer, of not being able to give relief, of seeing the 
progression of illness and the gradual diminution of strength and energy. The rela-
tionship itself is frequently affected when the person suffering no longer has the 
energy to show affection. The situation is even more complicated by the fact that 
family and friends frequently have multiple roles. They may be the principal care-
givers if a patient is cared for at home. At the hospital, they are frequently called 
upon to assist the staff in daily care, and are also the ones to transmit the patient’s 
requests or questions to the medical team. They accompany, continuously or inter-
mittently, the person suffering—while doing the best to go on with the other ele-
ments of their lives. All of this frequently leads to an immense fatigue: a husband or 
wife, who has to take care of the children while his/her spouse is hospitalized, con-
tinue working as the sole provider, and be present at the same spouse’s side in the 
hospital, will soon be exhausted. Even if several family members or friends take 
turns, fatigue is almost inevitable and makes it difficult for each of them to make 
time for his/her own emotions.
Attention to the suffering of family and friends is an integral part of caring for the 
sick person. Not to contrast or compare suffering, but in recognition that they are 
living the experience of compassion in its most literal sense: a presence to the other 
in the reality of his/her situation, which means a presence of love. Yet the pain of 
seeing a loved one suffer, or even the ongoing accumulation of fatigue, can lead 
family or friends to wish, even unconsciously, for death to come and put an end to 
the patient’s suffering – and their own. Once euthanasia is presented as a legitimate 
option, the family may, consciously or unconsciously, encourage the patient to turn 
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to it as a solution or welcome his/her request as a relief. The point is not to judge 
those in such a position, but to be aware of the inherent difficulties. The Dutch 
article on the outcome of euthanasia requests [6] gives “pressure of next-of-kin on 
request” as one of the “reasons for reluctance in granting the request” in 10% of 
cases—even if in some of these cases the request was ultimately approved.
Two articles about the Belgian situation [11, 12] discuss cases where a person is 
put to death without having asked for it; most of them cases where the person was 
either unconscious or suffering from dementia. Not only was the family frequently 
consulted (79%) when making the decision, but “Unbearable situation for the fam-
ily” was one of the reasons given in 38% of cases. These numbers show us how 
necessary it is to remain vigilant, in order not to respond to the families’ suffering 
at the patient’s expense. It is essential that family and friends be supported and 
accompanied; they should be helped to see how much their presence and actions are 
important, and also to recognize their own need for times and spaces of respite.
5.8  How Can the Medical Staff Act or React to a Request 
for Euthanasia?
Each member of the medical team is first of all a human being trained to care, to 
heal disease and suffering. Incurable or terminal illness is always difficult, since the 
healthcare worker is obliged to face what seems a failure to accomplish his/her mis-
sion. The experience of facing a severely ill patient and having to admit that there 
are no more therapeutic options left is always a painful one; and the temptation to 
take refuge in aggressive yet futile therapy is all too well known. It could be an 
oncologist who suggests more and more experimental therapies, or an intensive care 
team which refuses to admit defeat and resorts to more and more heroic measures. 
This frequently happens to medical teams facing a tragic situation: aggressive can-
cer in a previously healthy person, a young person with sudden sepsis or a road 
accident. There is also what could be termed “default” over-aggressive treatment. 
An elderly or debilitated person may arrive at the hospital alone and confused or 
unconscious. If there is no information available on the person’s previous state of 
health, the doctor on call will do what is necessary to save life…and may discover 
after the fact that he/she performed aggressive resuscitation on a person with 
advanced dementia or a terminal illness, who would not have wanted the treatment. 
At the moment, it is often the only possible decision, but afterwards healthcare 
workers and family may regret having taken excessive measures relative to the con-
dition and wishes of the patient.
While the above-described situation is familiar to most hospital physicians and 
nurses, there is less awareness that the acceptance of euthanasia by the medical staff 
may originate in the same feelings which too often lead to futilely aggressive medi-
cine. In both cases, there is a refusal to admit one’s own powerlessness; euthanasia 
eliminates the suffering by eliminating the patient—and so removes the obligation 
of facing his/her suffering. When there are no more treatment options to suggest, 
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and no hope of improvement to offer, it can be very painful for a doctor to daily face 
the anguish of patient and family. Euthanasia, paradoxically, seems to restore the 
doctor’s authority: if he/she no longer has the ability to save life, there remains the 
possibility to act… by giving death.
A medical team may also welcome or even encourage a request for euthanasia as 
a relief from the pain involved in accompanying the patient. Similarly to what was 
described for futile medicine, the temptation to turn to euthanasia may be even 
stronger in circumstances which awaken a strong reaction against particularly 
“unjust” suffering, such as that of a child, or a sudden, fulminant disease. There are 
also situations, especially frequent when dealing with prolonged illness, where the 
medical team becomes emotionally involved with the patient, and hence shares the 
reactions of family and friends—without necessarily being aware of the fact.
In a difficult situation, created by treatment decisions which turned out after the 
fact to imply futilely aggressive treatment, euthanasia may seem to be a way to 
“undo the mistake,” and can be quietly practiced on patients who are not in any 
condition to request—or refuse—it.
There are other, often unadmitted motives which may encourage healthcare 
workers to approve euthanasia: in overloaded hospital departments, prolonged treat-
ment of patients in the final phase of their illness may be perceived as a burden by 
the staff, or as a problem relative to an urgent need for available beds for those who 
“really need” medical treatment.
Finally, there is the question, practical yet morally unacceptable, of the connec-
tion between euthanasia and the supply of organs for transplant. A letter to the 
Journal of the American Medical Association [13] calculates that among the 2023 
persons who were officially listed as having died by euthanasia in Belgium in 2015, 
204 would have been eligible as organ donors, and then compares this number with 
that of the patients awaiting organ donation. Any healthcare worker who has worked 
in intensive care knows the extreme vigilance employed to keep the team taking 
care of the patient distinct from that which evaluates his/her for brain death as a 
potential organ donor. A connection between euthanasia and organ donation creates 
a risk of distorting the relationship between the treating staff and the sick person, as 
if the value of his/her life were to be weighed against the good his/her organs could 
do after death.
Admitting the potential distortions involved and understanding the influence of 
human reactions can help us to seek alternative paths. If both euthanasia and futile 
medicine make the patient pay the price of the medical professions’ illusions of 
omnipotence, then our refusal of these means can help us to see the true situation of 
the person concerned. We will need a great deal of courage and lucidity to be willing 
to see the true situation of a suffering human being, and to admit the reactions of 
family and friends provoked by this suffering—as well as our own. It is never easy 
to move from an active, decisive medical approach to one that listens and accompa-
nies the person, particularly when dealing with protracted suffering. But if we dare 
to do this, we can learn to look for means of relief for the person’s individual, 
unique suffering, in partnership with the patient and his/her family and friends, 
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using the resources of both medical knowledge and our shared humanity. The will-
ingness to walk on this shared path with the sick person is in itself an affirmation of 
his/her human dignity. And that is the most essential care we have to offer.
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6Surrendering to or Inducing Death: Artificial Feeding as Paradigm
Marie Frings
Western societies are confronted increasingly to the dilemma of euthanasia. 
However, as we enter the public debate, we find ourselves in a Tower of Babel of 
sorts because it is almost impossible to reach a consensus on the definitions of key-
words and terms. It is also true that this specific question should not be separated 
from the larger picture of all other ethical questions related to end-of-life realities. 
In such a context, I opted to withdraw from the sterile “conceptual” disputes sur-
rounding this essential issue. I returned to my practice of palliative care and looked 
at these issues through a concrete clinical questioning, the one around tube feeding 
either in terminal illness or at the limits inherent to age with its multiple pathologies.
The subject of tube feeding may seem highly specific and a selective study; it 
actually reveals itself as a paradigm of all “end-of-life” ethical questions: therapeu-
tic obstinacy, vs. unreasonable and coercive therapies, euthanasia, assisted suicide, 
abandonment of the sick, informed consent, difficulties with the loss of autonomy, 
advanced directives, and/or designation of a legal proxy (living wills), quality of life 
concepts, chemical or physical restraining methods, the subtlety of the act leading 
to double effect, with unintended consequences.
Euthanasia because of loneliness, because of unappeasable 
suffering, because of the inadequate training of caregivers, 
because of the lack of personnel, because of family neglect, etc. 
Euthanasia, presented as THE solution, disguises the real 
questions that underly this act of death. Once “bandaid” 
euthanasia is carried out, the miseries remain.
Didier D. (close friend)
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The very question at the core of this debate is: what is the cause of death? Did we 
want to induce it or did we surrender to it as ineluctable? How can we distinguish 
between “surrendering to death,” i.e., accepting it as part of our human condition 
with its limits, and “inducing the dying process,” i.e., to kill or to let someone die 
intentionally, transgressing the prohibition of murder, either in an active and direct 
way or indirectly by neglecting the positive correlate of the prohibition which is to 
assist any person in a time of danger. How can we answer? How can we elaborate a 
path to find a response to these essential questions? Or if we speak of the right to 
die, how can we distinguish, in clinical practice, between the right to die with human 
dignity and the right to kill (self or others) on one’s own terms.
But before we reach these existential thresholds, we need to investigate and eval-
uate the clinical dimensions of the question.
6.1  Framework of this Reflective Study
I have conducted this research on artificial feeding and hydrating in end-of-life 
cases for many years. In my medical practice in palliative care units and long-term 
facilities, I was often confronted with what appeared to me as forced feeding. I saw 
old people in end-of-life situations, literally sated ad nauseam, who needed to have 
the injected liquids pumped back out because they were immediately rejected; some 
of these old people were restrained in their chairs or beds to prevent them from pull-
ing the feeding tubes away from their nose. As I watched these practices, I came to 
question their rationale. But, on the other hand, I was debating mentally whether it 
was possible not to feed a patient, and to forego these feedings. Was this not induc-
ing the death of this patient and therefore engaging oneself in a process of euthana-
sia? These questions represented a terrifying onus because they had never been part 
of the academic curricula nor included in any practical training I had received in 
medical school. What was to be done then? As many others, I started questioning 
the now common recourse to these feeding tubes. A thoughtful reflection prior to the 
placement of the feeding tube would have offered the option not to keep it indefi-
nitely on the patient thus sparing all involved from the harrowing questions sur-
rounding the therapeutic scaling back.
I then sought the advice of a geriatrician friend, Dr. Veronique Latteur. She 
worked in an acute geriatric medicine ward. There, her experience was as frustrat-
ing as mine, yet for a different reason: she was appalled by the number of elderly 
patients undernourished due to the neglect of this basic health issue. She bitterly 
deplored the lack of teaching in this important field of nutritional support. She 
was outraged as she observed the patients’ sufferings, and even more scandalized 
that many caregivers were so unaware of this. She was determined to fight and 
create a new awareness to address the nutritional needs of the elderly population, 
as well as to train the caregivers in this field in which the negligence and the indif-




This is when we started discussing some of our patients’ cases. I feel compelled 
to present some of these cases here below, as “narrative ethics” is becoming more 
and more relevant in clinical ethics.
6.1.1  Case #1—Madame B. 73 Years Old
This patient is suffering from Alzheimer’s disease; she lives with her only daughter, a 
widow. Mrs. B was diagnosed five years ago, and she has been coming to this geriatric day 
center six months ago because she is more and more disoriented and she cannot any longer 
be left alone in the house while her daughter who is a nurse is at work. One morning, Mrs. 
B. was found in a coma and was rapidly admitted to the hospital. She was diagnosed with 
an acute cerebral hemorrhage that could not be operated on. She remained in a coma over 
the next few days and in the absence of any likely recovery, she was transferred to a pallia-
tive care facility near her home, but with a feeding tube and, despite the coma, a subcutane-
ous pump with morphine and sedatives to ensure a continuous sedative state.
What is the meaning of this situation? What can be done for Mrs. B.?
6.1.2  Case #2—Madame F. 90 Years Old
Mrs. F. is quite alert for her age. She is suffering from arthritis and hypertension. She pru-
dently opted to move to a nursing home six months ago to avoid being hospitalized in an 
emergency and having to endure unwanted therapeutic obstinacy. But then she had a stroke 
that left her hemiplegic, aphasic, and having troublesome deglutition. She had to be hospi-
talized. After a month-long treatment, having made no significant progress, she was sent 
back to her nursing home with a feeding tube. Four months later, her feeding tube “fell off” 
three times within a week, and was put back in place each time, till her son intervened and 
refused to let the nurses replace the tube.
What can be done in this case? We know the patient is conscious and most likely 
understands what is going on, yet she cannot communicate and express herself?
Are we not here with a case of nutritional therapeutic obstinacy? Why? Who 
decides these treatments? And regardless of who and why, let us ask: “how can we 
face such a situation?”
6.1.3  Case #3—Madame J. 68 Years Old
“A 68 years old patient is not a geriatric patient,” the geriatrician thought as she was on 
her way to the Emergency Unit of the hospital to take charge of a new patient. This patient 
was suffering from acute pneumonia, but more worrisome was her weight registered at 
admission: 31 kilos, or some 68 pounds. The file revealed a complex and dire medical past: 
the patient had suffered from polyarthritis for the past twenty years, had taken cortisone 
drugs for years, and her condition had worsened because of the many side effects of the 
disease and of the treatments over the years. And yet this thick file showed no mention of her 
weight, nor did it contain any notes on her nutritional status. The doctor fortunately had a 
solid background in nutritional therapies and addressed immediately and aggressively the 
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many causes of her patient’s undernutrition. Even if her polyarthritis was not curable, the 
patient was fed through a feeding tube for six weeks. This allowed this woman to gain ten 
kilos or 22 pounds in two months, and recover a functioning autonomy she had lost for the 
past two years. This patient was then able to take care of her own daily hygiene, get dressed 
without help, and even go briefly on a few errands. To imagine that she could have just as 
well landed in the palliative care unit of the hospital, located next to the geriatric ward, 
because of her state of severe malnutrition, and would have died a few days after her admis-
sion, is indeed food for thought.
These clinical narratives illustrate the multiple questions we must raise, from the 
most fundamental to the most pragmatic—and in fact, a doctor will always address 
the latter ones first. It must be restated that the majority of problematic clinical cases 
concern dependent individuals, having lost their autonomy, and relying on other 
people to make decisions in their name. This reality creates a vulnerability that 
places these patients’ safety and rights in jeopardy. Confronted with the incapacity 
of the patients to express their will, the caregivers may at times be tempted to over-
protect their patient whom they legitimately want to assist to the best of their ability.
Regarding the clinical questions, I will only treat those linked to tube feeding, 
and I will set aside the issues related to malnutrition.
6.2  Why Use Feeding Tubes? What Criteria Prevailed? How 
Efficient Are they? How Did we Come to Adopt 
these Protocols?
Dr. Veronique Latteur and myself shared our experiences and went on to explore the 
existing medical publications that revealed a multitude of clinical studies. First, we 
discovered papers published between 1985 and 1995, on the pros and cons of intra-
venous artificial hydration in the last days of life, mainly in terminal cancer patients, 
where palliative care originated. Then we continued to read the research published 
after 1995, on artificial feeding, its advantages, and the other questions around it, for 
other medical populations, particularly in geriatrics because palliative care was then 
extended to other palliative groups and not reserved anymore for terminal cancer 
patients.
The rapidly growing number of published articles on artificial feeding could be 
explained by the fact that a larger number of patients were being tube fed, thanks to 
the improved technical tools used (mostly thanks to the introduction of the tube 
directly in the stomach through a gastroscopy1). Incidentally, it is interesting to note 
that this technique was developed in 1979, in neonatology, for premature babies. 
After 20 years of increased use of this new technique, way beyond neonatology, it 
became necessary to evaluate the practices in this field. To understand the scope of 
this phenomenon we will cite an American statistic according to which the number 
1 Guided by the light of the gastroscope (the camera tube), the doctor can make an incision at the 
right place to create the orifice through which he will introduce the tube. The orifice created in this 
manner is called percutaneous gastrostomy.
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of Americans over 65 years of age, who were treated with such a tube, skyrocketed 
from 15,000 individuals in 1988 to 123,000  in 1995, or a 10-fold increase over 
8 years.2
What did we want to measure? Studies have tried to remain objective as they 
looked at the impact of this type of nutrition on the span of life gained, but also on 
the resulting quality of life during that time, two criteria that seemingly could show 
improvement through these feedings. A thorough study conducted on American vet-
erans showed that lives were prolonged in an average by 7 months and a half for a 
group of 7000 former soldiers who had been fed through gastrostomy in the 1990s, 
whether in the case of a cancer, a brain thrombosis, or other medical conditions. The 
study concluded that most patients fed that way were in the terminal phase of their 
lives since the American medical corps designates the last 6 months of life as “the 
terminal phase!” Regarding the quality of life, the studies tried to take into account 
the impact on the bedsores (expected to go away thanks to a higher level of pro-
teins), on the pneumonias caused by inhalation (also expected to disappear in the 
absence of troublesome deglutition) and the functional status of the patient (i.e., his 
or her physical and intellectual performances linked to the weight of the person, to 
name only one factor), all these elements being the main rationale invoked when a 
doctor prescribes artificial tube feeding.
The patients fed this way represent a wide spectrum of conditions. Some have 
been largely studied such as the geriatric population, especially the Alzheimer 
patients, or those who suffer from other neurological pathologies such as Parkinson’s 
disease, or cerebral-vascular strokes. There are also many younger patients, suffer-
ing from rare affections, such as Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), also known 
as motor neuron disease (MND) or other neurological dystrophies. Yet other 
patients, also tube fed, are more rarely evaluated. It is particularly true of some poly- 
handicapped children (brain-impaired or suffering from syndromes called “orphan 
diseases”3) who are often fed this way, or persons in a persistent vegetative state 
(PVS) after a coma from a head trauma, a medical complication, or an operating 
room incident. In order to guard against hasty comparisons and avoid mixing situa-
tions up, there are other important aspects to consider such as the clinical state of the 
patient at the time of the placement of the feeding tube. This state can be quite sat-
isfactory when the tube had to be placed “early on” in the disease, to nourish the 
patient having a troublesome deglutition, as the person was still in a good nutritional 
state (as is often the case in a certain form of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis); how-
ever, most of the time the tube is placed as a last resort, when there is nothing else 
to be done and the malnutrition of the person is in an advanced state, making it most 
often a futile recourse (with the exception of the third clinical case presented above 
that constitutes a counterexample). To add a further observation, the deglutition can 
2 The numerous references to the mentioned studies, and other texts, can be found in the book Les 
alimentations artificielles en fin de vie, Racine, Brussels, 2005.
3 An orphan disease is a pathology that does not benefit from effective treatment. Most orphan 
diseases are rare diseases, the development and commercialization of which are not profitable for 
the pharmaceutical industry.
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be impaired either totally or partially (still allowing an oral feeding, albeit insuffi-
cient, as is the case for Parkinson patients who need extra time to eat). The question 
of foregoing the tube feeding is obviously more acute in the first situations.
The conclusions of these studies that I evoke here only briefly show that there is 
little clinical evidence, i.e., few clear answers to our questions. Many grey areas 
remain. It is also difficult to build an objective knowledge on these populations, as 
we encounter many problems, ethical and practical, to conduct research studies on 
them. We do not know for certain that tube feeding leads to the relief—or the heal-
ing—of bedsores! Yet, it does not mean this is never the case. And alas, we also 
observe that even with tube feeding, the patients still contract pneumonia through 
inhalation.
But it is clear that a patient, while still by and large healthy, suffering a first 
stroke with troublesome deglutition, can truly benefit from this form of nutrition in 
the rehabilitation phase. We are not here in an “end-of-life situation.” This is also 
true in the case of ear-nose-throat cancers, where tube feeding does not pose a prob-
lem unless the disease evolves towards its ultimate phase.
For the ultimate phase as such, the remaining grey areas must lead us to act with 
prudence. We are well inspired to speak prudently about the benefits a patient may 
receive from tube feeding, as much as we must exercise caution in our interpreta-
tions of the studies. The evaluation tends to be a little clearer in the case of patients 
suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s disease. A large number of studies concur in 
demonstrating that when the advantages, in life span and in quality of life, and the 
recurring downsides of the tubes placed on these patients, in particular the need to 
restrain the patient physically (attach the patient), are weighed against each other, 
the balance is clearly in disfavor of this type of feeding. It is as if the feeding prob-
lems were a sign that the disease is very advanced, even if the patient is still mobile. 
However, let us also remind ourselves that a general statistical data cannot ever 
establish an individual prognosis. Some of these studies conducted on a population 
suffering from dementia rightly conclude that tube feeding must not be offered to 
this particular group of patients, barring a specific reason brought up by the family. 
The standard care for these patients, from a professional point of view, must be 
assisted oral feeding, meaning that the caregivers could and should take the time to 
spoon-feed these patients, as appropriate.
This allows us to understand the current way of thinking when facing uncertain 
clinical situations. One seeks to weigh the pros and cons of such a therapeutic 
option, while referring as much as possible to the latest known objective data. This 
approach, based on the ethics of principles, i.e., on balancing the principles of 
beneficence and non-malfeasance, of respect of autonomy and of justice, already 
represents a judgment on a clinical situation. This conscious weighing goes beyond 
ordinary clinical work, as it already implies an ethical reflection. Clinical work 
leads the physicians to judge a given therapy option as balanced or imbalanced in 
connection to the expected results (teleological perspective4). In other words, scien-
tific studies and clinical experience will qualify a particular treatment in a particular 
4 Perspective taking only results into account.
M. Frings
67
clinical reality, as obligatory or optional (or even sometimes, wrong), vis-à-vis the 
professional obligations (through the prism of deontology5); hence, the coming up 
of more and more recommendations for the clinical practice. Presently, in France as 
well as in the USA, more and more Standards-Options-Recommendations have 
been published in recent years. These rational and logical approaches, based on the 
objectivity of clinical studies are most useful, considering the complexity of poten-
tial clinical situations and today’s large offer of therapeutic options. Thus, from 
thinking more deeply over our clinical cases, we move on gradually to ethics.
6.3  First Approach of the Ethical Question
Let us come back to the concrete initial question: “Can we forego a tube feeding 
therapy?” Before all these studies even existed, a vast ethical reflection had already 
developed in the 1980s. Let us not forget that from the onset of this practice, tube 
feeding was apprehended not as some random medical treatment, but as a life sup-
port treatment. This was linked to its technical aspect, even though it is a very 
simple tool if we compare it to a ventilator or a dialysis machine. But this technical 
dimension implies de facto a kind of on-and-off button that adds an enormous emo-
tional and moral level to the questions related to these treatments. This button turns 
into a life and death switch. Let us also mention that with the increasing number of 
borderline situations of this kind, linked to the progress in reanimation, a new con-
cept appeared around 1995, that of treatment of prolongation of the dying process. 
And it is in this context that a more fundamental question came up in relation to our 
subject: “Is artificial feeding a medical treatment or a basic care?” Are we in a cure 
perspective or in a care mode?
This question quickly placed itself at the forefront of a heated debate. After 
perusing these fascinating publications, and having given much thought to my own 
experience, I, along with a vast majority of caregivers who paused to reflect on the 
subject, have rallied, in a first phase, to the following proposition: “Tube feeding is 
indeed a medical treatment.” For me, two types of arguments firmly supported this 
position. First, a phenomenology-based analysis of this type of feeding written by 
an American nurse, Jacquelyn Slomka [1], for whom it sufficed to look at this form 
of feeding to understand that it is part of a medical reasoning. Second, a reflection 
on the goals of medicine and therefore on the medical responsibility and its limits 
led me to the following statements: (1) there is no obligation to pursue unreasonable 
therapeutic obstinacy (deontology approach), and (2) the objective to maintain life 
at any cost is not part of the acts that define the medical profession (teleological 
approach). I have further reflected on this standpoint as I taught it for many years, 
till various new encounters and seeing other stands taken, in particular surrounding 
the extreme situations that are the “persistence vegetative states” encouraged me to 
rethink my position and, eventually, to amend my conviction.
5 Perspective dealing mostly with the moral duties of the profession beyond the strict legal 
parameters.
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I then adopted a more nuanced position, beyond the constructed dichotomy 
between care and treatment: tube feeding belongs in a special niche between care 
and cure!
De Vettere sums up the debate as follows:
“It may seem that concern over how we classify nourishment by tubes or lines is a linguistic 
quibble without importance. But this is not so. The moral judgment of many people is sig-
nificantly influenced and sometimes determined by how they classify the procedures they 
are evaluating.
Thus, those classifying intravenous or tubal nourishment as medical treatment inevita-
bly defend the morality of withdrawal whenever it seems unreasonable, and those classify-
ing the procedures as feeding inevitably claim withdrawal is immoral as long as the body 
accepts the nourishment…
By not describing the procedures simply as feeding, withdrawal of the procedures will 
not be considered as “starving the patient to death.” And by not describing the procedures 
as medical treatment, withdrawal will not be considered as if it were simply another case of 
stopping a medical treatment.
In our analysis of cases involving feeding tubes and lines, we will not classify the inter-
ventions in either of the traditional categories of feeding or treatment but in terms of a new 
hybrid classification that we will call “medical nutrition and hydration6” or, more simply, 
“medical nutrition.”
In avoiding in this definition to describe the procedure as simply “source of nourish-
ment,” we will not see the eventual interruption as an act aiming at starving the patient to 
death. And because we do not describe the procedure as a mere medical treatment, avoiding 
the same restriction as in the former aspect, the interruption will not be assimilated to other 
routine treatment interruptions.” [2].
Finally, behind this proposition, a non-dichotomist representation appears that 
allows us to look at the situation for what it really is.
Today we do something similar when speaking of palliative care vs. curative care 
as we pass progressively from the first type of treatment to the second and from cure 
to continuing care.
This position is notably different from the one adopted in France, known as the 
Leonetti law considering artificial feeding as a medical treatment. But it differs also 
from the position defended by those who raise a caveat against the potential conse-
quence of this law to shorten the life span of a patient by foregoing his/her feeding 
through the tube because it is deemed out of proportions and there is no more con-
sent. Those voicing the caveat insist that tube feeding be always qualified as basic 
care so that it can never be foregone except in cases when it would be materially 
impossible to pursue it, in particular among the patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state.
However, for the sake of pursuing our research, we decided not to focus on 
these extreme and over mediatized situations, also quite diverse, and most likely 
still poorly understood (they also represent only a slim percentage of the cases 
where questions of medical nutrition limitations are raised) in order to reflect on 
6 This corresponds to the choice we made in the book Les alimentations artificielles en fin de vie 
(Racine, Brussels, 2005) to speak of “medically assisted nutrition” or, when we include hydration, 
to speak of “artificial Hydration and nutrition”.
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the more common problems. Contrary to the always basic care position, the 
median position adopted by many allows, in effect, to keep the question open 
regarding the eventual foregoing of tube feeding, which may, in some circum-
stances, be considered as a medical treatment, potentially becoming excessive. 
This nuanced position also prohibits answering the difficult question of with-
drawing or withholding of a feeding tube, in a purely medical logic. This leaning 
towards a more median positioning proved itself to be more and more necessary 
as we faced the large spectrum of clinical situations presented to us, a spectrum 
that included among others, as mentioned earlier, handicapped children and per-
sons in a persistent vegetative state. This median correction is also helpful so that 
we never exclude, neither in the resolution nor in the working out of the deci-
sions taken, the global care, including the accompaniment, also called caring, 
thus introducing a human dimension, indispensable and decisive, while facing 
any end-of-life issue.
6.4  Distinguishing between Ordinary and Extraordinary
Historically, in the 1980s, what was at stake in the dilemma care vs. treatment was 
to know whether one could use, in this context, the historical distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment, the distinction that had been promi-
nent for centuries in medical ethics. Indeed, it seems that care can only be inter-
rupted by death, while in the case of treatment one can reevaluate its pursuit 
according to its efficiency. However, this distinction between ordinary and extraor-
dinary—historical contexts are necessary in this debate—goes back to the battle-
fields of the sixteenth century, where soldiers with gangrened legs from wounds 
inflicted by a cannonball, refused to be amputated. Were these soldiers suicidal 
since they risked a certain death by their own choice? And were those who did not 
operate on them homicidal?
The question was also raised regarding nourishment, as the Canadian Ethicist, 
H. Doucet explains:
“Already in the XVI century, when artificial recourses did not yet exist, the Spanish theolo-
gian and moralist Francisco De Vitoria (…) wonders if a sick person who stops eating 
because he or she has lost the sense of taste would be considered guilty of a sin equal to a 
suicide. The answer of the moralist is the following. If the patient has to make herculean 
efforts to manage to eat because he or she is very depressed and has lost all appetite, we 
must accept here a sort of impossibility. The patient is therefore exempted, at least of the 
mortal sin, particularly if there is no hope of life to speak of.” [3].
But for the modern mind, and with the development of medical techniques, this 
global judgment, that was the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary 
means according to the circumstances of a particular life, was transformed into 
operational categories. And indeed what was then extraordinary has become ordi-
nary nowadays. This distinction, initially so pregnant, was somehow eviscerated of 
its subjective and properly moral intensity, to end up being narrowed in simple 
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medical and technical terms. To simplify, its importance became obsolete, and as a 
consequence it became reductive.
It is in the purpose of reintroducing the spirit of a global judgment that the dis-
tinction was converted and renamed proportioned—disproportioned.
However, with the continuous evolution of techniques, questions keep being 
raised and studies will inevitably proliferate to research an objective weighing of the 
pros and cons, and establish the Standards-Options-Recommendations I mentioned 
earlier, which are useful to formulate this ethical judgment that I qualify as first 
level, i.e., the professional level.
I quickly realized, however, that this first professional level (already partly in the 
domain of ethics) is often so burdensome if it is done thoroughly that there is a 
genuine risk of omitting other ethical aspects, namely the patient’s voice, the emo-
tions of the caregiver, the role of personal convictions, i.e., the ethical and anthro-
pological markers that are a significant part of all these debates, and that in reality 
are more important than the sole criteria of clinical efficiency. But historically, these 
elements were prominently present in the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary.
What is therefore at stake in the status of artificial feeding is making a global 
discernment possible that would include some medical aspects, but also moral and 
religious parameters, properly personal, with the weight of responsibility linked to 
the imperfection of any serious discernment.
To answer the partisans of a therapeutic status of artificial feeding by its counter-
part, i.e., the basic status, is to remain at the level of a technique-based mentality 
where such considerations have no place, as Kevin Wildes of Georgetown University 
explains:
“With the help of family and physician, the patient is the one who weighs risks, burdens, and 
benefits in light of a treatment’s probable impact. The distinction depends upon the patient’s 
quality-of-life judgments. The idea of benefit, as understood in traditional teaching, is not 
merely the conservation of life. The benefit must be worthwhile in quality and duration. To 
only include the former and exclude the latter is to lock oneself in a partial and incomplete 
vision of medicine. The approach of modern, scientific medicine has tended to follow a 
Cartesian model of the human being and to treat the pathological body (res extensa) as a 
broken machine separate from the person (res cogitans). This mechanistic view of medicine 
and of the patient has increased with medical specialization and sub specialization!” [4].
So-called narrative ethics are precisely contributing to the reintroduction of the 
nonmedical elements because they are necessary in the process of any ethical deci-
sion that deserves to be called such.
6.5  Three Levels of Ethical Judgment
This is how Dr. Véronique Latteur and myself came to elaborate and propose a 
three-step protocol as a reference for the caregivers confronted to difficult questions 
related to handling tube feeding.
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 1. A professional intervention with a judgment on the proportionate and 
disproportionate;
 2. A meeting with the patient (or his next-of-kin or proxy) to find out his/her (their) 
judgment on the ordinariness or extraordinariness of the proposal resulting from 
the first step.
 3. Finally, the conclusion of the process consisting in a concerted decision, with a 
well-formulated objective, and with reevaluation at a mutually agreed time, in 
order to favor a process guided with more common sense, rather than only by 
rational criteria, and also a practice including more personal elements rather than 
entirely dictated by a technical mentality.
Thanks to this framework, one can grasp two delicate situations. First, when a 
treatment is judged proportionate to the caregivers but appears extraordinary to the 
patient or the family/proxy. Second, when a treatment is deemed by the caregivers 
as disproportionate but is found by the patient or the family/proxy as ordinary. 
Facing that kind of divergent standpoint is very difficult. However, if all parties do 
listen to each other and communicate well, there are often ways out of the impasse. 
It does take time and it is a real process whose keystone is the quality of the relation-
ship between the patient and the caregiver.
When the tube feeding is practiced on a long-term basis (as is the case for patients 
in PVS) and is then largely related to the basic care, the caregiver’s conscience, even 
though more and more familiar with the questions and the subtleties behind all the 
terms used to express them, knows that he or she is almost forced to wait for a new 
clinical event (e.g. pneumonia) or an event of a different nature (such as the repeated 
fall of the feeding tube mentioned earlier), in order to be able to question anew the 
tube feeding’s relevance. We have to recognize that any reflection on a life- sustaining 
treatment made cold-bloodedly or at a deadline (e.g. at the expiration date of a 
hospital stay), will reveal itself as pertaining to another logic. We are then not talk-
ing about a practical discernment based on one patient’s reality, but we are debating 
about the value of somebody’s life, and that kind of judgment does not honor our 
humanity, nor does it honor the medical profession, who, actually, has always pro-
scribed this type of considerations in its deontology.
To come back to the distinction between surrendering to death and actively or 
passively inducing death, it seems to me that it is only at the end of the process 
described above, and after having respected each of its steps, that one will be able 
to speak of surrendering to death in the respect of life. The subtle distinction 
between “do we surrender to death?” or “do we induce death?” is rooted in the fol-
lowing. The former—legitimate—comes at the end of a global process that takes 
into account the sum of all the dimensions. The latter is the result of a technical 
conclusion estranged from the complexity of what the patient has expressed, and 
divorced from the rigorous clinical evaluation done by the caregivers. It is also 
oblivious of the social component of any human life and of the indispensable mark-
ers that are the fundamental prohibitions, sine qua non conditions rendering life 
possible in society.
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So that the process may come to its full deployment, long deliberations are insuf-
ficient. It requires that some individuals be committed to face those clinical situa-
tions, bring these questions to the debate, and be ready to take a stand, by meeting 
all the parties concerned, particularly the patients because they should always 
come first.
At this point, let us reanchor these abstract concepts into concrete situations as 
we go back to two of the patients presented earlier.
6.6  Madame B. or the “Disproportioned Deemed Ordinary”
Despite the fact that the risk of nutritional coercion was quickly raised in the case of Mrs. 
B., and that a reasonable extension of the evaluation was announced, her daughter, who 
had a very close relationship with her mom, begged that the tube feeding be continued for 
her. In these circumstances, we were engaging in an unknown timeline of tube feeding and 
a nutrition program was proposed along with a transfer from the palliative care unit back 
to the nursing home, thankfully in an adjacent building. The patient continued to live in a 
relative stable quietude for about a year, enjoying the good weather during regular outings 
in her wheelchair, and in the company of her loving daughter. Then, came a pneumonia, 
“the old man’s friend,” as the old popular expression used to name it; it then allowed the 
daughter to accept her mom’s death with a reinforced palliative protocol established to 
that end.
6.7  Madame F. or the “Proportionate Turned Doubtful 
(Optional) and Deemed Extraordinary”
After three “falls” or “withdrawals” of the feeding tube in Mrs. F.’s case, her son asked for 
a second opinion regarding her tube feeding. It is when I first met them because the assigned 
physician was on vacation and the substitute doctor called me for advice.
At this point, four months have elapsed since her stroke and there is no hope for improve-
ment. The son explains to us that his mother has always said that she did not want any 
therapeutic obstinacy and this preference was the reason she had opted to move to a nurs-
ing home. He feels that his mom, who cannot speak, is clearly signaling this same request. 
A nurse’s aid/auxiliary assigned to her care shares this perception. It is as if Mrs. F. has 
been “pouting” at everyone for a week and no one recognizes her anymore. I went to see 
the patient and I tried to establish a contact with her. Being very much disconcerted, I 
attempted to articulate to her the question that her son and the caregivers had posed to me. 
I explained that we had put the tube back in place to take time to think it over. After discuss-
ing with the substitute doctor and other caregivers, I explained the nonobligatory nature of 
this treatment in such a clinical situation, and I invoked the available alternative of strict 
palliative care. In a consensus with the son and the caregivers, we agreed to meet again in 
two days to discuss it over. I was also told then that this lady is a faithful and devout 
Christian. I also learn that she has been inconsolable following her husband’s death and 
she yearned to be reunited with him in afterlife.
At the end of these multiple meetings, it appeared to us that this medical nutrition did 
not fulfill any therapeutic objective per se anymore and that strict palliative care was the 
most respectful way to serve the patient; we all went together to explain it to her.
Much to our surprise this lady was transformed as she heard us, she recovered her 
peaceful mind and was herself again. Her assent to our proposed care appeared clear to us. 
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We all shared a general sense of relief and we learned a lesson. A week later, following the 
withdrawal of artificial feeding, and within the protocol of strict palliative care, Mrs. 
F. faded away into her death, as the light of a candle would flicker out.
I took a risk in my discernment, calling to mind my medical knowledge as well as putting 
my decision to the test of my enlightened conscience “hic et nunc”, while also trying to 
focus on what the patient meant to convey to us. I dared speak, at my own risk; it was dif-
ficult. It is my opinion that what ensued confirmed the accuracy and justness of my 
discernment.
It can be said, then, that it is in accompanying the patients and their loved ones, 
and by articulating such questions through as honest as possible a communication, 
but also with the daily cares and treatments, that we can progressively discover the 
just responses to these questions however daunting they may initially appear.
6.8  Conclusion
Let us not rush immediately to the ethical questioning. Let us see first what clinical 
situation we are confronted with, let us evaluate the existing options, and their rea-
sonable expectations, in the light of what science currently affords us. The accom-
paniment of the patient, to the best of our ability, should be our first priority.
Then, let us enter the moral debate and let us clearly distinguish the following 
three levels:
• The professional level: the proportionate or the disproportionate. Let us under-
stand well that qualifying an intervention as disproportionate does not mean that 
the doctor is denying the patient his/her personal dignity;
• The patient’s perspective: the ordinary or the extraordinary. In particular, let us 
look for the patient adhesion or non-adhesion in case of only nonverbal commu-
nication where doctors have a lot to learn from nurses in order to include the 
personal elements of the patients’ lives.
• The process of working things out together with the two perspectives.
Let us not be absolute in the principle of preservation of life. This obligation 
must be linked to other obligations: not to harm, not to impose undue burdens, to 
respect other’s conscience—knowing that self-respect may lead a caregiver to 
entrust a patient to another physician under personal conscience clause—and finally 
to consider that life is a mystery of which we only perceive a part.
It is in active compassion that we will find the just attitude, allowing to surrender 
to death in the respect of life, because compassion really means to suffer with.
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7The Meaning of Suffering or the Meaning of Life Despite Suffering
Benoit Beuselinck
Healthcare staff, who are close to those who suffer, face all the dimensions of health 
as defined by the World Health Organisation as early as 1946, in the preamble of its 
Constitution: ‘Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being 
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.
In 2002, a law was passed in Belgium decriminalising euthanasia, under cer-
tain conditions, for people who are suffering from an incurable disease with 
symptoms that are difficult to control, and if all available means to relieve their 
suffering have been exhausted. In this framework, one thinks in the first instance 
of refractory pain, asphyxia, or terminal anguish. But other supporters of the 
law prioritise the total autonomy of the person and feel that people should be 
allowed to choose their time of death, if and when their life no longer has any 
meaning to them. From this perspective, euthanasia becomes a matter of the 
patient’s rights.
Everyday practice of oncology brings us to deal with symptoms and physical 
suffering in the terminal stage, which we are generally able to control with support-
ive care. Sometimes however the symptoms are refractory and palliative sedation 
Relieving suffering is for all of us our primary duty, but denying 
that it can have meaning falls under the failure to provide 
assistance to a person in danger.
Cecile L. (volunteer on palliative care).
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proves to be necessary.1 On the other hand, psychological suffering in the face of 
incurable disease, fatigue of lengthy treatments, loneliness, lack of family support, 
experiencing dependency, and the inability to go on with one’s normal life are some 
of the many consequences of serious chronic illness which cannot be treated with 
medication. This is a matter of mental suffering that can take the form of depression, 
but also of existential, spiritual, or metaphysical distress. Psychological and social 
circumstances can give the underlying physical suffering a very different dimen-
sion. For instance, muscle pain one feels after running a marathon can be physically 
identical to those induced by a car accident, but they will be devoid of psychological 
suffering.
Thus, in the current practice of medical oncology, we observe that many requests 
for euthanasia from people suffering severe physical illness are motivated by psy-
chological reasons. The patients feel that their life no longer has meaning. They fear 
having to suffer in the future. They are disheartened at not being able to manage 
their life as they previously did. And they do not want to depend on others. On the 
other hand, for the same reasons, requests for euthanasia can be made by people 
who, in the absence of any significant physical illness, consider that it is time to 
draw their life to a close. Autonomy, which has become a main concern, has replaced 
life as the fundamental value to be respected. Death, administered by the healthcare 
professional and offered as a solution, little by little replaces solidarity and creativity.
People who work in palliative care know that a request for euthanasia is very 
often a cry for help. One always has to start by listening to the pain and emotions 
behind the question and analysing the underlying reasons for the request. In most 
cases, when the suffering is taken seriously and solutions are offered, the request for 
euthanasia disappears.
The complaints of the people who are ill need to be heard. Minimising them or 
brushing them away does not help. Consequently, healthcare staff must be able to 
respond to physical suffering with scientific skill and knowledge (by administering 
pain killers in a professional way), but they must also be able to address psychologi-
cal and existential suffering by drawing on their own humanity. Acknowledging that 
a person finds themselves in a humanly difficult situation—‘What is happening to 
you is really hard’—is essential to avoid driving them further into distress! It is the 
only true help because when the person feels they are being understood, they can 
see themselves from the outside and come out of their despair.
But where can we find the necessary resources to respond to psychological and 
existential suffering? The theories of Viktor Frankl seem to be a good starting point 
since this psychiatrist devoted his entire career to empirical research on the meaning 
of life.
1 Palliative sedation lowers the state of consciousness of the dying with the help of medication, in 
order to relieve their pain, their (feeling of) choking, and/or their anguish. If it may be necessary to 
maintain sedation until the patient’s death, in no way does sedation seek to hasten death. According 
to a study conducted in Leuven University Hospitals and published in the Journal of Pain and 
Symptom Management in January 2011, under the title ‘Palliative sedation, not slow euthanasia: 
a prospective longitudinal study of sedation in Flemish palliative care units,’ 8% of the patients 
admitted to the palliative care unit needed palliative sedation at the end of life.
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7.1  Viktor Frankl: The Question of Meaning at the Heart 
of Medicine
Viktor Frankl was born in 1905 in Vienna. Doctor in Medicine and in Philosophy, 
he is the founder of logotherapy, the third Viennese school of psychotherapy, along 
with Freud and Adler. Deported to Auschwitz in 1942, his psychiatric career was 
brutally interrupted by 3 years in the concentration camps. Furthermore, a manu-
script which contained the essence of the thinking he had been developing since the 
30s was lost. But this painful episode did not turn Frankl’s life into a failure. On the 
contrary, it became the bedrock of his work, validating his theories that life can have 
meaning even in the most degrading of circumstances.
We owe it to the work of Viktor Frankl that the question of meaning, a fundamen-
tal philosophical theme, entered the world of Medicine and became the basis of a 
new school of psychotherapy: logotherapy. In a survey involving thousands of stu-
dents, Frankl established that for most participants finding meaning in life was their 
highest priority. Being human always points, and is directed, to something, or some-
one, other than oneself—be it meaning to fulfil, dedication to a cause or another 
human being to encounter. Humans are not pure instinct, neither is their behaviour 
entirely determined. They need purpose, direction and motivation, without which 
they risk experiencing ‘existential frustration’ with widespread consequences such 
as alcoholism, substance abuse, suicide, depression, and fear of ageing.
Existential frustration leads to ‘noögenic neurosis’ which has its roots in the 
‘noös’ or the spirit of the person, and arises from meaninglessness. Sometimes, 
man’s search for meaning can induce tension instead of inner balance, but this ten-
sion is vital to mental health. People with a purpose in life are more likely to with-
stand adversity. Frankl quotes Nietzsche: ‘He who has a why to live can bear almost 
any how’ [1] and points out that missing accomplishment can bring about minor 
psychological disorders in the young unemployed.
During therapy, Frankl’s primary focus with patients is to awaken transcendence, 
i.e. the capacity to rise above adversity using their inner resources of mind and 
spirit. In order to do so, he conducts an existential analysis of what gives purpose 
and meaning but, unlike other European existentialists, Frankl is neither pessimistic 
nor anti-religious. He endeavours to draw together the fragile threads of a broken 
life and to reveal the pattern of meaning and responsibility they are displaying.
During consultation Frankl often asked patients with symptoms of depression 
why, all things considered, they would not commit suicide. The range of answers he 
gathered in conversations with thousands of people allowed him to ‘empirically’ 
ascertain a collection of motivations in life which can be grouped into three catego-
ries: finding meaning in accomplishment, in love, and in suffering. Accomplishment 
is achieved through creating a work or doing a good deed; love is about experienc-
ing something in-depth such as goodness, truth, and beauty which can be found in 
nature or culture, or—better still—getting to know the uniqueness of another human 
being through love. Thus, Frankl recounts how, despite the dullness of the camp 
barracks, some prisoners stood in awe of the beauty of a sunset. As to the meaning 
of suffering, Frankl was struck by how many people in the camp were able to find 
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meaning in spite of suffering and, for a number of them, even because of their suf-
fering. Suffering, of course, is to be avoided as much as possible, but faced with 
unavoidable suffering, one needs to develop a way of bearing it. Frankl believes that 
this is possible. In Auschwitz, he has seen people ‘shoulder’ their situation like 
heroes. He liked to quote Dostoyevsky ‘There is only one thing I dread: not to be 
worthy of my sufferings.’ One needs to uplift suffering, make the most of each situ-
ation, adapt, and learn. If suffering cannot be avoided, one needs to learn how 
to suffer.
Let me give an example of existential analysis into what gives purpose and mean-
ing to life. A man suffering from depression came to see Frankl because he could 
not overcome the loss of his wife with whom he had shared 50 years of marriage. 
Frankl confronted him with the question ‘What would have happened, if you had 
died first, and your wife would have had to survive without you?’ ‘Oh,’ the man 
said, ‘for my wife this would have been terrible; she would have died of grief!’ and 
felt much better after Frankl told him that he had spared his wife this suffering by 
surviving and mourning her.
In the camps, amidst indescribable suffering, Frankl encountered many opportu-
nities that gave his life meaning. To name but one example, he chose to care for 
people with infectious disease rather than working on the night shift, thinking: ‘if I 
die, I’d rather it be caring for the sick than doing useless work.’ Another drive for 
him was to carry on developing his theories. Frankl knew that that desire kept him 
going. In any case, he was one of the few survivors, even though on his arrival at the 
camp, the SS officer hesitated a long while before considering him suitable for work 
instead of sending him straight to the gas chamber.
According to Frankl, we need to look outside ourselves to find meaning. Through 
self-actualisation and transcendence, we can turn our talents into achievements. 
Reaching out, we can find meaning in self-effacing love, or in service to relieve 
another’s suffering. ‘For success, like happiness, cannot be pursued; it must ensue, 
and it only does so as the unintended side effect of one’s personal dedication to a 
cause greater than oneself or as the by-product of one’s surrender to a person other 
than oneself.’
Similarly, when ‘one expects nothing more of life’ is not the time to put an end 
to it, Frankl says. Instead, it is the time to ask oneself ‘what does life expect from 
me?’ This is particularly true for people with a life-threatening illness. He remem-
bers a patient who had been paralysed from his neck down since an accident which 
rendered him a quadriplegic, aged 17. This young man learned to live with his con-
dition and even managed to take courses at College via a special telephone. In a 
letter to Frankl he wrote: ‘I view my life has being abundant with meaning and 
purpose. The attitude that I adopted on that fateful day has become my personal 
credo for life: I broke my neck, it didn’t break me. I believe that my handicap will 
only enhance my ability to help others. I know that without the suffering, the growth 
that I have achieved would have been impossible’. [2].
A suffering person can find great solace in knowing that they are a unique per-
son. Each one of us is unique and irreplaceable and nobody can suffer in a patient’s 
place. They alone can face up to their situation and accept it with courage and 
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strength. With dignity too. And crying can be dignifying. There is no need to be 
ashamed of tears, for tears bear witness to the greatest of courage, to suffer and 
accept the struggle ‘in spite of the despites’. Suffering makes us stronger. Nietzsche 
said it even more clearly: ‘Was mich nicht umbringt, macht mich starker’ (‘What 
doesn’t kill me, makes me stronger’) [3].
No one knows what the future holds. Even though prisoners in the camp had little 
chance of surviving, they could not exclude the hope that they might find happiness 
again be it in a family, a job, or in freedom. Also, the past could be a comfort for a 
prisoner, without making him nostalgic, because that which we have experienced or 
done well, cannot be taken away from us. Our experiences, the deeds we have done, 
our positive thoughts, all our suffering—no one can take them away. Even commit-
ted to the past, they are not lost because we have experienced them. In times of trial, 
the past is as contemporary as the present day, if not more so.
Death, which is inevitable, must spur us to live in a responsible way. In life there 
are many opportunities for self-actualisation, and bringing to fruition the talents we 
have. If we seize these opportunities, we will be able at the end of life to look back 
with contentment on all we have been able to experience and achieve.
Such an attitude towards suffering can be achieved thanks to an inner freedom 
we can maintain, whatever the circumstances. Our capacity to choose our attitude 
and stick to it, whatever the circumstances, is the ultimate—and probably the only 
real—human freedom. Human beings can uphold this ultimate freedom in adver-
sity, although Freud claimed the opposite. Frankl holds that, within certain limits, 
human beings can choose their destiny and pleads for allowing more space and 
importance to human freedom and responsibility in the practice of psychiatry. ‘A 
human being is not one thing among others; things determine each other, but man 
is ultimately self-determining. What he becomes—within the limits of endowment 
and environment—he has made out of himself. In the concentration camps, for 
example, in this living laboratory and on this testing ground, we watched and wit-
nessed some of our comrades behave like swines while others behaved like saints. 
Man has both potentialities within himself; which one is actualised depends on 
decisions but not on conditions.’ [4] For Frankl, freedom without responsibility was 
an oxymoron. That is why he suggested that the Statue of Liberty in New York 
Harbor be supplemented by a ‘Statue of Responsibility’ somewhere along the 
West Coast.
7.2  How Can We Apply Viktor Frankl’s Theories 
to Helping Patients?
Now that we know something about Frankl’s theories, we can try and apply them to 
the situation ill people find themselves in. How do patients find meaning despite 
suffering and illness? Why do some experience meaningfulness and are keen to 
keep alive despite the hardship? Why are others disheartened and feel their life is 
not worth living?
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7.2.1  First Pathway: Accomplishment Through Love
A number of patients hang on, hoping to be at a family event such as the wedding 
of a child or the birth of a grandchild. Others want to stick around as long as possi-
ble so as not to leave their partner behind or in order to watch their children grow.
A 72-year old patient with prostate cancer had already received many treatments, including 
chemotherapy, when he suffered a relapse in October. By that time, he had become frailer 
due to his advancing disease and prior treatments. We discussed the possibility of another 
course of chemotherapy. The patient was undecided because of his overall condition but, as 
his daughter was getting married the next year on July 26th, he wondered about his chances 
to be around for the wedding. We told him that life-expectancy can be difficult to gauge, but 
a new line of chemotherapy might help him make it, which seemed unlikely without any 
more treatment. He decided to have the treatment, knowing that he could stop it at any time 
if he wanted. He had four courses of chemotherapy until February, when he asked for a 
pause due to fatigue. In April he had two more courses before asking for another pause. He 
was at his daughter’s wedding and the following day was admitted to hospital, where he 
died on July 28th. This man’s motivation to live was undoubtedly boosted by the will to be 
at his daughter’s wedding.
Illness can be an opportunity to deepen a relationship. We have seen couples 
who, having had a difficult relationship, found peace and a revived love when one 
fell ill and the other could—finally—start looking after them. A patient wondered 
whether his wife could still love him in the circumstances, to which she replied 
‘now it is getting interesting!’
Many patients fear becoming a burden, although being cared for by someone can 
be very beneficial, both for the patient and for the carer. Here follows a conversation 
with a patient in the presence of her daughter:
‘Doctor, I don’t want to be a burden to my children.’—‘Have you ever cared for someone 
who was ill?’—‘Oh, yes, I looked after my mother for three years and my father for six 
months before they died.’—‘Did that worry you?’—‘Not at all, I did it with great pleasure.’ 
Before I could tell her that maybe it was her turn now, her daughter took her mother’s feet 
and, in tears, asked if she would let her care for her.
Thus, it will not be surprising that patients who are isolated, with few family 
members around, may find it more difficult to find meaning than others who are well 
connected. Studies show that the survival rate in cancer patients is higher for people 
who enjoy personal bonds [5] and in our practice we note that euthanasia requests 
are more often made by people who are lonely. Long lasting family conflicts can 
also trigger psychological suffering. Unfortunately, these are often difficult to solve 




7.2.2  Second Pathway: Accomplishment Through 
a Meaningful Life
Many people want to go on living, despite illness or treatment, because they feel 
they have a reasonable quality of life and they can still enjoy good times. They plan 
weekends and trips in between chemotherapy courses, are happy as long as they can 
have a cigarette or enjoy cycling in good weather. Such an attitude requires the 
patient to adjust and adapt. They need to avoid focussing on what they can no longer 
do, in favour of finding new pursuits or resuming old ones they had let go of for lack 
of time. Sorting pictures, for instance, can be very meaningful. In youth one looks 
forward, in older age or illness, there is not much to look forward to anymore, but 
one can enjoy looking back on a life full of wonderful moments. Memories can be 
cherished with thanksgiving. Some patients say ‘it is not so hard to leave, because 
I’ve had a full and meaningful life’. Nobody can take our memories away!2
Even so, not everybody can achieve this, and particularly people who suffer from 
depression can find this very difficult. This is where the doctor and professional car-
ers have an important input: they can help the patient and their family find meaning. 
That is, if they do not shy away from the question of meaning for themselves.
In order not to cause an erroneous understanding of the notion of Christian Salvation 
through suffering, I do not say that patients find meaning in suffering, preferring to 
use the expression: patients can find meaning in life despite suffering.
7.2.3  Third Pathway: Knowing How to Deal with Suffering
Challenging patients’ fears of physical pain, decline, and the burden of treatment 
are important. I can think of a number of reasons why these fears seem to have 
increased in recent years. First, we are less confronted with death in everyday life, 
so we no longer see it as a natural process. Another source of fear is the practice of 
therapeutic obstinacy which proves ineffective and leaves the patient exhausted. 
Finally, there are the media who repeat again and again that ‘now that we have 
euthanasia, we no longer have to endure horrible suffering’, by which they generate 
a very negative image of suffering.
In our daily clinical practice, we notice that dispelling patients’ fears bring peace. 
We assure them that we will not undertake therapeutic obstinacy. We explain that 
they may die from kidney or liver failure or a cerebral herniation,3 for instance, 
which usually induces coma and a peaceful death after a few days. We tell them that, 
if necessary, we can use palliative sedation to lower their consciousness during the 
last hours of life. Eight percent of the patients in our university hospital have 
2 Some palliative care units allow patients to meet with a biographer who can help them write their 
memoirs.
3 A cerebral herniation is the shift of a part of the brain structures through a reduced opening, for 
instance the connection between the skull and the cervical spine. This leads to compression of the 
brain structures and loss of function, which will lead to coma and death.
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palliative sedation at the time of death; in New Delhi, India, community palliative 
care teams can help up to 20% of patients dying at home with palliative sedation. 
Being clear about these helps drive out patients’ fears of not being helped in the 
terminal stage.
A patient suffering renal cancer with bone metastases that paralysed her was still in treat-
ment. Yet, she needed to remind us regularly that she was determined to request euthanasia 
at some point in the future. When we asked why, she said that she did not want to end up 
‘attached to a ventilator in ICU in a vegetative state.’ We told her that was unlikely because 
admission to ICU is not easy for patients with advanced metastatic cancer, as intensive care 
makes no sense when the underlying condition can no longer be treated. We also said that 
we would make a note in her file stating her request not to be transferred to ICU and we 
reminded her that we did not practise therapeutic obstinacy. On hearing this, the patient’s 
face lit up immediately, and she told me that if this was the case, she would no longer 
request euthanasia. After a few months her cancer treatment, which had become ineffective, 
was stopped. She was transferred to a nursing home near her daughter and lived there hap-
pily for two months, enjoying several outings. She organised a party for her 70th birthday, 
surrounded by about a hundred friends. When her condition deteriorated again six weeks 
later, she was nearing the end of life. She then asked for euthanasia again, but died natu-
rally a few days later, before her request could be fulfilled. She was in fact already dying, 
after having filled her last weeks of life with meaning, despite being paraplegic.
Being open with the patient, describing their situation clearly and precisely 
brings peace. Good communication with patients about their diagnosis and progno-
sis is a real challenge for doctors, which we have to face up to. For many patients, 
not knowing is often worse than clear information, even when it is bad news. With 
so much to research online, patients and families will soon find out if they were not 
given accurate information, and they will lose trust in their doctor, while good com-
munication based on facts can help them appraise what they might still try to achieve 
in life.
Illness can teach us how to live with uncertainty, in a way that is habitual for less 
stressful cultures. Living with uncertainty is particularly difficult in a society which 
keeps projecting itself into the future and seeks insurances to keep it safe from each 
and every hazard. When one suffers a chronic disease with an uncertain outcome, 
one is bound to experience living more in the moment. If patients have been given 
bad news of a cancer diagnosis, it does not necessarily mean that good surprises can 
no longer come their way. They may respond well to treatment, even better than 
expected, or their illness can plateau for a while, and it would be sad to throw that 
lease of life away with negative thinking.
Recently an ambulance was seen in front of a patient’s house. She had been suffering from 
cancer for many years and her condition was deteriorating. Neighbours came out, worried 
about her, only to discover that she was fine, but that her husband, who had been in very 
good health, had suffered a pulmonary embolism and died…
Finally, doctors too must learn to accept death as the natural outcome of illness 
and of every human life. For some, death can be a relief after a long and difficult 
illness. Theresa of Lisieux’s autobiography [6] is interesting on the subject: ‘Oh! 
B. Beuselinck
83
What is agony? It feels like I am in it all the time… how will I manage to die? I will 
never know how to! Could it be today? If I were to die right now, how wonderful it 
would be! When will I choke completely? I can’t stand any more…’ Thus, we notice 
that even a Doctor of the Church like little Theresa can at the same time both long 
to die and fear death, but it must be said that she experienced ‘agony’ (during the 
last hours of life) in a time when palliative care was not as advanced as it is today…
Although people without any religious perspective can find ways to live with suffer-
ing, we are aware that religion can mitigate patients’ psychological and existential 
suffering. Someone who stands tall in the faith that God loves them personally, that 
their name is written in the palm of His hand, and that He gave His life for them may 
have a different outlook on death and dying. But some atheists also speak about 
their ‘spirit’, or the ‘soul of the world’ and discuss their ‘desire for eternity’. We 
each hold a seed of eternity in us which drives our longing for total and sustainable 
happiness, and leaves us horrified at the thought that death might lead to nothing-
ness. For those of us who have faith, death becomes a passage… to another mysteri-
ous way of life.4 From experience, I would say that people with faith often die more 
peacefully, but they too can suffer terminal anxiety, which can be something 
physiological.
7.3  What Happens in a Country Where Euthanasia Has 
Been Decriminalised?
The most important reasons why patients request euthanasia are: fear of deteriora-
tion, of becoming dependent, of being a burden, of terminal suffering and of no 
longer being able to do what one was used to. Very rarely do patients request eutha-
nasia because of severe and unappeasable physical pain; it is more often about exis-
tential suffering underlying the physical pain. Let us think for instance of an elderly 
lady in a nursing home who suffers urinary incontinence and is becoming blind. 
When she asks for euthanasia, it is not because of intolerable physical pain, but 
because of underlying psychological suffering such as loneliness. Another person 
with a similar physical condition, who is well supported by family and friends, may 
not even think about euthanasia!
Cases of euthanasia that hit the media in Belgium are a perfect example. A trans-
sexual man who was not satisfied with his bodily transformation is but one example 
of someone suffering psychologically, not physically. The writer who requests 
euthanasia as soon as he notices the first symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease does so 
because he fears foreseeable deterioration, more than because of what he is cur-
rently experiencing. Twins who requested euthanasia out of fear of becoming blind 
still had good eyesight at the time of their euthanasia, and the Nobel prize winner 
with bowel cancer spoke of his loneliness in the face of illness.
4 Thus, some compare death to a new birth. In his mother’s womb, a baby does not know either 
what to expect after birth. Why should he leave this warm and comfortable place where he has his 
needs met?
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Euthanasia requests are more frequent among people who are isolated or 
depressed. It is important to make them understand that, if we can no longer add 
days to their life, we can still add life to their days! The last phase of their life can 
still be full of meaning, for instance when they feel supported by carers, or a long- 
standing family conflict can be resolved. Because of this, carers and family mem-
bers need to dig deep into their creative resources, day after day, to make patients’ 
lives satisfying. The purpose of palliative care can be summed up in two Latin 
words: ‘consolare et sedare’ to bring comfort and peace—a peace which is physical 
as well as psychological, spiritual, and social. Furthermore, the question of meaning 
which is a feature of human beings all through their lives needs to be taken seriously 
in their final moments. Palliative care respects the course of an illness which leads 
the patient to natural death, neither precipitating nor delaying it unnecessarily. 
Family and carers will draw on everything they can, with love and ingenuity, to 
make those final moments meaningful: a last opportunity for self-actualisation and 
growth; a final moment of humanity and love.
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Julie Blanchard
Trained in France, I have been practising in Belgium since 2015. As general practi-
tioner, I also hold a diploma in palliative care, a degree requiring 2 years of training 
and placements. Before coming to Belgium, I practised in France in a mobile hos-
pital and community palliative care team, and in a palliative care unit.1
When in Belgium, I elected to work in a setting where I would be spared quan-
daries of conscience. As early as the employment interview, I made clear that I 
would not perform euthanasia and wished to work with people who shared my 
views; even my head of unit does not perform euthanasia. When the question is 
raised by a patient, it is a matter for discussion and I can express my opinion. That 
is why the workplace suits me. Besides, we never admit patients specifically for 
euthanasia.
My rule of thumb is not to take part in it in any way. When a patient expresses 
a wish to be euthanised, I report it in the staff meeting, making very clear that 
1 Palliative Care Units (PCU) in France are comparable to British hospice wards. Patients stay for a 
limited time in beds set aside for specialist palliative care and support. Priority is given to more 
complex and difficult situations. PCUs, like hospices, engage in a triple mission of caring, education 
and research. (www.sfap.org/rubrique/definition-et-organisation-des-soins-palliatifs-en-france).
To accept the concept of ‘unappeasable suffering’ as a legal 
condition of euthanasia is to disguise a wolf in sheep’s clothing.
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the information I share can in no way be considered medical advice on my part 
about the euthanasia request. I simply report that I have heard the patient’s ques-
tion. Luckily, I am not ostracised because of my convictions and can see all 
patients. On the other hand, some members of staff who are in favour of eutha-
nasia will help patients fill in their request form if they cannot do it themselves. 
But even they accept my refusal to be involved in euthanasia and I experience 
genuine respect; when a euthanasia is planned on the ward, the team makes sure 
that those of us who are against it are not present at the time of the lethal 
injection.
8.1  The Request for Euthanasia
Organisations that advocate the right to euthanasia campaign to incite people to 
write down Advance Directives requesting euthanasia. This mainly serves to belittle 
the act in people’s minds, who see it more and more as a merely civil act. But the 
Advance Directives form—which needs to be updated every 5 years—only applies 
to situations where the patient is unconscious, which represents a very small per-
centage of the actual cases of euthanasia… at least so far. Furthermore, a number of 
patients who have registered Advance Directives with the local authority wrongly 
believe that this covers all possible end of life situations, which can lead to painful 
misunderstandings.
Another issue worth mentioning is that of the ‘trusted person’2 whose role is 
not very clear, and the chosen person is not always aware of what their designa-
tion entails. Some organisations have started to provide ‘trusted persons’ for 
people who do not know who to ask in their immediate circle of family and 
friends. Thus, a ‘trusted person’ is reduced to paperwork, devoid of emotional 
connection.
According to the law, the euthanasia request needs to be handwritten by the 
patient, or, if they cannot do it, by a third person in the presence of two wit-
nesses. What bewilders me is that as soon as a patient says ‘I want to die!’ cer-
tain health workers take this literally. What we consider a cry for help and an 
expression of suffering in palliative care, becomes for some an outright request 
for euthanasia! Some carers will not even take the time to reformulate the 
patient’s request and verify that they have understood what the patient is really 
saying. Does the patient actually mean: ‘I want you to make sure I die’? So 
often, a lot depends on the carer’s attitude towards the patient. In palliative care, 
we are used to hear patients speak along those lines. That is normal! We know 
that death is part of life, that it is natural to die, that it is a challenging time one 
has to go through, and that we can talk about it without it being understood that 
the patient wants to be euthanised!
2 In Belgium, unlike in France, naming a ‘trusted person’, i.e. a person who can speak or decide on 
the patient’s behalf, is not included in the hospital admission form.
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8.2  Family Pressure
It happened to me once or twice, in Belgium and in France,3 that a family asked for 
euthanasia for their loved one. The main challenge for the people around a patient 
is time: the time illness takes to bring life to a close, and the duration of the final 
phase. Patrick Baudry says it very well: ‘Terminal restlessness is not only a sequence 
of physiological reactions leading to death; it is a psychological and spiritual pro-
cess which eludes us to a large extent. Speaking only about symptoms would mean 
reducing it to a last illness. Yet, we stand facing a mystery’. [1].
Human nature is better at tolerating an ordeal when one knows how long it will 
last. But End of Life essentially changes our perception of time. This is not easy. 
There can be a huge disparity between what people imagine and what is really hap-
pening. Often too, family members who notice physical decline, immediately think 
ahead about the end of life.
I remember a patient who had written Advance Directives for euthanasia ‘in the 
event’. Day by day, he was becoming frailer but, fully accepting his physical condi-
tion, he took it in his stride and enjoyed all the ‘good’ that he was offered. As days 
went by, it was his family who raised the question of his euthanasia request…
Patients can be very frail in these moments. They walk a tightrope and it does not 
take much to sway them to one side or the other.
Working in a mobile palliative care team within a hospital,4 one can find oneself 
at odds with a ward team. Thus, I remember advising against prescribing around- 
the- clock morphine to a 90-year-old patient. His daughter pleaded: ‘But Doctor, he 
is nearing the end of life, you cannot leave him like this!’ I replied: ‘I understand 
that it is hard for you to watch your dad dying. We do all we can to relieve his pain 
during his care, but there is no medical reason to increase morphine in between 
those times’. As it happened, the ward doctor had prescribed around-the-clock mor-
phine to hasten the patient’s death; there were conflicting medical opinions. Such 
moments of tension are difficult; they happen a lot with mobile teams.
8.3  Explaining Euthanasia
I once heard a colleague say lightly: ‘There’s no problem with killing someone who 
is dying!’ This gruesome pun tragically points towards a reality where many illegal 
requests for euthanasia are thus conceded: when a patient says they long to die, 
morphine doses are progressively increased until death ensues. This reflects a ten-
dency to impatience in the society which puts pressure on everyone: carers, family 
and patient; people are no longer permitted to take time to die.
3 In Belgium, euthanasia will not be penalised under certain conditions, in France it is still totally 
illegal.
4 Mobile palliative care teams within a hospital can be called to any of the hospital wards to advise 
the ward team on end of life care of a terminal patient on the ward.
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The purpose of the law, however, is to help the patient who is nearing the end of 
life and to inform them about alternative options. Unfortunately, not all profession-
als have a sound knowledge neither of the law nor of the framework regulating a 
euthanasia request. So, in practise, procedures can be rather messy, and medical 
reports are not always registered according to the law.
When a patient asks me about euthanasia, I explain clearly what it is about: a 
request for death by appointment. I remind them that the euthanasia request is not 
irrevocable and that they can change their mind at any time. I try to comprehend the 
reasoning behind their request and reassure them that, nowadays, nearly all physical 
pain can be controlled, and that we will support them all along. It is extremely 
important that the doctor is available to discuss their concerns with a patient.
I remember an elderly woman with all her children around her. They wanted 
‘something that happened gradually and peacefully’. (The gradual process of eutha-
nasia is a contradiction in terms!). We met with the children who told us about their 
idea of ‘gradual peaceful death’, and we explained that euthanasia, consisting of a 
lethal injection after which the person dies very quickly, is all but gradual and 
peaceful. Appalled at such horror, the children changed their mind but, in any case, 
the request could not have been endorsed because the patient had not written her 
request down; she had only talked about it. The request came from the children who 
wanted to speed up the process. It is likely that, had we not been able to explain so 
clearly what euthanasia was, the ambiguous situation would have rendered their 
mother’s end of life very distressing for all involved.
Sometimes it does not take much… I am reminded of a patient who could not 
stand any more pain nor being a burden to everyone. I said to her: ‘I am convinced 
that you can think of at least three sunbeams in your day and when I come back 
tonight, I will expect you to tell me what has been beautiful in your life today’. She 
replied that I was her sunshine… And when adequate pain relief had set in, she did 
not ask for euthanasia again.
8.4  The Trap of ‘Integrated’ Palliative Care
Euthanasia brings an end to all support.
In France, I looked after a patient who had a deep impact on me. He was a self- 
made businessman, brilliant and handsome with a gorgeous wife… and had been 
living with cancer for 6 months. He was exceedingly angry. But feeling listened to 
and respected, he gradually settled down and even thanked me. This man needed to 
feel heard in his suffering as he experienced it. I had told him from the start that I 
was against euthanasia, and that boundary was very clear between us. He taught me 
a lesson which was very obvious with him and helps me to this day: that boundaries 
facilitate support.
There is an increasing pressure to integrate euthanasia within palliative care. 
There is a trend in hospitals to transfer patients to palliative care units when nothing 
more can be done to cure them, in the understanding that euthanasia is part of pallia-
tive care…. To me, euthanasia and palliative care are each other’s opposite!
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The hospital’s Communication Department once sent me an invitation to a pallia-
tive care training course in which euthanasia was considered to be the ultimate care. I 
declined, stressing how important it was not to confuse palliative care with euthanasia.
Pressure comes from the medical staff too. In an insidious way, staff in favour of 
euthanasia can portray those who are against it as unkind; insinuating that leaving a 
patient like this without agreeing to their request for euthanasia lacks humanity. One 
sometimes wonders whether doctors who refuse to practise euthanasia are deemed 
cowards, by colleagues who have ‘the courage to perform it!’ In my book, it is not 
a matter of courage but of my conviction that we can support the patient in other 
ways, without having to kill them. The tragedy is the speed with which people 
become upset in these discussions. If one is looking for proof that something is 
unhealthy about euthanasia, the fact that people cannot discuss it calmly fits the bill!
There is a difference between causing death and letting someone die naturally. 
After euthanasia, there is a chilling silence in the ward, nothing like the reflective 
silence following a natural death, even when it has been difficult, like the death of a 
young person whom we have looked after for a while. The atmosphere following a 
natural death is different from that following euthanasia. People are upset too, but it 
is not the same. There is not a deliberate act to cause death.
Often carers hide behind the ‘patient’s choice’ which they consider their duty to 
carry out. Saying so is a way to protect themselves: ‘I am only the executor, I have 
no part in the decision making’.
Once I overheard: ‘Has Mrs. So and So’s treatment arrived?’ Can one consider 
euthanasia to be a treatment…? Worse, on the death certificate, euthanasia is 
recorded by ticking ‘natural death’. Is it impossible to declare euthanasia?... What a 
confession!
8.5  Sedation: Misunderstandings and Confusion
The Foundation against Cancer explains ‘palliative sedation is a deliberately cho-
sen medical treatment. It consists in administering medication to reduce conscious-
ness. If pain and discomfort in the palliative phase can no longer be controlled, it is 
possible—after discussion with patient and family, and only with the patient’s 
informed consent—to resort to palliative sedation. Palliative sedation is in no way 
a means to “hasten death”, its sole purpose is to relieve pain’.5
However, a number of patients ask for terminal sedation because they see it as a 
gentler and more compassionate form of euthanasia! The fact that some colleagues 
speak about euthanasia and palliative sedation within one and the same conversation 
with a patient—something I choose not to do—may add to the confusion. Sedation 
is a way of relieving uncontrollable symptoms such as respiratory or psychological 
distress which do not respond to any medication. Sedation can also offer temporary 
respite and allow a patient to review their situation when waking up. It is imperative 




I have prescribed temporary sedation for a patient whose wound care was excru-
ciating despite appropriate pain and anxiety medication.
Sedation can eventually become permanent, but only in the patient’s very last 
days, when all else has indeed been tried.
8.6  Palliative Care: A Hospital Paradigm
Palliative care can serve as an example. On the oncology ward, for instance, the 
doctor would call upon our mobile specialist palliative care team for an interdisci-
plinary meeting about a patient’s care: how to alleviate their pain, nausea and vomit-
ing, etc. Even when a family asks for our advice, the ward doctor’s approval is 
required, which is logical.
The mobile specialist palliative care team has an advisory role: the doctor who is 
in charge of the patient has the last word regarding their treatment. This way of 
working is very encouraging as it allows us onto the wards where we can promote 
palliative care. The advice we give may or may not be followed, but our visit will 
have enabled a discussion with the doctors on the ward; a dialogue has begun. I may 
still be young, but whatever the ward doctor’s experience, when asked what to put 
in the syringe driver I say ‘It is your decision doctor, and depends on what you are 
aiming for. I don’t believe increasing the doses is warranted unless the patient’s 
condition requires it’.
Palliative care is not a new medical speciality. It is a way of thinking about 
patient care and it would probably be more appropriate to speak about ‘palliative 
culture’. Some oncologists gladly admit to an increasing need to resort to palliative 
care because of the advances in cancer treatment which lead to unheard-of develop-
mental stages.
I remember a doctor who frequently called upon us to talk about a patient, aware 
of the need to start with palliative care as early as possible in the course of treat-
ment. Starting in the curative phase of treatment helps with building a therapeutic 
alliance, and eases the transition into palliative care when curative care is no longer 
an option.
Another interesting aspect of working in the mobile palliative care team is that we 
often deal with registrars whom we can support with complex treatments. When 
something mentioned on a prescription surprises me, I take it upon me to challenge 
the registrar about their aim: ‘Why did you prescribe this? What is your goal?’ 
Sometimes, they reply: ‘My boss told me to do so’. This is when I remind them that 
it is their prerogative to take responsibility for what they write on the prescription. 
Often, they will comment: ‘You are right, I cannot do that…’ and change the pre-
scription. I think this is a tremendous awakening of their conscience! Some registrars 
even told their boss to write their own prescription… they would not do it, and I fully 
endorse them! Of course, there are the others too who say it happens everywhere… 
I then advise to do what feels right to them. I believe it is easier for them not to think 
and simply do as they are told. And sometimes, I need to dot the ‘i’s and cross the 
‘t’s: ‘Are you aware that we are a palliative care team, not a euthanasia team?’
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8.7  Contradiction and Ambiguity
Sometimes disguised forms of euthanasia take place which bring us to a halt as 
powerless witnesses. There are situations which do not fall under the legal frame-
work when morphine doses are increased until death ensues. When one looks 
through a patient’s medical prescriptions, their history is revealing. In situations like 
that, when treatments are given that are not in accordance with the principles of pal-
liative care, I may decide to withdraw from a patient’s care.
One of the weirdest situations we can be confronted with is when a doctor asks 
for the palliative care team to intervene, while, at the same time, increasing the 
doses and inducing disguised euthanasia…
Patients’ self-determination and fear of medical paternalism are the two pillars of 
euthanasia, which have justified lifting the essential ban on killing. But what are we 
to make of a doctor who increases morphine doses without anyone asking them? Is 
that not an even greater form of paternalism? And why are not even the legal pre-
scriptions applied? Some blame the long-drawn-out paperwork, but I believe it is 
more an unease of doing something which does not really feel right. A shifty expres-
sion I have heard a number of times to name euthanasia echoes this: ‘On to 
morphine-champagne!’
Thus, my advice to registrars is to look for training schools and placements 
where they can be taught real palliative care, where euthanasia is not on offer.
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Our conscience is an infallible judge,
when we have not already killed it.
Honoré de Balzac.1
Euthanasia is on everybody’s lips, the media, politicians, public services, and 
various organisations…. However, the debate is often biased or ill-informed, and it 
is my wish to contribute to this volume by describing the (harsh) reality surrounding 
the practise of euthanasia as accurately as possible.
Life in our hospitals no longer runs smoothly and gently; it is exceedingly busy 
and often near breaking point. As a member of the healthcare staff, I notice how 
difficult it can be for us nurses, doctors, psychologists, and social workers, to keep 
our heads above water when it comes to ‘ethics’.
1 La peau de chagrin (1831).
Caregivers in palliative care must fight to continue providing 
the care that ensures a peaceful end of life … in an atmosphere 
that favors death.
Dr. Jacques T. (doctor in palliative care)
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9.1  Distress of the Healthcare Worker
It may be easy to proclaim oneself for or against euthanasia from afar, but when one 
is faced with a patient’s end of life and their request for euthanasia, boundaries can 
get blurred when one is overcome by reason, feelings, and a sense of duty. One can-
not imagine what havppens behind closed doors in a patient’s room, a hospital cor-
ridor, a doctor’s office, or a meeting room, but more often than not I have been a 
direct or indirect witness to the deep distress doctors experience when they perform 
euthanasia. They may work in different hospitals or come from varied backgrounds: 
they all seem to experience certain inner conflict between their sense of duty and 
deeply held beliefs.
Such was the experience of a qualified doctor who told me he had performed euthanasia 
several times in the care institution where he works. His eyes filled with tears as he con-
fessed that some nights he wakes up in a sweat, seeing the faces of the very people he has 
euthanised in front of him. Can there be anything harder to bear? Who could guess that 
behind the confident and experienced doctor, an honest and sincere man endures such 
suffering?
In public, professionals stress their ‘sense of duty’ and the responsibility to con-
form with patients’ requests to justify their performing euthanasia, but in the depths 
of their hearts, conscience rebels...
In another hospital, another doctor cried his heart out to the ethics committee: ‘I will do it 
once more for this patient; but this is the last time. I have already performed euthanasia 
twice this year, and that is as much as I can bear’.
Many practitioners are compelled by what they consider to be their duty to 
perform euthanasia, but they can sometimes overlook that by putting an end to 
a human’s life, they are also putting an end to their own peace of mind. One can 
understand that their ‘blemished’ conscience is tempted to bury the experience 
of euthanasia as deep as possible in order to survive, while the performer tries 
to persuade themselves of their ‘good’ deed. It is a matter of psychological sur-
vival. And this could be one of the reasons why partisans of euthanasia are so 
persistent.
When a GP in the audience expressed disagreement during a lecture aimed at promoting 
euthanasia, the only answer the speaker could come up with was: ‘But can’t you open your 
eyes? Euthanasia is good!’ It sounded like downright autosuggestion according to the 
‘Coué method’2…
That is why I feel that maintaining the conscientious objection clause in the law 
is of the utmost importance. We have only one conscience and we owe it to our-
selves to hold it dear. It is what makes us into who we are as a spouse, a friend, a 




relative, a healthcare worker…. By not respecting or by ducking it, we alter our 
deepest self.
9.2  Euthanasia: A ‘De-Humanising’ Act
It is well known that the workload in health services is increasingly heavy. 
Continually understaffed, the numerous administrative tasks on top of the daily 
schedule of nurses render patient care more complex and difficult. Euthanasia hap-
pens in this turmoil.
At a handover meeting, there was a heated discussion about a patient who had requested 
euthanasia. The euthanasia was planned to happen this very day, and was to be performed 
by a highly respected doctor in high demand, whose timetable is continually overbooked. 
The euthanasia was scheduled for 2:30 pm but when the clock struck 2.30, the doctor was 
still in consultation and running very late. The patient became impatient and so was the 
family who had come in specially to escort their loved one on this final journey. The patient 
paced up and down the room, waiting for death. Tension mounted in the ward as family 
members came and went from the patient’s room which happened to be in the middle of the 
ward corridor, while nurses continued to provide care to other patients. General unease 
was at its peak; a real nightmare. When, finally, the doctor arrived several hours late, 
another problem surfaced: he had not fitted a catheter nor an intravenous drip for years… 
The nursing staff on duty did not want to be involved in euthanasia and claimed their right 
to conscientious objection. Eventually, barely following the protocol and showing little 
respect for the staff, the doctor called in a nurse from another ward who accepted to assist 
him. With an ironic comment to the ward team ‘You have to live with the times!’, she helped 
the doctor and euthanasia was performed with more than three hours deferral...
But I do not want to dwell on such a gruesome note. The deep unease that eutha-
nasia has brought to our services has also—and probably in the first instance—to do 
with the fact that our doctors are fine people. Most of them are gems, competent and 
dedicated to the work they are doing.
When I made that point, a psychologist who is in favour of euthanasia, com-
mented: ‘One has to acknowledge that euthanasia requires a doctor to de-humanise 
themselves momentarily’. I was struck by the word ‘de-humanise’ used by this 
experienced psychologist. Did he mean that one needs to ‘de-humanise oneself’ in 
order to be able to perform euthanasia? That otherwise it is untenable? That is per-
plexing! How could we de-humanise? We are born human and I do not believe that 
we can withdraw that humanity at any time until death. We do not have that capac-
ity. From our first breath, our first heartbeat, I dare even say from conception we are 
and remain a human being, all the way until death. We cannot change our human 
condition. To say that one might ‘de-humanise oneself’ is an oxymoron.
What is more, official records reveal healthcare worker’s unease with euthanasia. 
There is no mention of ‘euthanasia’ on the death certificate; one has to tick ‘natural 
death’ to record it. Officially having to declare that dying after a lethal injection is a 
natural death, reveals a general unease regarding euthanasia. This is outright a State 
lie. All the more so when we consider that the doctor’s identity on the form is 
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concealed3 in the case of euthanasia, while it is explicitly documented in any other 
significant medical act. If euthanasia is beneficial for the patient and should be con-
sidered progress for society, why can one not mention explicitly that a patient died 
following euthanasia? And why should the name of the doctor who performed a 
‘valuable’ act be concealed?
There is an obvious gap between the reality on the ground and what is being 
discussed in high circles.
During a debate at the Ministry of Health, I was struck by the intervention of a professor of 
Medicine. The discussion was getting out of hand, each putting forward their arguments for 
or against euthanasia—some about the patient’s rights, others about respect for the indi-
vidual—when this doctor stood up, slammed his fist on the table, and asked: ‘Do you really 
believe it is easy for us, doctors, to perform this lethal act?’
This man who was generally considered a great supporter of euthanasia dared to 
assert the muted distress of the practitioner in the midst of this high circles debate.
9.3  When Conscience Competes Against Law 
and Bureaucracy
Lately, a great debate hit the media questioning the freedom of healthcare institu-
tions to choose whether or not to allow euthanasia on their premises. The law is 
unclear about this and the void this causes can lead to fierce lawsuits by patients or 
families against institutions that have refused to consider euthanasia for patients in 
their care. But this debate is misguided. To understand this better, let us look at both 
the viewpoints of health professional and patient.
Each professional signing an employment contract is expected to stand by the 
values of the institution he signs with. And so, before signing, they will have exam-
ined whether these values are compatible with their own and with their conscience. 
In the matter at hand, let us take the example of a healthcare institution which 
chooses not to allow euthanasia on their premises. When signing an employment 
contract with them, the new staff member agrees to this. They may even be particu-
larly sensitive to this very principle which concurs with their personal values, and 
therefore look forward to joining this particular end of life care team. They might 
not even have considered accepting the job had it not been for this determin-
ing factor…
3 After performing euthanasia, the doctor has to complete two sections of a form which serves to 
verify whether the act happened in accordance with the law. The Federal Control Commission cor-
roborates ‘a posteriori’ whether the prescribed conditions and procedures have been complied 
with. They do so, examining the anonymous section of the form. If the Commission considers that 
not all the stipulations were followed, the second section, with the doctor’s name, is opened and in 
the event of a two-third majority endorsing the decision, the case will be sent for further investiga-
tion to the Crown Prosecutor in the locality where the patient died. This happened only once in 
15 years since the introduction of the law.
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Now, let us look at the patient… They too may have chosen a specific institution 
because they know euthanasia does not happen there. A patient or family consider-
ing euthanasia might be well advised to enquire about the institution’s policy before 
applying, and if the charter stipulates that no euthanasia is performed on the prem-
ises, look elsewhere where their need can be met.
Sadly, we have to note that freedom of expression and respect for the other are 
equivocal in this debate, as they seem to work in one direction only. Little or no 
room is left for institutions that stand for life.
During a hospital inspection, an institution was blamed for not having any euthanasia 
protocol. The director objected they did not need one since internal regulations stipulated 
that euthanasia would not be performed on their premises. The inspectors summoned the 
hospital to update the document and lay down a euthanasia protocol...
Considering the law is unclear, it seems to me that such an attitude denotes abuse 
of power.
Having considered the healthcare workers’ conscience issues and experience of 
euthanasia in the first section, let us now turn to the patients. Undeniably, situations 
are equally complex and difficult for patients and their families, who are suffering. 
Faced with their request for euthanasia, what does palliative care have to offer? Can 
they come up with an answer or even a valuable alternative?
9.4  Euthanasia, a Stage in Accepting One’s Illness
A number of specialists have explored different stages patients can go through when 
they are given bad news: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance can 
be experienced to a greater or lesser extent. I would want to add a further stage: 
requesting euthanasia.
This new stage came about in the social context in which we live, marked by a 
legislation decriminalising euthanasia under certain conditions; by media, some-
times encouraged by biased activists, publicising difficult and exceptional situa-
tions; and, finally, by the testimony of healthcare workers who have performed 
euthanasia and become cheerleaders of the practise so as not to be overwhelmed by 
second thoughts. These contextual factors have rendered a euthanasia request very 
nearly systematic for the seriously ill. Continual brainwashing has secured in peo-
ple’s minds—without the slightest shadow of guilt—the option that an end can be 
put to their life ‘as and when they would like it’ and a euthanasia request has become 
a societal claim which we all have to contend with, avid defenders of life included. 
Requesting euthanasia has become the norm. Hence, I see a parallel between the 
request for euthanasia and the anger stage of grief. We need to integrate it in the 
process, but most of all see it as a temporary stage, not an endpoint. Nothing forces 
us to kill!
But what happens precisely in practise? A patient will arrive at the hospital with 
a note from their GP saying: ‘Thank you for taking care of Mr(s) X for euthanasia’, 
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clear and to the point! This often happens with GPs who are not against euthanasia 
but do not wish to perform it themselves. They tell the patient ‘They will do it at the 
hospital’ and the patient is convinced that they will be euthanised within days of 
being admitted to the hospital, not realising it is not that simple. According to the 
law,4 patients can be referred to the hospital either at a family’s request, who do not 
want to live where their loved one has died or at the GP’s request who asserts: ‘I’ve 
reached my limit!’ Euthanasia referrals rarely happen from one GP to another, 
rather, it is suggested that the patient goes to hospital.5 But most hospital doctors 
refuse to perform euthanasia ‘on request’, and the patient ends up in a palliative 
care bed.
In order to rise above the ideological feud ‘for or against euthanasia’, one needs 
to remember that patients who are referred are people, first and foremost. We cannot 
shut them out of our care simply because they requested euthanasia. But this does 
not mean that we should accept putting people to death either. Admitting them to the 
palliative care ward requires us to accept the people as they are, with their under-
standable anger and unbearable anguish, and help them face up to their death, and 
working through anger and fear towards acceptance. When we support patients 
competently and with empathy, we may help them consider their demise differently 
than how it looks through a euthanasia-tinted lens, and help them to live life fully 
till the end.
A request for euthanasia is not the end of the road. We need to look at it as a new 
phase, among the other stages of grief, on the way to acceptance. At the end of this 
process, we hope that the person, with the help of the palliative care team, will be 
able to die a natural death, having lived their life to the full till the end. A patient 
who requests euthanasia is usually in the thralls of dread: fear of suffering, of dying, 
of being a burden… Euthanising them in that distress deprives them of the time to 
ease their worries and find answers to their questions. Furthermore, it confirms a 
failure and denies them the hope to overcome it.
The health professional who is aware of this possible care pathway will no longer 
feel apprehensive around a patient requesting euthanasia; they will take them by the 
hand and walk alongside them to the end of the road.
A patient arrived in our department accompanied by her husband. She was about 50 and 
had so far been living at home, taking 32 medications a day. Convinced that she was a 
burden to her husband and her two children, she repeated day in day out: ‘Let me go, I want 
to die, please don’t give me any more medication’. She attempted suicide four times. On the 
fourth attempt, she pushed herself down the staircase in her wheelchair. Her husband, who 
loved her deeply, was totally overcome. He was devastated at the thought that he could not 
prevent her throwing herself down the staircase. To the GP it was clear that she wanted to 
die and he referred her to the hospital for euthanasia.
4 The 2002 law on euthanasia, section 14, makes referral to a doctor of the patient’s choice obliga-
tory: ‘The physician who refuses to take a euthanasia request into consideration is deemed to refer 
the patient to a doctor of their choice when requested by the patient or their “trusted person”’.
5 This can happen both ways. The hospital team which refuses to perform euthanasia for a patient 
who fulfils the criteria and has the necessary forms, can discharge them home where a consenting 
physician can do so.
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When she came in her husband shouted: ‘Don’t let anyone get in our way, she is to be 
euthanised’. The team started to panic. I went to see the patient and we had a 4-hour con-
versation with husband and wife. We argued and as I was not agreeing to go ahead with 
euthanasia, he wanted to take his wife back home and have her referred elsewhere. I told 
him: ‘The choice is up to you, but right now, your wife cannot be transported; any move-
ment is extremely painful and we need to take care of her pain first. I guarantee you we will 
do all we can to make her comfortable. When she is, you can still decide whether you want 
her to be transferred in order to be euthanised’. Thus, the situation calmed down, the hus-
band decided to leave his wife in our department and we worked together. Seeing how, with 
the combined use of painkillers and controlled sedation, his wife rested peacefully in bed, 
he became convinced that palliative care was effective. A very tactile man, he appreciated 
the massages with essential oils we gave his wife. We encouraged him to bring the CDs they 
listened to together. The two children, both young adults, followed suit, even though they 
were ill at ease at the start. They feared they might betray their mother’s resolve who had 
been adamant from the start that she wanted euthanasia. We reassured them saying that she 
was receiving no more medical treatment and we did nothing to prolong her life, only to 
make her comfortable.
This lady died peacefully in her husband’s arms, listening to the music they had played 
at their wedding. After a week, her husband came back, asking to see me. He thanked me 
with a box of chocolates… and asked whether I could keep a place for him in our palliative 
care ward when his time came!
The sad thing is that it took 32 medications and four suicide attempts for this 
woman to be heard and cared for, rather than be the object of therapeutic obstinacy.
Too often, unreasonable and coercive therapies are maintained. Because health-
care professionals perceive death as a failure, they go ahead with heavy treatments 
and invalidating surgeries which take away patients’ quality of life and cause appall-
ing suffering. Exhausted and desperate, euthanasia seems the only way out for the 
patient: they cannot go on like this! The doctor can no longer witness the suffering 
he brought on the patient either, and tends to go along with their euthanasia request. 
If only the patient’s wishes about having another course of chemotherapy or under-
going more debilitating surgery could be better assessed, they would have the 
choice, with the help of palliative care, to end their life with dignity.
9.5  Euthanasia as a Wake-Up Call from Indifference
The above example puts the finger on the drama that lies hidden beneath a number 
of euthanasia requests. Another, even more striking, situation has deeply trans-
formed my professional practise.
During the Christmas holiday, a 75-year-old lady, whose convalescence after hip surgery 
was difficult, suffered several falls at home. Feeling relatively well but no longer able to live 
alone, she was placed in a nursing home—which happened to be cruelly understaffed—by 
her overworked children. In the home for a whole month, she witnessed people being left in 
bed—even for meals—three or four days running during long weekends, for instance, when 
the staff was reduced. Sometimes residents’ cry for help to go to the bathroom would go 
unnoticed, and the like. Fearing she might end up in a similar situation, she preferred to end 
her life right away. She stated her wish to the GP, completed the documents in due form, and 
was given the all clear to be euthanised. The nursing home sent her to the hospital. Since 
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she was not imminently dying, there needed to be, by law, a month’s delay between accep-
tance of the request and the actual euthanasia. During this time, she was cared for by our 
palliative care team, even though her condition did not warrant it. The psychologist saw her 
regularly. When I overheard the following sentence, it rang like thunder to my ears: ‘Did 
you notice? I had to request euthanasia for people to start taking an interest in me’. Indeed, 
she had several visits a day, received proper care, saw the psychologist, some people would 
bring chocolates… Even people from the nursing home came to visit the star she had 
become. And this all came about after she had volunteered for ‘death’s corridor’. It was a 
very unhealthy situation where it appeared that requesting euthanasia became an ‘open 
sesame’ to receiving proper care and support.
That patient caused a professional electroshock for me! She made me realise 
how important those moments at a patient’s bedside are, when we give them our 
time to talk or even play cards, and simply to be human. Her experience spurred me 
to call together a group of volunteers who give of their time to go and sit at a 
patient’s bedside. It also taught me that, whether a euthanasia request comes from 
the patient or a family member, it is worth checking whether they want to test the 
medical world. I have been positively surprised to realise that when we say calmly: 
‘No, we do not practise euthanasia, but we have something better to offer you’, 
people are willing to listen. And when we explain that pain will be relieved and that 
their quality of life is our main concern, the euthanasia request quickly fades away. 
Relief from pain and being treated as a human being is what most patients and fami-
lies long for.
There is still another dimension worth considering. Families, like doctors, are 
often upset when euthanasia is mentioned. Family members do not always agree for 
or against euthanasia, and this can lead to painful conflicts in the very ward corridor.
I remember a family that was torn apart over the question of euthanasia and I spent a long 
time in the patient’s room, talking to each of the family members. I do not remember what I 
said, but the crisis calmed down and palliative care was quietly put into action.
Often, a request for euthanasia comes from caring people who cannot fathom the 
idea of being a burden to their loved ones. Our art as healthcare staff consists in 
helping the patient find ways of expressing their love.
Thus, a volunteer suggested a quadriplegic grandmother could tell stories to her grandchil-
dren. This helped her come out of the shell she felt locked in.
9.6  Sedation: Palliative Practise or Hypocrisy?
Defenders of euthanasia can sometimes point the finger at sedation, which they 
deem to be hypocritical. Nevertheless, sedation has a place in palliative care, when 
the doses are controlled and it is used with the intention to relieve a patient’s 
suffering.
While morphine derivatives can take care of physical symptoms (difficulty 
breathing, unappeasable pain, etc.), sedation can relieve psychological distress 
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which also needs to be taken care of. The principle of sedation is to give a patient 
respite for a longer or shorter while, at regular intervals, in between which the 
patient can be peacefully awake when their suffering is more bearable.
A lady who used to be the tenant of a small pub was admitted to the palliative care ward. 
Despite many courses of chemotherapy, her illness had progressed and reached terminal 
stage. A very active lady, the patient suffered huge physical and psychological pain. She 
missed terribly standing behind the bar and having contact with the clients. Her treatment 
had two objectives: relieve her physical pain with morphine and, with an eye on her psycho-
logical comfort, allow moments of rest when she asked for them with controlled sedation. 
She would always be awake during visiting hours when family or clients came in and they 
would have a beer and a chat, as they were used to in the pub.
About to become a grandmother for the first time, her ultimate goal in life was to make 
it to the birth of the child. Sedation helped her to hold on and she was happy and relaxed. 
However, on the eve of the expected birth, her condition took a turn for the worse and it 
became unlikely that she would make it. Sedation was stopped around midday the following 
day when the grandchild came in. Full of joy and strength, the patient could get up, hold the 
baby, and contemplate it with wonder. That evening, she took to bed never to get up again. 
She died peacefully two days later, happy for having achieved her goal and held her 
grandchild.
When it is used properly, there is nothing hypocritical about sedation! It is a pal-
liative tool geared at the patient’s and their family’s well-being. While morphine is 
a painkiller for the body, sedation can relieve psychological distress.
This being said, it does happen that high doses of morphine or other substances 
are administered despite the risk that such doses might hasten death. We constantly 
adapt to a patient’s pain and suffering in palliative care, so as to make sure they are 
comfortable. When pain and suffering are very resistant, we may sooner or later 
have to prescribe such high doses of medication that they may induce the patient’s 
death. Even so, the professionals will have fulfilled their contract with the patient to 
keep them comfortable until the very end. It needs mentioning that, at no time are 
the care or medication given intended to end a patient’s life; the intention is only to 
relieve their pain and make them comfortable. Although, pharmaceutically, there 
may seem to be only a very thin line between palliative care and euthanasia, in effect 
the difference is huge. In palliative care we administer the lowest dose possible by 
which the patient’s suffering can be relieved; in euthanasia a large dose is adminis-
tered to make sure the patient dies. Healthcare workers who administer sedation are 
very aware of their intention either to relieve or to kill thus ensuring their peace 
of mind.
One day a colleague asked me: ‘What difference do you see between euthanasia 
and palliative care? The patient dies anyway. The aim is to respect their wish to 
die’. Having recently visited the Opal Coast (Northern France), a metaphor came to 
mind. I said:
A person at the end of life is like someone standing on the edge of a very high cliff. They can 
see the sea lapping the rocks down below. They know they may soon have to leave solid 
ground to enter the sea. The person who asks for euthanasia does not dare to jump on their 
own. It is too high and they do not know how to get down below. So, they ask the doctor to 
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give them a push to help them plunge. In palliative care, rather than pushing the patient off 
the cliff, we take them by the hand and lead them down to the shore along a coastal path. 
Palliative care means taking the time to find the path which suits the patient, to go down 
with them all the way, and allow their nearest and dearest the time they need to walk along 
that path with them. Of course, the path can be very steep and tricky at times, but carefully 
and cautiously, both patient and family can reach this beach from where the patient can 
travel peacefully.
We all get to the bottom of the cliff, but the way to get there is very different.
9.7  When Trust Meets Professional Integrity6
One of our professors quoted Dr. Portes: ‘The career you have chosen is about an 
encounter between trust and professional integrity’; it is about the professional 
integrity of the healthcare professional meeting the patient’s trust. Unfortunately, 
too often patients’ trust is fading away or even turned into suspicion when they are 
dealing with professionals whose integrity has dwindled to a perverted sense of 
duty. The medical world is annoyed when patients look for information on the 
Internet, ask for a second opinion, and express distrust. But what is at stake is more 
than the globalisation of information online: in failing to provide proper answers to 
ethical dilemmas, medicine has broken the delicate balance of trust and professional 
integrity. And I greatly enjoy the trust patients grant me, thanks to my refusal of 
euthanasia.
But what about training and the ideas that are conveyed nowadays?
Some lecturers are pretty good at convincing an audience of hundreds of people 
that, under certain circumstances, euthanasia is an act of love. Knowing how to play 
on emotions and feelings of guilt, they use it to convey how beautiful a response to 
suffering euthanasia can be. Many of us have sat in lectures of this kind. But when 
they are geared to young professionals in training, they may cause huge damage, 
anaesthetising their capacity to be with someone’s pain and suffering. Here too, one 
could speak of a betrayal of trust in the young, through a changed nature of the 
tutor’s professional integrity.
But I do not despair. Even if today many are trained for euthanasia, believing it 
to be a part of patient care, I am convinced that there will always be enough people 
to look reality in the eye and not run away from life’s tragedy. And I hope that they 
may discover by themselves what I was brought to understand.
One day I was travelling home after having dealt with a particularly difficult situation. I 
was in total turmoil, at the end of my tether. Driving home from the hospital takes me about 
half an hour, across beautiful scenery. That evening, the sun was highlighting the autumnal 
colours, and suddenly it dawned on me: ‘Fortunately nature does not react like us humans… 
What if the leaves said at the end of the summer: “I want to die. Soon, there will be no more 
6 Dr. Louis Portes (1891–1950), ‘Du consentement à l’acte médical’ (communication à l’Académie 
des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 30 janvier 1950), in A la recherche d’une éthique médicale, 
Paris, Masson et PUF, 1955.
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tree sap, so better end my life right away”. If this were the case, we would miss out on the 
autumnal beauty. As early as July many still green leaves would litter the ground and there 
would be none left to display their colours in fall. The richness of autumn lies in the time 
leaves take to let the vital juice dry out and die. In spring and even more in summer, all the 
leaves are green, but in fall an extraordinary variety of colours is displayed. Similarly, a 
human being in the twilight of life lets go of their masks and reveals their true self. In every-
day life, running after time, we all have green leaves and, sometimes, it is not until the end 
of our lives that we realise that, beneath the green, there is a wide array of warm and 
exquisite colours. Palliative care is the autumn of our life; it is the time the leaf takes to 
gradually detach from the tree. Even though the sun is not always shining and there are 
difficult times of heavy showers and wind storms, the leaf holds on to the tree with all the 
colours it has left. Could we imagine a year with three seasons only? Could we go from 35 
°C in summer to -10 °C winter without any period of transition? No!... However, that is 
what happens with euthanasia’.
I have met all sorts of people during my career, from the humblest to those who 
are used to being in the limelight. For each and all of them, masks come down at the 
end of life. No doubt this is very difficult for the person, but it is also very beautiful 
to watch. They reveal their deep inner self and remind us that they are unique and 
irreplaceable. We see a person readying themselves to leave this life. For sure, their 
body is often falling to pieces, and their mind is slowed down, but what is being 
said, what is being experienced, is of a beauty and intensity that remind me of the 
autumn leaves…
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I would like to conclude this work with some important points to remember that 
shed light on our daily life.
The authors of “Euthanasia: searching for the full story” give us a very positive 
message. Doctors and nurses need to believe in their patients’ resilience, the inner 
force that allows a person to adapt to new and difficult situations, to redefine his life 
goals and to recognize that he is capable of what seems impossible. Every day I see 
magnificent examples of this in hospital. But this resilience is sometimes under-
mined and needs to be reinforced by family members, friends, and health-care staff, 
especially in palliative care. Negative signals, be they direct or indirect, can snuff 
out this inner flame. Thus, doctors and nurses help their patients, not only through 
their medical and scientific knowledge but also by being bearers of hope, without 
however resorting to extraordinary measures to prolong life. To bring hope is not 
necessarily to tell a sick person that she will heal. It is listening to her suffering. It 
is seeking with her the meaning of her life in spite of her suffering. It is making her 
feel, in spite of all she is living through, that her life is worth living, that she still 
can love.
Accepting a request for euthanasia sends the patient a signal. It confirms that her 
life in effect is no longer worth living. The law however stipulates precisely that 
euthanasia must never be proposed. But the examples given in this book show that 
this border is often crossed. Here is another example that was related to me by a 
young intern in psychiatry. It speaks volumes about the shift that is taking place in 
our society. His middle-aged patient was suffering from alcoholism and spoke to 
him about the thoughts of suicide that oppressed him when he had had too much to 
drink. To deal with this, he was in the habit of calling the helpline of the suicide 
prevention center. Then this patient, very upset, told him that the last two times he 
had called the center, the person at the other end of the line had suggested to him 
that he ought to discuss euthanasia with his family doctor. At the time the patient 
told this to the young intern, he was sober and stated that he had no intention of 
discussing the option of suicide with his doctor and even less of requesting it. The 
patient was distraught because at the time of his call for help he was told that his life 
was perhaps no longer worth living and even that he was a nuisance.
Most requests for euthanasia are rooted in mental suffering, even if there is an 
underlying physical pathology. Several references are in agreement on this point [1]. 
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Everything depends on the way the health-care staff approach this mental suffering. 
This is precisely the reason why the health-care staff’s message of hope and interest 
in listening is so important. Is not there a risk that requests for euthanasia caused by 
a feeling of loneliness and uselessness will multiply exponentially if the bonds of 
solidarity continue to unravel in the name of the total autonomy of the individ-
ual person?
“Euthanasia: searching for the full story” also shows us how family members 
and the health-care staff who carry out or assist in euthanasia are distraught. Yet 
there is very little scientific literature about this matter. Numerous testimonies show 
a malaise, even a sense of guilt, among health-care workers. An elderly person in a 
rest home requests euthanasia and the staff members blame themselves in the belief 
that they probably did not give this person the best care. This is the reality. For doc-
tors who induce death, the emotional burden is not negligible and can lead to emo-
tional exhaustion and a feeling of loneliness [2]. There is an urgent need to 
acknowledge this phenomenon, to document it, and then, if necessary, to conduct a 
deeper inquiry into the matter.
In Belgium it is clear that the promise and the numerous expectations of the law 
on euthanasia of 2002 have not been fulfilled. The law was supposed to bring trans-
parency to and control over euthanasia, which at that time was carried out in secret. 
Today, we know that many euthanasia cases are not reported and that the system of 
control after the fact [a posteriori] is largely insufficient. The paternalism of the 
doctor was to be brought to an end, but this book shows us that a new form of pater-
nalism has appeared today. It is no longer the paternalism from the past over whether 
or not to start a treatment, but a paternalism concerned with life or death. Furthermore, 
an insightful analysis demonstrates that there is a link between unreasonable persis-
tence in treatment and euthanasia, namely the doctor’s rejection of powerlessness. 
Doctors and nurses must accept their powerlessness when faced with certain situa-
tions, as this book shows.
It has been for me a very great honor to work with the authors of this collective 
work. They have taught me a great deal. All of them, from the perspective of their 
particular expertise and experience, have analyzed the evolution in end-of-life care 
in an honest and open way. In this book there is neither negativism nor fatalism. The 
authors wish neither to judge nor to blame. On the contrary—they are all looking to 
the future and the book leaves us with this message: “We can do better in caring for 
the sick at the end of their lives. We must aim higher!”
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an acute geriatrics department admits as inpatients elderly patients who 
present several disorders and a significant state of physical, mental, 
and/or social dependence.
Anoxia: a deficiency of oxygen the blood distributes to the tissues.
Antalgia: the attenuation of pain.
Cerebral (brain) 
herniation:
the protrusion of brain tissue, blood, or cerebral fluid through a natural 





Advance declaration/directive of euthanasia: the form by which a 
person “requests that, in the event he/she is no longer able to express 
his/her will, a doctor perform euthanasia if all the conditions stipulated 
by the law are met.” It will be implemented only in cases where the 
person is unconscious.
Obligatory declaration of euthanasia: the form for verifying the 
legality of the completed act. The Federal Commission for the Control 
and Evaluation of Euthanasia certifies a posteriori [after the fact] that 
the conditions and procedures stipulated by the law have been adhered 
to. In order to accomplish this, the Commission examines the 
anonymous section of the forms completed by the practitioners who 
carried out euthanasia. If the Commission deems that the legal 
conditions were not met, it opens the second section, which names the 
doctor. If the case does not appear to conform to the law, the 
Commission, by a vote of two-thirds majority, sends the record to the 
royal procurator at the place of the patient’s death. This has happened 
only once in 15 years in the 13,000 cases of euthanasia officially 
declared (as of the end of 2017).
Decriminalization 
of euthanasia:
the assurance given to doctors who induce the death of their patient at 
the patient’s request that they will not be criminally prosecuted, 
provided that they operate within the boundaries of and meet the 
criteria of the law. It is inexact to say that euthanasia has been legalized 
or that it has become a right.
Deontology and 
teleology:
the deontological perspective is concerned above all with obligations 
and duties (in a broader sense than a strictly legal interpretation) of the 
profession. The teleological perspective is more interested in results.
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Euthanasia: the act performed by a third party (a doctor) who intentionally puts an 
end to the life of a sick person at the person’s request. It involves 
administering orally or intravenously a substance or combination of 
substances with the intention of inducing death. Although certain 
authors use the term “lethal sedation” for a slower euthanasia, it is 
nonetheless clear that it is a form of euthanasia whose aim is contrary 






the implementation of disproportionate means with a view to 
prolonging a patient’s life. Since a cure is no longer possible, the 
burden of treatment is incommensurate with the expected beneficial 
effects.
Federal 





the organization charged with verifying whether a doctor’s act of 
euthanasia met the conditions and followed the procedure stipulated by 
the law.
Gastrostomy: a procedure implemented when oral feeding is no longer possible, 
involving the surgical opening of an orifice that communicates directly 
with the stomach, in order to supply the patient with suitably prepared 
nutrition. With the aid of the light of the gastroscope (a tube with a 
camera), the doctor makes an incision in the proper place in order to 
create an orifice that allows the feeding tube to be introduced. The 
orifice created in this way is known as a “percutaneous gastrostomy.”
Grief: the process undergone by everyone who experiences a loss. The classic 
stages of grief are denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and then 
ideally acceptance. Grief is experienced not only in the case of a 
deceased loved one. One may go through all the stages upon receiving 
various kinds of bad news: loss of employment, separation, chronic 
illness, loss of autonomy, or incurable illness. These stages are very 
upsetting for the person and those around him and can make support 
necessary.
Human dignity: 
There are two 
conflicting 
concepts:
  1.  Ontological dignity: a person has dignity by the very fact of his 
nature as a human being. Nothing can take away this dignity. It is 
the responsibility of health-care workers to provide the care and 
attention worthy of his quality of being human, to the very end.
  2.  Existential dignity: a concept that has to do with the image that a 
person has of himself. Accordingly, a person has dignity 
inasmuch as they are autonomous and have the capacity to 
function. For example, once one becomes dependent on another, 
one will have lost one’s dignity.





according to the law of 2002, this act cannot be called euthanasia and 
must be labeled as murder.
Medical restraint: the restriction of a patient’s mobility through physical or chemical 
means. Employed for various reasons, it can be criticized on ethical 
grounds when it reduces the freedom of the patient.
Morphine: a substance extracted from opium capable of relieving intense pain—by 
working on the central nervous system—and inducing sleep. When 




cancer of the bone marrow induced by the uncontrolled proliferation of 
a specific type of white blood cell, the plasmocytes. Normally, these 
cells specialize in making antibodies.
Pain management: the study of the physiology of pain in order to better treat and manage 
pain.
Palliative care: the monitoring and management of patients with an active, progressive 
disease, the stage of which is very advanced and the prognosis 
(expectation of recovery) is very poor. This form of care aims to 
maintain the quality of life by treating pain and other physical, 
psychological, and spiritual problems that are linked to it. The 




institutional health-care units that take patients into palliative care for a 
limited time. They consist of beds exclusively for the practice of 
palliative care and support. Admission is restricted to the patients 
whose situations are the most complex and/or most difficult, thus 
assuring a triple mission of care, teaching, and research. There exist 
also mobile palliative care teams and palliative care hubs that send 
health-care workers to the bedside of patients in other hospital services, 
to rest homes, or to patients’ homes. They are available to support and 
counsel the primary caregivers, that is, family doctors, nurses, and the 
families of the patients at the end of life.
Passive euthanasia: the withholding of commensurate treatment or care normally due, with 
the intention of putting an end to a person’s life. Strictly speaking, the 
expression “passive euthanasia” has no meaning, since it contradicts the 
sole legal definition of euthanasia (see “Euthanasia” above). What is 
called “passive euthanasia” is nothing other than the refusal to use 
extraordinary measures to prolong life (see “Therapeutic de-escalation” 
below). That being said, there are nonetheless criminal abstentions that 
are disguised cases of euthanasia.




Anorexia: the mental disorder of nutritional behavior, characterized by 
a refusal to maintain normal weight. The fear of becoming obese, or 
indeed simply fat, incites people who suffer from anorexia to follow 
very restrictive diets. They sometimes have episodes of bulimia or 
purging. In keeping with their distorted perception of reality, the 
anorexic person continually sees herself as fat in spite of her low 
weight.
Bipolar disorder:   variations of mood out of proportion with events. 
They attain such an intensity that the individual no longer perceives 
that their exuberant mood or their anger is out of bounds, or 
alternatively, that their depression is so deep that they are paralyzed by 
it and haunted by suicidal thoughts.
Borderline (“borderline personality disorder”):  a mode of generally 
unstable interpersonal relations, self-esteem, and feelings, with a 
marked impulsiveness that appears at the beginning of adulthood and 
is present in a variety of contexts. Borderline individuals make 
frenzied efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.
Obsessive compulsive disorder:  OCD is an anxiety disorder 
characterized by obsessions, compulsions, or both. In an attempt to 
repress their obsessions, the afflicted person feels obliged to engage in 
repeated gestures and compulsions; these are genuine rituals that can 
take up to several hours a day and that interfere in a significant way 
with the activities and relationships of the affected person.
Schizophrenia:   a disease of the brain defined as a loss of contact with 
reality, manifested by disturbances of certain mental functions. It is 
not an illness of the soul, nor a lack of will, nor a double personality 
(dissociative identity disorder), but rather a defect of certain nervous 
circuits of the brain.
Reformulation: ascertaining that what the patient has said has been properly understood, 
by restating what they have said and asking them if that is indeed what 
they meant. It is one of the key concepts of palliative care.
Sedation: palliative sedation reduces the awareness of the dying person by using 
medication to relieve their pain, their sensation of asphyxia, and/or 
their anguish. It is commensurate with the patient’s condition, is 
regularly reassessed, and is most often temporary. Although it is 
sometimes necessary to continue sedation until the patient’s death, it is 
in no way intended to accelerate their death.
Stroke (CVA): a stroke, or cerebrovascular accident (CVA), occurs when the flow of 
blood encounters an obstacle (either a blood clot, in the case of 
thrombosis, or the rupture of a blood vessel, in the case of a cerebral 
hemorrhage) that blocks its passage to the different parts of the brain, 
thus depriving the cerebral cells of their vital supply of oxygen, causing 
their dysfunction and then death within a few minutes. A stroke often 
entails the paralysis of a part of the body and/or a speech disorder.
Therapeutic 
de-escalation:
intentionally sparing patients burdensome treatments that they do not 
necessarily need in order to heal, with the intent of preserving their 
maximum quality of life; or intentionally offering patients the least 
burdensome effective treatments, with the intent of preserving their 
maximum quality of life. One also speaks of “commensurate care,” that 
is, care that is suited to meeting these new objectives. When healing is 
no longer possible, one prefers to stop invasive or painful treatments in 
order to make patients as comfortable as possible.
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